Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network

All the world knows that Dr. A. Q. Khan (Khan) stole but incomplete diagrams & he initailly thoughts he can make bomb with few technicians but this was his Deputy Dr. G. D. Alam (Dr. Alam) who told him that you can't do this without proper manpower. Dr. Alam is the actual man behind this achivement for Pakistan and he is the man who achived this for Pakistan (Dr. Alam died on 5th December 2000). (This is Dr. Alam once said that "History don't lie" this is true. This is the book 1st time mentioned Dr. Alam as his deputy, which means his investigation and research is very thorough, Dr Alam is the man who negotiated with all seller throughout the world for Pakistan's bomb, but refuse to help Dr. Khan sell the technology for personal gain) Cheers'

George Tenet reportedly described A.Q. Khan as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." Corera adds that Khan has had greater impact on nuclear proliferation than any other individual - yet, his story begins simply as the right man in the right place. Trained as a metallurgist in Europe, he began work in '72 at a research lab in the Netherlands at the forefront of Europe's efforts to develop the latest centrifuge technology for nuclear fuel, providing independence from the U.S. Next to the research lab was a plant holding thousands of tall, slender centrifuges connected by a maze of metal piping. Each machine only enriched the gas a tiny amount - thus, the need for a connected cascade. Each centrifuge consisted of 100 parts, many engineered to within /001 of a mm. and able to withstand very high speeds. One tiny mistake and the centrifuge spins out of control, often crashing into other machines and destroying the entire cascade. Khan's first job at the research center was to translate documents for a new German-designed centrifuge - the P2. Security at the site was lax, and within three years Khan's co-worker became convinced Khan was a spy. Authorities were alerted, but according to most accounts, the CIA helped convince them just to watch Khan and remove his access to secret materials. Realizing he'd been found out, Khan returned to Pakistan, taking thousands of pages of documents and even discarded parts with him. At about this same point in time the U.S. learned of Pakistan's intent to use fuel reprocessing (aided by France) to make a bomb. France as convinced to stop the program, leading Pakistan to instead focus on Khan's knowledge of centrifuges. (Other advantages of using centrifuges were that much less space and power were required than reprocessing or gaseous diffusion - making the program much easier to hide.) Khan knew Pakistan lacked the manufacturing skills ("couldn't make a pin"), but he also knew who the component suppliers were for the research lab where he had worked. Thus, he utilized a network of Swiss, German, U.K., U.S., China (bomb design), North Korea (missile design), and Niger (yellowcake) suppliers. By 1987 Pakistan had the bomb. Soon after, Khan began marketing his/Pakistan's skills - North Korea, Libya, and Iran. Throughout this period and on to the present, the U.S. knew of Pakistan's activities but refrained from taking strong action because their cooperation was needed to help defeat the Russians in Afghanistan, and then after 9/11 in terror-reduction efforts. An IAEA inspection in '03 found Iran with 160 cascaded P1-design centrifuges and evidence of uranium enriched to between 36 - 70%. Iran's original efforts began under the Shah in 1976, were known about in the U.S., and reportedly led Saddam Hussein in Iraq to press for his own program (began by purchasing a reactor from France). Iran, like its mentor, Pakistan, eventually also decided to go the centrifuge route after the U.S. pressed

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings. Diane C. Donovan California Bookwatch

And how in detail he aborted his nuclear bomb building project soon after Saddam was taken out of power in Iraq by the USA. You'll also learn interesting stuff like about how terrorist leader Gaddafi tried for over 20 years to get a nuke bomb for Libya but was happily unsuccessful.

This book is a must read for any aficionado of international politics. The issue of nuclear proliferation can never again be discussed without AQ Khan's name being preeminent (though by no means exclusive.) Corera does an excellent job of presenting the facts as known in a readable fashion and mercifuilly keeps the book relatively free of jargon. But the story begs too many questions, such as how could MI6 and the CIA have ignored the red flags Khan hoisted for so long, or how could Libya's efforts to build nukes have been missed? In fact, a cynical reader will have to conclude that not even the now-well-worn excuse of recurring intelligence failures from a bungling, underequipped agency is adequate to explain these events (as if Bush's WMD fiasco was not enough to convince one that the CIA merely serves to justify political decisions.) The ease with which Khan created his vast worldwide empire, supposedly under the noses of Musharraf and Bush and Blair, is also extremely troubling, and must lead readers to the inescapable and obvious conclusion that this occurred with tacit understandings. Money was to be made by many, until Khan outlived his usefulness. And Corera's epilogue offers no warm and fuzzy solace at Khan's arrest; as long as countries see benefits outweighing risks and "superpowers" threatening regime changes willy nilly, the temptations to keep Pandora's Box wide open will be irrestistible. Indeed, his closing statements make a good case for more nukes in more hands being a stabilizing influence, rather than allowing a few white imperialists from imposing nuclear-balced hegemony on an increasingly recalcitrant and non-white world. I suspect that statues to Khan will someday proliferate amongst Third World nations as profusely as his centrifuges have.