Seven Sins of American Foreign Policy

This is not a perfect book. It has more than its fair share of flaws. There are a number of glaring factual, terminological, and stylistic errors that are downright cringe-worthy. For example, in one place, the author refers to James Madison as the second President of the United States (Madison was actually the fourth president); in another place, he refers to "ionized" radiation from nuclear weapons (the correct term is "ionizing" radiation); and, in another place, he refers to the British foreign intelligence service as the "Strategic Intelligence Service" (it is actually called the "Secret Intelligence Service"). I blame poor editing more than anything else. The errors in this book are mistakes that any writer (even a noted foreign policy, national security, and intelligence expert like Loch Johnson) is liable to make when quickly throwing together a first draft. But these errors should have been caught and corrected in the editing process before the book went to print. The errors are certainly a distraction; but their significance should not be overstated. This is NOT a perfect book; but it IS a good book. And, as the saying goes, the perfect is the enemy of the good. To dismiss this book because of its imperfections would be to toss the baby out with the bathwater. Some of the most informative books I've ever read have been riddled with far worse errors than are found in this text. So, if we are willing to overlook the annoying factual, terminological, and stylistic errors -- which can be attributed to poor editing -- and focus instead on the substantive points that Johnson is trying to make, we find a book that is worthy of serious consideration. First of all, the introductory chapter presents a truly excellent overview of the history of American foreign policy from the founding of the republic to the present day. It is succinct, and doesn't get bogged down in unnecessary details; yet it is thorough and nuanced enough to provide readers with a good understanding of how American foreign policy has developed over the years -- what has remained constant, what has changed, and what forces have shaped America's relations with the rest of the world. After this excellent introduction, Johnson turns to his critique of American foreign policy; focusing on seven "sins" that have plagued American foreign policy throughout recent history, and devoting a chapter to each: 1) Ignorance; 2) Executive Branch Dominance; 3) Excessive Emphasis on the Military; 4) Unilateralism; 5) Isolationism; 6) Lack of Empathy; and 7) Arrogance. In his concluding chapter Johnson identifies "the good, the bad, and the ugly" of American foreign policy since the end of World War II -- i.e. where we got it right, where we got it wrong, and where we shot ourselves in the foot. You may not agree with all of Johnson's conclusions; but you cannot dismiss the importance of his critique. The issues that Johnson addresses represent the most salient debates in Americ

It is no secret that US foreign policy decisions have gotten us into trouble in the past, present, and will do so in the future. The introduction gives a short history of the United States, from the Revolutionary War to Iraq. (It seems that the pre-Spanish-American War U.S. wasn't as "isolationist" or "inward-looking" as is commonly thought). The first sin is ignorance, or lack of awareness of other places in the world. Americans do badly at map-reading and geography, balk at learning foreign languages (especially "hard" but strategically crucial languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese), and lack (or do not seek) meaningful media coverage of important events outside the U.S. This knowledge deficit has spread to government agencies too. It is difficult to find people who can reliably translate Arabic or Farsi, or are familiar enough with Middle Eastern culture in order to be able to do proper intelligence work in the Middle East. The right intelligence could have helped prevent the 9/11 attacks, or kept us from invading Iraq. The second sin is "Executive Branch Dominance". This chapter is subtitled "The President as Superhero", and indeed, there has been much veneration of the office of President of the United States, as well as whoever holds that office at any particular time. Americans tend to forget, however, that the power of the President is Constitutionally limited (by design). Presidents (and the executive branch staff) have occasionally overstepped their bounds, or shut Congress (and others) out of foreign policy decisions (ex. Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and to some extent the 1991 and 2003 Iraqi invasions). At times, it has been considered "unpatriotic" to ever criticize the President. Next is "Excessive Emphasis on the Military". A military response to a world crisis is just one of the possible tools that the United States has to offer. Diplomacy (including "public diplomacy", or presenting/promoting American culture and ideals), intelligence, foreign aid, trade decisions (ranging from most-favored-nation status to embargoes and boycotts) can be utilized to head off a major conflict. But the US has over-relied on (and over-funded) military solutions to the neglect of other possible decisions. Our big nuclear arsenal might have helped us win the Cold War, but it is useless against suicide bombers. President Eisenhower's sage remarks about the "Military-Industrial Complex" still ring true today, Next is "Unilateralism". Wryly subtitled "How to Lose Friends and Alienate People", this chapter describes America's propensity to "go it alone" rather than working with other nations. Examples include the 2003 Iraq War, the Vietnam War, Cuba (attempts to assassinate Castro), and Central America. Trade protectionism and refusal to work with other nations on global environmental and human dignity issues also contribute to at least the perception that America wants to go it alone. Hand-in-hand with unilateralism is isolationism, or retreating

