Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy

This book provides the most balanced and detailed review of the fighting in Normandy that I have ever read. Other books about the same subject from both German and British viewpoints often contain bias and foggy memory. The British are particulary famous for re-writing historical defeats as victories. That is why we have the "Miracle at Dunkirk" instead of the disaster in France and why Montgomery's failed initial attack in Normandy became a "holding action" with failure blamed on the Americans. Montgomery even tried to claim the disastrous "Market Garden" operation was a glorious success! This seems to be the official opinion at Sandhurst. On the other hand, many German commanders fought in multiple theaters without significant pause and went through the trauma of American war crimes trials or endured horrible conditions in Russian prisons. They could not write anything down in prison. Years later, they tried to remember what happened in 1944 without implicating themselves in any wrongdoing. The solution? Blame Hitler for defeats and skip over details that may seem inglorius. This book is excellently organized and includes detailed descriptions of the fighting in Normandy 1944. It is refreshingly balanced. The allies won because they had an overwhelming advantage in air power and artillery. This is a lesson that America learned well, but the Birtish still don't seem to understand. (Someone needs to write a book about this.) In hand to hand fighting, when air power and artillery could not be used, the Allies often were stopped despite a huge disparity in the number of Allied attackers versus German defenders. Many Brittish commanders made poor decisions based on rigid tactics, poor planning, and overconfidence. Germans were unable to deal with air interdiction and could not concentrate by moving into defensive positions. Rommel understood the air power threat, but von Rundstedt, Dollman, and others clearly did not. Use this book to put all the other books about Normandy into perspective.

In his second book Michael Reynolds gives an excellent acount of the hard battles in the Caen/Falaise sector just after D-Day. First he starts with a short history, the organisation and the tactics used by I SS Pz Corps (consisting of the 1st SS Pz Div "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 12th SS Pz Div "Hitlerjugend"). After that Reynolds gives a very detailed account (including unit designations, commanders, equipment and losses) of the desperate battle fought by this corps against a numerical superior unit. Along the way Reynolds destroys some myths surrounding the Waffen SS. Eyewitness-accounts make the story very graphic and give an idea what the fighting must have been like. The maps used are adequate and make it easier to follow the fluid battle for the tiny villages, forests and ridges. My conclusion of the battle: The German Waffen SS was far superior in fighting spirit and tactics. The commanders, from NCO to the highest officers really knew how to lead and inspire their men. They lost because they were numerical not as strong as the allies and could not make up for lost personnel and equipment.On the whole the book is easy to read and - in my humble opinion - not to dry or academic (as some reviewers have suggested). I would recommend this book to every amateur historician interested in WW-II and every NCO and officer, especially if he trains to lead people in combat.

In his second book thematically centered on the vaunted 1st SS Panzer Corps, retired British Army Major General Michael Reynolds has produced one of the most erudite military histories of the twentieth century. This salient feature alone is sufficient reason why enthusiasts of maneuver warfare should consider this book. In addition, Reynolds also highlights the significant role airpower played in driving the Wehrmacht back through France in the weeks following the Normandy beach landings.It is noteworthy that Reynolds' breadth is not delimited to the 1st SS Panzer Corps, but covers tactical movements, battlefield objectives, and terrain analysis issues of all contending armies. Hence, at both the operational and tactical levels, lessons abound, and the key to battlefield success was how effective either side exploited time, terrain, and the ability to apply combined arms warfare. So circumstanced, the Germans were tactically successful - amidst impending operational defeat - because they better employed infantry/armor integration, acting upon the urgency to launch counterattacks against Allied battlefield encroachments. Yet overall, German battlefield achievements proved diminutive, for they were continually driven to retrench eastward.How did the Allies fare? As Reynolds states, the problem with many of the Allied commanders - particularly British and Canadian - was that they "displayed none of the panache, drive, imagination or willingness to take risks" found in their German counterparts (133). Due to lack of aggressiveness on the part of some commanders, they inexplicably paused to go on the defensive in the midst of a successful offensive. Sometimes Allied plans were askew from the start, with only battalion-strength units hurled against much heavier and entrenched SS forces. Time and again, Allied commanders did not follow-up their dearly- won, time-critical advantages while their enemies stood incredulous over their adversary's inefficiency, hesitation, and poor judgement. Through errors of this character, thousands of Germans were able to escape the Falaise pocket, as Allied commanders failed to coordinate between components, or showed a lack of urgency, misapplying their armor, "making the task of blocking German escape routes difficult by day and impossible at night" (336). However, though the ratio of Allied casualties to German in the fighting in the critical Caen area (for instance) was more than six-to-one, Allied manpower superiority held sway. It was this pivotal factor that weighed heavily in critically depleting German manpower. In retrospect, how were the Germans able to perform so effectively, especially without air supremacy or air superiority? As Reynolds illustrates, it was "weapons handling, marksmanship, fieldcraft, camouflage and night operations, coupled with physical toughness, self control and a sense of camaraderie...[that] created a very formidable fighting machine" (42). Furt

Reynolds has produced a superb book, full of detail, anecdotes and information. Well worth it. Buy the paperback and save a lot. It's so cheap you shouldn't think about it if you are even vaguely interested in the Normandy campaign.

This exemplary unit- and campaign-history; thoroughly researched, well organized, and well written, provides a wealth of detail in a compelling narrative to give a complete picture of some of the most dramatic battles of World war Two. General Reynolds, himself a combat veteran, handles the controversies in an admirably clear-eyed and even-handed manner, giving soldiers their due regardless of nationality but not fearing to confront the war crimes which have forever marred the reputations of otherwise brave and dedicated. fighters. With photos, bibliogrphy, useful organizational appendices, and a splendid index, this work will not disappoint the most exacting reader of military history. Highly recommended. (The numerical rating above is an unfortunately ineradicable feature of this website. This reviewer does not employ numerical ratings.)