Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Recent historiography on the Arab-Israeli Conflict has focused almost exclusively on the 1948 War. The 1967 War, which rivals the War of Independence in terms of importance in shaping the region, has been overlooked. Michael Oren has written the first comprehensive account of this monumental event, based on the archives on the principal actors involved. Oren devotes about half on the book to the origins of the war, since they were both complex and highly unusual: Most wars are disputes between states over territory, influence, power, allies, etc. The Six Day was about power and influence, but not between the combatants. Rather, it was a result of Nasser's desire to increase his power in both his own country and the Arab world. As such, it was a war that didn't need to happen, and one with disastrous result for the region. Following a false Soviet report that Israel was moving against Syria, Nasser started increasing anti-Israel rhetoric and action. His goal at first was merely to improve his own position at home and abroad by being seen as taking on the Zionist invader. But he unwittingly unleashed a chain of events that eventually swept him up by their momementum. As pro-war crowds rallied in Cairo, Nasser moved his troops into the Sinai, and then demanded that the UN observers stationed there leave, which they did. This, coupled with the closing of the Straits of Tiran, which Israel considered a Causus Belli, probably made the war inevitable. Nasser then began to believe his own rhetoric, and drew plans for an invasion. Meanwhile, the situation elsewhere grew worse for Israel. The Arab world rallied behind Nasser, and the other states, including Jordan agreed to back Egypt. The driving force behind all this was visceral Arab hatred of Israel; Oren makes this intense dislike of the Jewish state palpable, and can feel the strength of this emotion's permeation througout the Arab world. Israel tried to gain French and Western support, but was unable to do so. In Tel-Aviv, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his cabinet weighed their options, and agonized over what to do. When they finally decided to go to war, it was almost too late: Nasser had cancelled an order to attack the day before. The war began on June 5th with an aerial assault on Egyptian targets that achieved all of its objectives. Israel then launched a ground offensive, which immediately drove back the Egyptians. The confused and poorly led Egyptian army never put up a real fight. In five days they were driven across the Suez Canal with huge losses. On the second day, Jordan began to shell Israeli positions in Jerusalem. Israel began with a limited response, but the fighting increased, and Israel decided to take the Old City as a military necessity. It was also militarily necessary to take the West Bank to secure Jerusalem from Jordanian columns, but Eshkol immediately realized the problems that would come with occupying a hostile population. Syria did little more than shell Israel from beh

Michael Oren's Six Days of War is one of the most exhaustively, minutely researched books I have ever read, a most flattering remark if one takes into account the innate investigative difficulties of the matter at hand. Objective, straightforward and an easy read, the book nevertheless leaves the spirit wanting for more strategic and tactical detail and for many more pages to read. It is that good. The history-conscious reader will go beyond the common analogy of tiny Greece versus the Persian empire to find interesting parallels with the 1936 Spanish Civil War in the sanctimoniously neutral behavior of the three Western powers, always ready to put pressure on Israel to accept Arab demands by negating her the most basic armaments, as opposed to the massive rearming of Egypt and Syria by the Soviets before, during and immediately after the war. In fact, Israel was able to maintain parity with Egypt only because of the unbelievably large amounts of untouched war material abandoned by Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians while retreating. There are even parallels with Europe in 1914, the Arab leadership making miscalculations just as big as those of Austria. Some of these miscalculations, and the absurd comicality of the power struggle among Arab leaders being such that at times one cannot help but think of the Three Stooges parody of Hitler (Nasser), Goering (Field Marshal Amer) and Goebbels (King Hussein), especially when their bickering led to three military decisions that sealed the fate of the Egyptian army and the war. First, King Hussein made unprovoked moves toward war that forced Israel to preempt in order to avoid a two-front war; second, Egypt switched from the defensive deployment indicated in the carefully developed Soviet Plan Conqueror to the offensive deployment required by Amer's improvised Operation Dawn; and third, Egypt, at the last minute, stopped their own preemptive attack against Israel. This put Egypt's military in the worst possible position, having to bear the full brunt of the Israeli offensive with inadequate defensive preparations. In an extreme way, of course, most of the above point to the essential differences in the political decision-making process between democratic and dictatorial regimes, a basic and important historical lesson in itself. Among the many invaluable facts and tips in the book that help understand the modern, if still byzantine, Middle East, here are a few: when you thought you had heard the worst about UN incompetence or of anti-Israeli bias in Europe, here comes Secretary General U Thant practically endorsing the Egyptian closing of the Tiran Straits and waiting several days before going to Cairo to meet Nasser until "his horoscope said it was propitious for him to travel." The despicable behavior of De Gaulle, who reneges on France's historical role of armament supplier to Israel and practically accuses Israel of aggression even before the first shot is fired, all for better relations with the Ar