If you are tryuely interested in a view of U.S. Foreign Policy with up to date examples this book is a must read!!!

This book is fair and objective, but Dr. Johnson's criticisms are sharp. We Americans are largely ignorant of the world's geography, different cultures and foreign languages. Executive powers are inadequately checked by congress where foreign policy is concerned. We've come to rely on our military forces as our only policy tool, rather than our tool of last resort. We don't provide enough foreign aid to developing countries. We've recently been all too willing to go it alone when employing our military. That's five of the seven sins. Here is where his Seven Sins framework starts to feel a bit forced. The last two sins, Arrogance and Isolationism, could have just as well been incorporated into the Unilateralism chapter. He acknowledges this, and does a pretty fair job of coming up with sufficient material to make seven distinct sins. I only have two small complaints with this book. The first is that he didn't place enough emphasis on the problems encountered distributing foreign aid. Much of U.S. reluctance to increase foreign aid stems from the fact that there is no good way to ensure that it is distributed to the people who need it. There are alternatives to Jeffrey Sachs' Big Plan that should have been considered in this chapter. My second complaint is that the current administration is cited as a violator of what seemed like all seven sins. Granted, they probably should step into the confessional, and he affords them adequate praise where it is due, but leaving them out of a chapter or two wouldn't have harmed the integrity of this book. Overall, 'Seven Sins' is a calm, objective and reasoned analysis that stands out among the shrill partisan rhetoric we are regularly subjected to. Dr. Johnson's book is a welcome contribution to the debate.

In 1983, Dr. Loch Johnson, arguably the Dean of the intelligence scholars who is also unique for having the deep insights that could only come from service on BOTH the Church Committee in the 1970's and the Aspin-Brown Commission in the 1990's, published "Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence in World Affairs (Fall 1983, v. 146, no. 2, p. 176-204). I still remember that article, which informed me as a (then) clandestine case officer, and helped inspire my own critical reformist writings over the years. This book is a completely new work on a grander scale and the seven sins (listed in the editorial information) are applied to foreign policy in all its forms. The following quote reflects the rich content of the book: "A foreign policy initiative is considered questionable ('sinful') if it is based on a false or sharply limited understanding of the region of the world it pupports to address; if it violates the bedrock constitutional tenet of power-sharing between the legislative and executive branches of government; if it too quickly or unnecessarily resorts to forcein the resolution of global disputes; if it runs counter to the established norms of contemporary international behavior accepted by the world's democracies; if it signals a withdrawal from the international community; if it exhibits a lack of concern for the basic human needs of other nations or projects a haughtiness in world affairs indicative of an imperious attitude toward others." The rest of the book, including useful figures showing successs and failures across diplomatic, military, economic, and covert action fronts from 1945 to date, fleshes out the above quote in a very thoughtful manner. Interestingly, deep in the book, the author points out that ignorance of global reality by the public is directly related to their choices of elected officials. If they are disengaged and uninformed, they will elect individuals who give short shrift to global affairs. I am reminded of the number of Senators and Representatives who used to brag that they did not have a passport "because nothing that happens abroad matters to my constituents." Those individuals are still in office. I know the author, who in his courtly manner and gracious ability to discuss all sides without rancor, while still being harshly critical, represents all that is good about informed academics who are also, from time to time, called on to serve the Nation. I put the book down thinking that this author would make a magnificent Secretary of State.