State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century

Weak or failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan are quietly causing some of the world's most pressing problems and will continue to do so, according to political analyst Francis Fukuyama. In this elegant, sobering critique based on his 2003 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, Fukuyama uses a simple, two-dimensional model of "stateness" to analyze why states fail. He focuses on what countries can do, rather than using some theoretical model of what they ought to do. Fukuyama describes the supply of and demand for government institutions, why states often don't deliver what their "customers" want and the organizational pathologies that prevent developing nations from "getting to Denmark," development theory parlance for achieving an efficient, transparent and legitimate government. Overall, the book is a mixed bag, mostly filled with solid diagnoses, but sometimes merely providing gooey think tank truisms. Nevertheless, we recommend this brief, skeptical examination to anyone who wants to understand one of the huge challenges of twenty-first century statecraft: how to prevent weak states from exacerbating such problems as AIDS, famine, poverty, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

One of the main contributions of this book is the underappreciated distinction between state-building and nation-building. Anyone interested in democractic nation-building ought to consider reading this volume. A clear analysis with obvious implications for American policy in places like Iraq. This is part of an increasing body of work on nation building that, collectively taken together, provides a good handle on the difficulties in creating democracy where previously there was none (and see the work of Paris, Dobbins, Somit, etc.)

Neocon apostate Francis Fukuyama has always been more of a social scientist than an ideologue. In his recent well-publicized falling-out with the movement on the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq, he has dealt neoconservatism a heavy blow. In this book, he cautions those who believe that democracy or good governance can be transplanted to weak or failing states. Since 9/11 there has been much discussion about weak or failing states and the threat they pose to international security. It is true that the instablity that is created can no longer be ignored by the international community. Fukuyama addresses many of the problems that we face in attempting to strengthen weak states or building them from the ground up. Fukuyama makes an important distinction between state-building and nation-building. Outsiders cannot build nations in the sense of creating all the social, cultural, and historical bonds that hold a nation together. State-building, however, is more limited in scope: it seeks only to strengthen government institutions such as the army, the police force, the judiciary, and the central bank, the bare minimum to make a state self-sustaining. Fukuyama distinguishes between the strength and scope of government power. It is important that the state be strong in order to provide security and stability so that institutional capacity can be built. It is also important that government be limited in scope in order for private markets to flourish. Outsiders should not replace local institutions - this has always been the sin of aid organizations. This is why, for example, in Africa one finds aid organizations still in place 20 or 30 years after they arrive, they have destroyed all the local institutional capacity. The first phase of state-building is relatively easy: it consists of creating stability, offering humanitarian assisstance, and jump-starting the economy. The second phase is more difficult: it consists of creating self-sustaining political and economic institutions that will be conducive to good governance and economic growth. Self-sustaining is the key word. Outsiders who intervene cannot exit unless there are viable institutions left behind. Fukuyama is very critical of the Bush administration's post-war efforts in Iraq. When the regime of Saddam Hussein was destroyed the state collapsed completely, there was a complete breakdown of public order. As with all totalitarian systems there was no civil society to take up the slack. What was initially a liberation devolved quickly into chaos and looting. And to make matters worse, the Department of Defence was put in charge of reconstruction. The State Department with its expertise in civil affairs was kept out of the picture. Neocons - Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz - were always distrustful of the State Department, they considered it compromised, almost as bad as the UN. The only problem was the Department of Defence had no knowledge or capacity for state-building. Observers al

Fukuyama will probably always be identified by the title of his first book---The End of History and the Last Man---but as this book demonstrates, he has moved on to tackle some of the most difficult problems facing our country today. This book, which is really a long essay , analyzes the problems and opportunities of state building, and reaches some conclusions which are not particlarly optimistic, but nevertheless seem to be realistic. Fukuyama revisits some of our past experiences in similar endeavors, and notes our failures as well as the limited successes we have had. This book should be required reading by all decision makers as our nation struggles to overcome our mistakes and failures in the aftermath of the Iraqi War. It is an excellent, even great book, written by a brilliant scholar in language which is easily grasped and appreciated.

Less government is to be preferred as a rule, however when no societal or cultural constructs or traditions exist to provide a framework for organized positive behavior, governmental organizations are to be preferred to chaos. In many areas of the world the infrastructure is not able to cope with either the problems facing the population or the volume of help offered by the relief agencies. The situation is further complicated by the imposition of aid structures by the relief agencies that compete with the existing frameworks for available resources. According to Fukuyama , keeping civil society from degenerating into simple rent-seeking interest groups is dependent more on the nature of that civil society than the design of its institutions. The Westphalian model of the nation-state implying state sovereignty has been challenged many times in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. It is unreasonable to accept the breach of sovereignty for humanitarian reasons, but not to prevent security threats, implying that defense of others is more legitimate than self-defense. Fixing this problem leads to the physical intervention in other states and the reform of their governments in order to eliminate them as a threat and prevent new threats from emerging. This is nation-building. Nation-building , to be effective , must create state services that can be effective after foreign support is withdrawn. Successful examples have been Germany and Japan after WWII due to strong bureaucratic populations that survived the disruption of war and occupation. Other examples are India, Singapore and Hong Kong, for the British, Taiwan and Korea for the Japanese. Fukuyama stresses the need for international aid organizations to make structural capacity building their primary concern rather than simple short-term crisis solving He is not optimistic since aid organizations or any other interested constituencies want to show quantifiable results to justify their efforts. Due to their competitive advantages, aid organizations marginalize locals and reduce the effectiveness of existing societal chiefs. The result is non-sustainability of their structures. Sustainability is still the goal and should be attempted. That being said, empowering local organizations at the lowest level possible to implement the policies is recommended as is the clear statement of organizational policies and objectives throughout the organization. Fukuyama further favors the use of small NGOs who can be more efficient than governments to implement policy and can make more effective use of local knowledge. The overall goals of state-building should be to create self-sustaining structures that can maintain order, security, accountability, education, and the rule of law. Finally Fukuyama contrasts the European universalist world view with that of Americans. He says that Europeans see the state as a guardian of public interest separate from and superior t