Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific

Marine Corps historian Joseph H. Alexander establishes that the two most unique combined arms forms of American naval warfare in the Second World War were the deployment of carrier task forces and long range amphibious operations against stiff opposition. He dubs the latter, "storm landings." Out of the hundreds of amphibious landings that took place in the Central Pacific during World War II, Alexander points out only those landings at Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa fall into this category. Alexander also discusses the proposed landings on Kyushu, in the spring of 1946, which was to be the greatest storm landing of them all. The author's exhaustive research makes this a significant addition to the study of amphibious operations. The three factors Alexander attributes to the success of these complex combined operations were: small unit leadership, logistics, and tactical mobility. Alexander brings to this work the technical specialization of a Marine Corps officer who had served twenty-nine years with amphibious units. His expertise is revealed in discussions throughout the book of such concepts as "situational awareness," combat loading, and the evolution of various types of landing craft developed during the Pacific campaigns. In his analysis of the small unit actions that exemplified the Pacific Campaign, Alexander praises the bravery and leadership at the squad and platoon level: "Tactical success in each case," writes Alexander, "required the leader to inspire small groups of disorganized men to overcome two inevitable characteristics of the assault beachhead-chaos and inertia." The author concludes that the battles waged in the Pacific in general and the aforementioned "storm landings" in particular had a direct influence in the outcome of the war. Alexander has scoured the Marine Corps archival material pertaining to the operations in the Pacific during World War II. The author has also made extensive use of private collections, oral histories, and post war studies. Sufficient maps, photographs, and tables pertaining to various weapons and equipment round out this refreshing study of a uniquely American contribution to victory in World War II. My main critique, however, is that Alexander presents a weak argument when he tries to compare storm landings in the pacific with similar large-scale operations in Europe. Alexander claims storm landings differed from landings made on Sicily and Normandy because, in both cases, those were jointly executed with Airborne drops and culminated in a long ranging campaigns. Sicily, up to that time (July 1943), the largest amphibious operation of the war, was also an island that had to be conquered. The accompanying airborne operation on Sicily, was, unfortunately a debacle, though the paratroopers fought bravely once they were finally organised in land. The operation's only connection to a long ranging campaign was a preamble to the arduous struggle up the Italian boot. Simila

This book is about the landings the Marines made in WWII against Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa. The author defines storm landings as large, risky, long range, self sustaining assaults executed against strong opposition and within the protective umbrella of fast carrier task forces. After Gallipoli in WWI, the Marines and Navy tried to figure out what went wrong, and could amphibious landings be possible in the future. Yet Ike in 1950, before the Inchon landing in Korea said that an amphibious landing is no big deal, just point the boats in the right direction. Ike, while he planned it, was not at Normandy. Had he been, he never would have said such a thing. Training books were written, and in the 1930's the Marines began amphibious landing exersizes, with the backing of Gen Holland Smith, who insisted on realistic training. He helped Higgins develop the design of the Higgins boat. The Japs had a lot of amphibious training as they had invaded several Chinese ports as well as Indo China. The Japs landed 10,000 troops at Shanghi in 1932, and it would be 10 years before we could do that. The Japs did amphibious landings on Guam, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Gilberts, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomons. At the battle of the points in Luzon, Mac Arthur threw the Japs back into the sea. The most embarrassing setback was the Jap attack at Wake Island. The Japs were better at night fighting. The pulled troops our of Kiska, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, at night. In 1942 Marine General Vandegrift said that landings should not be made against opposition. Lot's of other military commanders agreed with himm including MacArthur, who thought that land based aircraft were needed to support an invasion. In 1938 Gen Thomas told Congress he could defend Guam against 60,000 Japs if they gave him some money for fortifying the island. Congress refused, so the Japs were able to take the island easily. To conquer reefs, the tracked landing craft had to be used. Higgins boats needed 3-4 feet of water, and reefs were exposed during low tide, especially at Tarawa. Higgins boats could land where there were no exposed reefs, so quadrupled the ability of Marines to land in places other than ports. The allies tried two large amphibious raids. Dieppe and Makin. Neither did very well. The Makin raid worked well, but Carlson left 9 men on the Island, and the Japs caught and beheaded them. The Japs also knew by that raid that we were coming, and started fortifying the islands. Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, proved that we could land large forces against defended territory. War planners overlooked the smaller but opposed landings at Gavabutu and Tanambogo. Lack of training was apparent, lack of naval gunfire support, lack of intelligence on what was on shore. Troops could not communicate with each other. With no lessons learned passed on, the same thing happened at Ta

