Somalia on $5 a Day: A Soldier's Story

This is another good book by Martin Stanton. You really get a feel for Somalia pre-Black Hawk Down. It demonstrates why there is so much trouble in Somalia and other countries in the horn of Africa. This would be a good read for anyone who wants to help fix the Horn of Africa.

I am currently reading this book and see how it would be hard to follow if you have never Served in the Military. But i think Major Stanton did an excellent job explaining Military terminology. As to the facts of this book i know they are accurate from first hand experience. Unfortunately when writing a book you must consolidate your facts, and day to day stories otherwise you would have a thousand page manual on you hands. If you are interested in Somali History and the US involvement that lead up to the Black Hawk Down Tragedy this is the book for you. As far as Ray's comment from Washington DC , he is correct 3/14th INF was the first Unit in Kismayu starting in Dec. 22, 1992 until Mar. 18, 1993. But the 2/87 INF was the first 10th Mountain Div Unit in Country. We were based in Marka 45 minutes to an hour and a half South of Mogadishu ( The Mog ). I would also recommend you read Black Hawk Down, that was an excellent book. I just wish i new about Somalia on $ 5 dollars a day before i read Black Hawk down, because these two books amazingly go hand to hand.

Having just finished Somalia on ...Five Dollars a day, I was curious what others had to say about it. ....However, it was the criticisms from the other customer reviewers that got my attention.... Starting on the bottom of page 204 and continuing on page 205, the author talks about who was in Kismayu in December of 1992. ... Somalia on ...Five Dollars a day is closer to the day-to-day life of soldiers in a combat zone than Black Hawk Down. Stanton also supplied a glossary in the back of the book for the acronym-challenged ("like to use letters for everything you do").... When you work closely with people in a dangerous and difficult environment men pull together. It's not called "band of brothers" for nothing. Besides, this style of saying nice things about soldiers you're around is reminiscent of SLA Marshal's books.The tear gas / pepper spray is another point. To say pepper spray is allowed and not provide it is the same thing as having CS (tear gas) and prohibit its use. Stanton preferred using tear gas, which he had, to using bayonets and bullets Also, the effectiveness of pepper spray is in question. In Cincinnati last year, despite pepper spray, a criminal took a police officer's gun and killed him with it. This topic does need to be addressed in military writing. Somalia on Five Dollars a day is the most relevant book for the young troop leader or staff officer serving in Afghanistan and Bosnia. This book, and the USMC Small Wars Manual (if you can find a copy) supplement the junior officer's formal military instruction in this type of warfare.Anyone interested in this period of US military history should have this book in their library.

National Geographic's current July 2002 issue contains a good article, " Somalia, A Failed State?" that shows how little things have changed in Somalia from10 years ago, when prompted by CNN's coverage of chaos and mass starvation, President Bush sent over 10,000 American soldiers, called Operation Restore Hope, in a move to save the Somali's from themselves. Because this tragic man made famine was mostly the result of gang-clan fighting and seedy warlord power grabs. One early account of the US involvement in Somalia, by then US Army Major Martin Stanton gives a good idea of what it was like to be there. Stanton's, "Somalia on $5 a Day, a Soldier's Story" is an excellent telling of the his unit's part in the huge task of attempting to provide a measure of security to the Somali people and to the NGO's and UN organizations providing food to them, who at that very time where being harassed, robbed, murdered by bandits and armed gangs. A complicated task was required of Stanton and his fellow soldiers, requiring skills of a soldier, a diplomat, an anthropologist and a humanitarian aid worker to secure feeding sites, food warehouses, roads, airports and towns in coordination with other American and foreign units including Pakistanis, Belgians, etc. Dealing with reporters and charitable groups. Dealing with the mob actions instigated and provoked by warlords while holding to high standards of the rules of engagement on dealing with civilians who were used as pawns in the warlords power games. And, yes killing bandits. This is an excellent history and personal account of this deployment. The book contains many funny and bizzare snapshots of life, in Stanton's words, a "Mad Max World". Stanton is generous in his recognition of his men and his fellow officier's role in the operation. Technical and post operation analysis are contained in the book which would could be helpful for professional soldiers in dealing in similar tribal societies such as Afganistan where the expectations placed on the miitary may be ever increasing. Stanton showed himself to be a man who brought calm intelligence, practical and tactical skills, common sense and an ability to learn from experience to help accomplish his part in this effort. He has a good feel for history and a good enough sense of irony not to let it all get to him. I thought the book a worthwhile read and a credit to the US Army. If you want to learn something about a place like Somalia or similar places where we are now engaged, read this book. Did Stanton think the effort worth it? You'll have to read the book.

Stanton provides a welcome perspective on the U.S. Army's involvement in Operation Restore Hope, Somalia, Dec 92 - May 93. As an operations officer (S-3) with a battalion in the 10th Mountain Division, Stanton brings us an insider's account of the units preparations for and experiences in Somalia both thoughtful in perspective and engaging in its personal nature. We are given a feel for the administrative challenges faced in preparing for and executing a deployment, the personalities and roles of elements in the unit, and how the unit confronted the complex challenges that Somalia presented. I especially appreciated Stanton's thoughtful discussion of tactical lessons following several of the incidents he was personally engaged in. Stanton also provides an interesting case that hightlights the difficulties of centralizing command even in our information rich age. The unit had a questionable report of a hostage situation (turned out to be a rather confrontational labor pay dispute) that higher headquarters blew out of proportion. The battalion had to expend much energy keeping the Joint Task Force from sending in hostage rescue forces while the battalion should have been allowed to focus on determining what was going on and whether it needed additional (outside) support for resolving the crisis (which it didn't). Communications improvements create the impression of perfect knowledge throughout the military and political command structure -- this simply isn't the case. The private on the front line will know something that the general doesn't -- even if it is whether there is water in his fox hole. Command structures must take this into account.This is a valuable work for anyone interested in the challenges of using military force in the complex emergencies from Albania to East Timor to Haiti to Afghanistan.While a valuable read, two issues seem worthy of highlighting in issues. First, for non-US Army officers, the discussions of individuals will be confusing. After reading almost 300 pages, I gather that every single person that Stanton mentioned is something close to a saint in terms of military capabilities. US Army personnel reviews are written with very disguised criticisms that outsiders can't understand. I find it hard to believe that everyone was as perfect as Stanton seems to say.Secondly, the lack of knowledge works two ways. Stanton decries the refusal to allow the use of tear gas, relating it to a fear over whether this would harm Somalis weakened by hunger. While this issue was discussed, the real reason restricting use of tear gas is international treaties on the use of chemical weapons -- which tear gas is (even if not "deadly"). This restriction on tear gas has constrained many operations and is a reason why the U.S. military has pepper spray (which was allowed in Somalia).These issues are, however, trivial in the context of what is otherwise a quite worthwhile read.