Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45

Tuchman wrote "Stillwell and the American Experience in China" during the waning years of the Vietnam war, and it is difficult not to draw a straight line between Stillwell's frustrations with Chiang Hai-Shek and the Johnson/Nixon administrations' later projects in Indochina. Stillwell was in charge of the China relationship, with coordinating mainland China operations against the Japanese Imperial Army with the more fruitful (if almost just as frustrating) campaigns in Burma. Much is made of Eisenhower's career as a diplomat-general but Stillwell was even more the proconsular figure; constantly shuttling between the Nationalist court and the other allies. Not only is Tuchman scathing on the subject of Chaing and his Lady MacBeth wife, she is also deeply skeptical of British motives throughout the Burma campaign. Of all the fronts in World War Two, the Chinese theater is easily the most complicated, and this is the best work, in English, on the topic.

This book is about a period that is both so important and yet largely neglected in American education. The book is quite easy to read with its strong steady narrative flow, its interest in the personalities at play as well as its study of the background of their struggles. Since the book came out around the time of the Vietnam War, I assumed it would be more anti-American foreign policy in tone than it is. It's quite balanced. Tuchman obviously regards Stilwell as the hero of the tale. It's hard to come to any other conclusion about this deeply humble but brilliant, unwearying but always frustrated man. Yet she is quite fair in assessing the difficulties faced by Stilwell's close-to-home antagonist, Chiang Kai Shek. She is also not sparing in describing the courage, success and tactical genius of Claire Chennault, whose (clearly wrong-headed) conception of the War was opposed to that of Stilwell.The story of America in China in WWII and its aftermath is so fascinating, so HUGELY important - and still so relatively little publicized - especially in relation to the affairs of MacArthur, Nimitz and Halsey in the Pacific or Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton in Europe. I long for a movie that will show the fascinating struggle among Stilwell, Chiang, and Chennault in relation to the Japanese and Mao's Communists. It can be said that America's foreign policy in 1943-50 has far less immediate impact in post Cold War Europe today than in Japan, China, Burma, and Indonesia. America's two costly wars since WWII have been in Asia. This book gives a wonderful background to anyone interested in how did the existing state of affairs in China come to pass? America was intimately involved - particularly two Americans - 1) Claire Lee Chennault, a maverick Cajun from Louisiana who resigned from the American Air Force in rage at their refusal to adopt his revolutionary views on fighters and bombing - and became the head of China's Air Force in 1937; 2) Joseph Stilwell, an upper middle class WASP from a family that went back to the early 1600s, who had been intimately involved with China since the 1920s. It's just a great story, and it's unlikely you know much of it.

Two-time Pulitzer prize winner Barbara Tuchman may be the pre-eminent historian of our age. What makes her so good isn't just superior scholarship, but superior presentation - she's eminently readable. She has an eye for anecdote and a lively sense of humor that frequently has the reader laughing. My intent here is both to discuss General Joe Stilwell and to provide a taste of Tuchman for the uninitiated.General George Marshall, who directed America's war effort, considered Stilwell his best corps commander before the war. But Stilwell never commanded US formations in Europe, where he would have excelled. Reading of his personal habits and professional preparation, one is reminded of Erwin Rommel. Had Stilwell been at Kasserine Pass, things might have turned out very differently than they did.Stilwell never got to WWII Europe because he was also the US Army's best Orientalist at a time when his skills were needed to train the Chinese Army to fight the murderous Japanese invaders. Stilwell had a high regard for the Chinese soldier as fighting material; but his fate was to work at the highest levels, with Chiang Kai-shek and Company, and his impatience and refusal to accept the second-rate made for tough sledding during the Kuomintang era of corruption, ineptitude, and clashing cultures (Chinese and other powers') that set the stage for the Communist takeover following WWII. At every turn, Stilwell's attempts to get the Chinese Army on its feet were frustrated by Chiang's double-dealing. There were cultural reasons for this-the identical problem would later frustrate US efforts in Vietnam-but it seems an unusually cruel fate for one of Stilwell's disposition to have to deal with it.Just as devilish, for other reasons, were his allies. Stilwell detested the British, and Tuchman seems unimpressed by them, also. "No nation has ever produced a military history of such verbal nobility as the British. Retreat or advance, win or lose, blunder or bravery, murderous folly or unyielding resolution, all emerge clothed in dignity and touched with glory. Every engagement is gallant, every battle a decisive action, every campaign produces generalship hailed as the most brilliant of the war. Other nations attempt but never quite achieve the same self-esteem. It was not by might but by the power of her self-image that Britain in her century dominated the world."Americans and Brits of course had to work together in the CBI, and friction was continuous, as much because of personal pique as differing institutional approaches to leadership. "Mountbatten took an intense interest in publicity, especially his own. When he visited the troops he liked to give an impression of `spontaneous vitality.' He would drive up in his jeep, vault nimbly, jump agilely onto a packing case carefully placed in advance, and deliver `an absolutely first class and apparently impromptu speech-simple, direct and genuinely inspiring. The men loved it.'"Stilwell did things differently. A direct

This book explodes the myths and misconceptions of the American people during a time of great upheaval in China and Southeast Asia. It lays out the mistakes and misunderstandings of the America leaders and statesmen in trying to work with the real and supposed leaders of China. Covering the final times of Chinese Warlords through the times of Sun Yat Sen, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and into WWII with the Nationalist Chinese and Mao's Communist movement, this book reveals all of the history and understanding that only Barbara Tuchman is equipped to accomplish. This book holds no punches and exposes the many mistakes made by American leaders, who did not listen to Stilwell, in making foreign policy in an area of the world where foreign policy and gamesmanship was created and practiced to a high art. For example, Madame Chaing's propaganda trips to the US is an excellent example of how the American people and its leaders were duped into believing that the Nationalist Chinese were doing all they could to fight off the Japanese. When in reality they stockpiled the weaponry supplied by the US for their battles against Mao's Communists instead of their intended use against Japan. Ms. Tuchman enlightens the reader that when the Communists and Mao took control of China their hatred of the US for supporting the Nationalist Chinese was a foregone conclusion. Ms. Tuchman's coverage of the China, Burma, India (CBI) theater is masterful as well as her handling of "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell. "Vinegar" Joe is a General more skillfull, humble and knowledgeable than any US General to have ever held the rank. He was a master of winning battles and achieving success with the poorest health conditions, meagerest of men, supplies and support. If Joe Stilwell had the support given to Eisenhower or MacArthur, "Vinegar" Joe would have been recognized as one of America's greatest Generals. But then again, Joe Stilwell was a humble man who got the job done and didn't much care who got the credit. It is unfortunate that Ms Tuchman is no longer with us. This one book (which I have read three times) lays the ground work for understanding Asia and the thinking processes of its leadership in the present world.