Michael Oren's book is a gripping account of the Six-Day War, one that is clear from his extensive research, no one wanted. Oren shows the complex issues that moved the Egypt and Israel into a deadly tragedy. Putting the Six-Day War into his vast Cold War context illuminates the impotence of the Superpowers, the incompetence of Egypt and Syria, and the dangerous gamble Israel took when launching its necessary strike. Oren gives us as many perspectives as he can; American, Russian, Israeli, Eqyptian, Jordanian, English participants all have their say. The brilliance of this book is not just Oren's gripping account of the war, but his making the reader understand the incredible pressure that Nasser, King Hussein, and Levi Eshkol were under. This book made me feel some sympathy for the Egyptians, poorly-led, sacrificed to Nasser's macho posturing and cronyism, to Cold war cant, and massive poverty. What is chilling about this book is that nearly forty years later, not much has changed, as Oren points out. Readers of Tom Clancy will find real people and real tragedy more gripping than fake heroics; no heros here, just survivors.

The events of June 1967 have been written about extensively. Never before, however, has a book been published that not only chronicles the six days of the war itself but also the factors which led to it. In this important new work, Michael Oren looks back and comprehensively examines each and every aspect of the conflict. Oren presents the history from a military, diplomatic, political and cultural perspective. Through the extensive examination of archives, official reports, memoirs and interviews with surviving figures, Oren details the roles played by all the major players from the perspective of, not just the Israelis but the Egyptians, Syrians and Jordanians as well as the United States and the Soviet Union.After beginning by presenting a brief synopsis of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that point, Oren describes the series of miscalculations by Nasser that led Egypt into war several years before he intended. A combination of Syrian bellicosity, support of Palestinian terrorist incursions in Northern Israel together with the goading of his unstable general Amer, led Nasser to force the United Nations out of the de-militarized Sinai and to illegally close the Tiran straits to Israeli shipping, tantamount to a declaration of war. As Oren clearly shows, war with Egypt was inevitable the moment the straits were closed. No sovereign nation could ignore a blockade of its shipping.Oren chronicles Israel's political struggle with the United States and the Soviet Union to permit an appropriate military response to Egypt's provocations.. Despite the clear act of war by Egypt, the Johnson administration, hobbled by Vietnam and fearful of a confrontation with the Soviets, urged Israel to show restraint. Oren describes the agony of Eskhol and the Israeli government in deciding how to attack preemptively without alienating the United States. In the famous meeting between Abba Eban and President Johnson, Johnson practically urged Israel to absorb a first strike. The execrable Charles De Gaulle did overtly demand this. Israeli military doctrine required the preemptive destruction of the enemy air forces. The tension drove Rabin to a temporary breakdown and probably took years off Eskhol's life.Once the war started with Israel's lightning strike on the Egyptian Air Force, Oren shows how events followed their own trajectory with Jordan drawn in and then Syria and Israel's military objectives changing on a constant basis. Indeed, what becomes clear is that Israel never had any particular political objective other than the elimination of the direct existential threat. Contrary to anti-Israel revisionists, Israel never had any specific designs on the West Bank or even the old city of Jerusalem. Ironically, the decision to conquer the old city of Jerusalem was not made until he last possible moment, even after much of the West Bank was already in Israeli hands. From the Arab perspective, Oren shows just how and why the war turned into a disaste

If you have time for only one book on the Middle East, purchase this book. Much of the current dispute is a result of the events of the 6 Day War. Mr. Oren's work incudes over 80 pages of footnotes, many referencing recently declassified files and personal interviews with the key players.Although packed with information, the book is well edited and a relatively easy read - managing to build suspense although the outcome is well known.No one emerges as a complete hero or a complete villian in Mr. Oren's gripping narrative - a tribute to the balanced, objective nature of the work.After reading this book, the reader will never view current developments in the Middle East in the same light.