Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress A Study in Deception, Discord & Desertion

Writing comfortably from Singapore (where indeed I myself live), the previous reviewer lambasts Peter Elphick's "poor research" and "lack of factual content". And whilst Elphick draws on the weight on official communiques, War Cabinet and Colonial Office documents, as well as eye witness accounts by those at the top and close to the military and civil establishment of wartime Singapore, on what basis does David Rew base his thesis that Elphick's account of Singapore's fall is "fiction dressed as history"? On some accounts in the Singapore National Library archives.If David Rew actually takes pains to read Peter Elphick's exceptionally well-researched and lucid account of the events leading up to the fall of Singapore, he will note that the author delves quite far into Singapore's administrative history in the 1920's and 1930's to explain the reason for the inadequacy of Singapore's northern fortifications. In simplistically attributing the error to General Percival and his staff, Mr. Rew overlooks the fact that the failure to adequately fortify "Fortress" Singapore was the fault not only of Sir Shenton Thomas, the colonial Governor since 1935, but of the local War Committee which presided over the immediate outbreak of hostilities in the West and the imminent threat of Japanese invasion in the East. The indecisiveness of the War Committee was further compounded by the infighting between the General Officer Commanding Malaya, General Bond (Percival's predecessor) and the Air Officer Commanding Malaya, General Babbington and the situation was not in the least ameliorated by the presence of Air Vice Marshall Brooke Popham, the GOC Far East or such key players as Sir Archibald Wavell. Indeed, the root of Singapore's false sense of security seems to have been Churchill himself, a well-known fact which Elphick alludes to. All in all, Elphick devotes considerable pages and chapters to explaining the complexity in terms of Colonial office directives, Cabinet policy and local infighting at the pinnacle of the settlement's very leadership itself which contributed to the unpreparedness which was a decisive factor in the disaster.But to attribute everything to the lack of guns facing Johore is equally simplistic. The agreed strategy had been to defend the Malayan peninsula in the first instance as it contained valuable tin and rubber resources which couldn't simply be handed over to an occupying force. One must therefore also consider other contributory factors such as the Allies' shilly-shallying over the execution of Operation Matador - the plan to oppose any Japanese landings in Thailand by invading the nation first, a move which would have outflanked the Japanese operations on Peninsula Malaya & made life more difficult for them. Another factor is the failure of the Royal Air Force to secure enough servicable aircraft to successfully oppose the arriving Japanese fleet at sea - in spite of the fact that the air strategy had been agreed as taking preced

Like the second reviewer, I bought the book in Singapore and read it on the plane after becoming facinated with the history of the region. (I visited everything from Ft. Canning to Changi Prision to Raffles). I disagree with the first reviewer in that Elphick doesn't say that the only cause of the fall of Singapore was the only the result of Capt. Patrick Heenan's spying for the Japanese. (He was indeed shot for spying). While the book is slow reading to follow the cast of characters, it is well worth it. Elphick lays out 100 years of stupidity and arrogance of the British...when personal relationships among military and civilian appointees determined the fate of the area. It leaves the reader wondering 2 things (1) if more competent professionals were in positions of authority would Singapore have fallen as early in the war as it did and (2) if better intelligence and understanding of the peoples/history/customs of the entire region...from the then Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) through Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia prevented the chaos following WWII and the events that led to the war in Vietnam? In a strange way, it reminded me of "The Pentagon Wars"...no one trusted anyone, everyone had a personal agenda, no one would take any responsibility....information to the contrary of an individual's position was buried, along with the career of anyone who got in the way.

I bought this book while in Singapore and read it on the plane trip home. Incredibly well researched and written. If you are looking for it, email me