Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing

I first learned about Spies for Hire from various people I follow on Twitter, who were amazed Dana Priest and William Arkin didn't cite it in their Top Secret America series. I decided to see (or rather, read) for myself, and can now say having read both the book and the Priest/Arkin articles that yes, Shorrock was all over this story years ago, and in far greater depth than the Post piece, which functioned largely as an update of what Shorrock had already reported in this book and elsewhere. I don't have a problem with the Post updating Shorrock's reporting, but it's pretty lame of them to pretend they weren't in his debt. Anyway, if you care about the corporatism that's slowly strangling our democracy, there's no better book I know of than this one. The conclusion was especially powerful. Highly recommended.

Tim Shorrock has dared to go where no journalist has gone before and explores new paradigms and issues that will be here for years to come: the explosive new world of privatized intelligence gathering and analysis. No doubt, this important work will become a landmark reference.

This book appears to be a compilation of articles that together reveal the excessive use of private contractors by the major agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). According to its author, the IC public officials in many cases have abdicated their duties to the public in favor of private contractors whose loyalties are divided between the public good and corporate profits. In any type of expose' it has to be asked how accurate are the charges and is the author really providing the whole story? Well the answer in this case is yes and no. The close relationship between the mega U.S. intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA) and private contractors is indisputable. What this book tries to do, but fails, is show this relationship is also corrupt and dangerous to national security. He does provide many examples of intelligence agency employees moving to the private sector and lavish use of contractors on key intelligence agency projects. Yet he clearly has not spent much time considering the real problems affecting contractor-intelligence client relations. First there are really three types of contractors currently serving the IC. The first are that body of contractors who provide consulting, advisory, and training services. The second are those contractors that provide technical support services such as development of information systems, IT infrastructure construction or enhancement, and other services that the clients lack the in-house expertise to perform. Finally there are the contractors who supply staffing for the core functions of collection and analysis, because their clients don't have the in-house personnel to fill all of the billets that they are authorized. This latter use of contractors for core mission assignments is the most often criticized by folks within and out of the IC. But as with all things there are two views of this. For example, John Brennan President of The Analysis Corporation (former CIA officer, mentioned in this book) is in point of fact an honest and patriotic IC contractor who strongly supports the use of contractors to fill core positions. Of course that is his business, but he appears sincere in this belief. (This reviewer had a polite dust-up with Brennan on this issue and ended up agreeing to disagree). In the end, the use of any type of contractor by the IC is a neutral phenomenon. Contrary to the contentions in this book, contractors while wishing to make a profit also generally want what is best for their clients. Their clients really want to meet their mission requirements and look to contractors to help them accomplish this. The problem with the concept of out-sourcing lays with the execution not the concept itself. Far too often it turns out that the clients are not competent to draw up the technical requirements or do not understand the goals they are articulating. And too often contractors will take the money without pushing back and telling their requirements are worthless (po

Edit of 4 Jun 08 to strongly recommend Retired Reader's review as a companion to my own observations. I sat down with this book today and found it absorbing. It is perhaps the best overview for anyone of names and numbers associated with the $60 billion (or more, perhaps as much as $75 billion) a year we waste on the 4% we can steal, and next to nothing on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The book loses one star for failing to integrate over 300 relevant books (see the annotated bibliographies to my first two books), and for failing to apply any visualization at all. This book is a mass of facts and figures, names and places. With or without visualization, it is a seminal reference point and recommended for all university and public libraries. The book focuses mostly on technical waste--the inputs--and does not cover outputs nor constituencies. The reality is as General Zinni has put it so well: the IC produces 4% of what is needed, at a cost so horrendously wasteful as to warrant severe outrage among all taxpayers. Having read the book, I can state that the author's agenda, if he has one, is to expose the risk to our civil liberties of creating a national surveillance state in which the bulk of the expertise is outside the government and subject to corruption and cronyism as well as lack of oversight. Here are three tid-bits that strongly support the author's general intent, and some links. 1) Secret intelligence scam #1 is that there is no penalty for failure. Lockheed can build a satellite system that does not work (for NASA as well as the secret world--two different failures--or get the metrics wrong so priceless outer space research does not deploy a parachute--}and get another contract. Similarly SAIC with Trailblazer, CACI in Iraq, Blackwater murdering civilians and ramming old men in old cars out of the way, this is all a total disgrace to America. 2) "Butts in seats" means that most of our money goes to US citizens with clearances who know nothing of the real world, *and* the contractor gets 150% of their salary as "overhead." That is scam #2. 3) Scam #3 is that the so-called policy world, when it exists, does not really care what the secret world has to say, unless it justifies elective wars, secret prisons in the US (Halliburton) and so on. Dick Cheney ended the policy process in this administration. But even without Cheney and his gang of proven liars, the dirty little secret of the secret world is that a) there is no one place where all information comes together to be made sense of; and b) less than 1% of what we collect gets looked at by a human; and c) most of the policy world could care less what Top Secret Codeword information is placed before them--as Colin Powell says so memorably in his autobiography, he preferred the Early Bird compilation of news clippings. I have been saying since 1988 that the secret emperor is not just naked, but institutionalized lunacy. Books like this are helpful, eventually

Rather than reinvent the wheel, I'm going to quote liberally from an excellent full-length review of this book from blogger Meteor Blades at Daily Kos: "Spies for Hire is one of those books so brimful of detail, including mergers and acquisitions by intelligence companies, that one wishes for coded links and two or three charts illustrating the career trajectories and corporate genealogy of a couple dozen of the key players." Another reviewer told an unsourced anecdote about an intelligence contractor who was downsized into driving a limo. Well, consider the story of neocon visionary Stephen Cambone. A charter member of PNAC, Cambone was appointed as the undersecretary of defense for intelligence at the Pentagon, a position of immense power and influence, which was forged from the conflict between Rumsfeld and the CIA. "Among his other duties was overseeing "Copper Green," the interrogations, much of them by private contractors, of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Cambone was so widely despised and feared at the Pentagon that an Army general had jokingly said that "if he had one round left in his revolver, he would take out Steve Cambone," according to the Washington Post's Thomas Ricks." When Rumsfeld was forced out of his job, his loyal retainer, Cambone was shown the exit a few months later, in January of 2007. However, Cambone did not end up driving a limousine: "In January 2008, the Pentagon's Counter-Intelligence Field Agency granted a $30 million contract to the Missions Solutions Group of QinetiQ North America...Just two months before that contract was awarded, QinetiQ hired a new vice president for strategy. His name is Stephen Cambone." So, why is this book a must-read? I'll leave you with one more quote from a different source: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together." --Dwight D. Eisenhower