Once again Retired Col. Joseph Alexander has penned a superb text. In "Storm Landings" he captures the essence of seven violent island assaults and the planning of a eighth; Kyushu in the Japanese home islands. These epic battles spearheaded by Marines were the core of the Central Pacific drive. Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, amphibious landings all, were distinguished as storm landings by the Japanese commanders. They were so called as they contained six additional elements: extreme danger, long-ranged, large scaled, self-sustaining, against defended positions under the protection of fast carrier forces. Col. Alexander's strength is his prodigious research skills and an ability to preceive the over all connection between diverse elements. Drawing on these skills the author reflects on the five separate landings on D-Day, Guadalcanal. In an interesting introduction to the main battles, Alexander notes that on Gavutu and Tanambogo the 1st Parachute Battalion, subsequently reinforced by B Co. 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, engaged in the first opposed landings. To Alexander's perceptive eye, the Gavutu-Tanambogo landings represented a microcosm of opposed landings to come. All were violent, relatively short, thoroughly decisive and always bloody. One can not read this work without coming away with a profound awareness of the increasingly fierce determination of the Japanese defenders the closer the din of combat came to the Japanese home land. 100,000 Japanese died defending Okinawa along with 150,000 native Okinawans. On Kyushu alone, 600,000 defenders awaited the invasion force that was to come but for the bomb. Obviously, for both combatants, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, were saved.The epilogue, quoting war correspondent Robert Sherrod adds, "...no man who saw Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa would agree that all the American steel was in the guns and bombs. There was a lot, also, in the hearts of the men who stormed the beaches." Lt.Col. Robertson after watching the Marines landing at Iwo Jima during the worst of the shelling asked himself, "What impels a young guy landing on a beach from the very first craft in the face of fire?" Reading this book, Marine or not, one has a deeper understanding of the answer to that question. It lies in the Hallmark of Marine pride: "Semper Fidelis".

The debacle of the British amphibious assault at Gallipoli during WWI caused conventional wisdom to say that amphibious assaults were too risky and too bloody to attempt. Between the wars, the Marine Corps developed a theory for making them work. They tested and refined this theory in the bloody crucibles of Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Pelileu, and Iwo Jima, with their magnum opus being Okinawa. Success came at a high price, and Alexander pulls no punches in describing the horror.As a teenager, I once expressed the opinion that it was wrong to drop The Bomb on Japan. My father, a veteran of the Third Marine Division who saw combat at Bougainville, Guam, and Iwo Jima, quickly informed me that I would never have been born if The Bomb had not been dropped. The Third Marine Division had been chosen to spearhead the amphibious assault on Kyushu, an isle of the Japanese homeland, and my father sincerely believes that he would not have survived the assault. Alexander dissects the plans for that invasion, and sums up the anticipated carnage. The assaults from Tarawa to Iwo Jima had this in common. Each was bloodier than the last. Kyushu promised to be a mini-Armaggedon. We can never really know what the bodycount would have been had The Bomb not been dropped. From Alexander's description of what was expected to happen at Kyushu, one could make the case that the death toll would have been much, much higher, both in Japanese and American lives.

Colonel Joseph Alexander's book is an analysis of seven Marine amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II. In his book, "Storm Landings," Alexander lets the reader see these battles through the planning and tactical stages of the Marine and Navy generals and admirals -- as well as the Marines who made the landings. This historical document contains a wealth of data and information, but at the same time is rich in describing the chaos, noise, suffering, and uncertainty of all these storm landings. (Tarawa came very close to being lost.) I particularly remember the words of a Marine batallion commander on Iwo Jima who described the firepower facing the Marines: "I could have lit a cigarette on the stuff going by." The Marines made mistakes, large and small, in these landings, but they studied them and learned from them. For instance, the Marines learned that the hiatus in Navy barrages just before the landings allowed the enemy to regroup and adjust. They learned to get the men ashore more quickly, obtained more efficient landing vessels, and developed weapons suited to the conditions, such as flamethrowers. This book is particularly interesting, since Alexander had access to Japanese documents showing how the Japanese prepared for, and learned from, the assaults. The Japanese moved their defenses from the water's edge, dug intricate tunnels, eliminated mass counterattacks which had proved unproductive, and instead calibrated their mortars and artillery to kill the Marines once they were on the beach. The author makes a hard analysis of these seven amphibious landings and it must have taken some courage on his part to criticize some of those at the highest levels for their mistakes, for even dead generals and admirals have friends and relative whose anger might be brought to bear on a retired colonel. "Storm Landings" is a rare historical book, for it captures the big picture, contains an abundance of relevant detail, gives an inside view of how the Japanese were dealing with these landings, plus it captures the experiences of the Marines who participated in these incredible military maneuvers.