Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda

Gretchen Peters, the Harvard graduate who covers Af-Pak region for ABC News provides an objective analysis of the role of poppy seeds in nourishing terrorism. If you are a venture capital investor, investing in Afghanistan/Pakistan in poppy seeds is the way to go. Reasons: Illegal drugs is a big market. 8% of global trade (against 5.3% for motor cars). Poor governance in Afghanistan facilitates drug lords to "order" farmers to harvest poppy seeds; buy future deliveries under salaam system; bribe those in power to overlook trafficking; pay Taliban war lords to oversee safe transportation; produce heroin in the lawless borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan; export through Iran/Turkey or Pakistan to hungry markets in Europe and launder the money through Dubai. The farmers get a pittance (and yet that pittance is 12 times what they would get for normal food crops). But the Taliban warlords net quite a pile; $ 439 million in 2007! The business model evolved over a period of time. Cause 1: In its obsession to win the cold war, US overlooked supporting religious zealots. Zbignew Brezezinski asked, "What was more important? A few stirred up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?". Cause 2: US conveniently ignored the drug connection of the mujahideen. Robert Peck of State Department testified to Congress in 1986 that US did not have enough evidence to believe the rebels were involved in narcotics trade. In 1989 Ann Wrobleski of State Department defended eloquently that "opium is the only currency the rebels have". Cause 3: Pakistan army and ISI did not have compunction in using drug money to fund covert operations. Nawaz Sharif, in a 1994 interview to Washington Post confessed that General Aslam Beg, Chief of Army and General Asad Durrani of ISI sought his permission to fund covert foreign operations through large scale drug deals. Cause 4: Warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani (both now allied with Taliban) saw huge opportunity in being part of the supply chain but cleaned up their prospectus by providing a religious coat to the business model and allying with Taliban. Cause 5: Taliban saw the drug revenue as a reliable source of revenue to fund its activities. Selling drugs to non believers was seen as part of the jihad against non Muslims. Though Mullah Omar banned poppy cultivation for one year (that was revoked later) in 2000, it was an ultimate insider trading con. That just pushed up prices ten times. Net margins went up. The only folks to suffer were the farmers. Cause 6: Post invasion, US pursued stability; but overlooked poppy harvest, heroin production and transport. Again, obsessive pursuit of one priority and compromise with another that could hurt US in the long run. The 1988 warning Edmund McWilliams issued to Milton Brearden of CIA that "we are financing our own assassins" is continuing to be ignored. If Harvard were to issue a degree in being a Co

Despite its depressing subject matter, the book itself was pretty easy to get through, maybe partly because it wasn't that long. What kept me reading was the accessible language, easty-to-follow structure, and interesting characters. Although you won't finish this book with detailed knowledge of all the intricacies of drug smuggling and how it finances terror groups, you (at least I gained) a basic framework to understand the situation and some idea of who the different players are and how they interact with each other. I did appreciate all the other reviews. But, I noticed there was some sort of conspiracy theorist in the mix, and, I have to confess, I have no idea where this viewpoint comes from. One minor problem, I caught one spot where the date the Taliban threw their chips in with the Taliban as 2004 at Spin Boldak. Should that have read 1994? I was thoroughly confused when I read that part. Anyways, I wouldn't have minded if this book was a little longer. This could've used a couple more chapters.

There is a 4 minute Video interview on [...] 'Money and the Taliban' added july 25 '09 with Gretchen Peter's including some footage of Poppy fields of afghanistan. I won't repeat what other reviewer's have made excellent case for the book, what i want to focus on is the character in chapter 6 'Follow The Money'. Meet Dawood Ibrahim, This character has played a role in terrorist attack on Mumbai (Bombay) in November of 2008 (The Taj Mahal Hotel Episode). The Indian government has asked Pakistan to extradite this exiled Indian gangster and narco-trafficker who has long been accused of arranging the 1993 bombing attacks in Mumbai which killed hundreds. Mrs Peter's says Ibrahim has the dubious distinction of being the only person Washington has designated both a "Global Terrorist Supporter" and a "Foreign Narcotics Kingpin". In 1984 he fled India for Dubai and after the 1993 Mumbai blast, even freewheeling Dubai would't have him anymore. Ibrahim took a refuge in Karachi Pakistan,reportedly under protection of the ISI (Pakistan Intelligence Service). U.S. Treasury Department's OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control )describes Ibrahim in its listing as "an Indian crime lord" who "has found common cause with Al Qaida, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamic extremists. He is WANTED by Interpol. United Nations Sanctions: Freezing of Assets, Travel Ban and Arms Embargo.

Gretchen Peters reports compelling evidence for a clear counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics strategy for the U.S. and coalition parterners in South West Asia. Having been stationed in Afghanistan with DEA in the early seventies with numerous assignments in Pakistan and the tribal area, I have a good working knowledge of the operational environment. I worked with all the DEA officials cited in her book and will verify everything she reported. I have only one thing to add - she is very brave. There are no points for second place in this extremely complex and hostile environment. Mike Holm, DEA Retired

To understand the Taliban and al Qaeda, read this book. "Seeds of Terror" takes you to the heart of the matter—money, not religion. Opium not jihad. Gretchen Peters understands the big picture, the one Obama and the U.S. military desperately need to see. Opium is still seen as just one means of financing religious fanatics. As Peters reveals, it's much more. For the Taliban, drug money is not just the means; it has become the objective—just like it is for the Colombian and Mexican drug mafias. As she tells us, "The insurgency is exploding precisely because the opium trade is booming." The Taliban are almost entirely from the Pashtun tribe, and to her credit, Peters speaks fluent Pashto, which may be why the book feels so credible. For ten years, she has tracked the drug racket in every way imaginable, from flying with Pakistanis using forward-looking infrared cameras looking for drug convoys to sipping tea in one of HJK's two hundred houses. HJK, you will learn, was the number one smuggler behind the Taliban, with a billion-dollar drug business extending from Osama bin Laden to Mullah Omar and from Uzbekistan to Dubai. It's a fascinating read. Peters admits she can't determine the depth of al Qaeda's involvement in the drug trade, although al Qaeda operatives routinely ship drugs to the Gulf. But she proves beyond a doubt that the Taliban has become primarily a criminal operation, and if the Taliban wins, al Qaeda will have its own narco-state. Here's a hint of what's in the book. Chapter (1) To go after terrorist, you must go after their drug profits. (2) The explosion of heroin during the war to oust the Soviets. (3) The rise of the Taliban and the narco-terror state. (4) How heroin saved the Taliban (and changed them) after we kicked them out. (5) HJK, the sheepherder turned kingpin. (6) How drug money flows outside the banking system—an amazing process. (7) How U.S./NATO policy has avoided the drug war or been wholly inadequate, and how the Afghan government has been corrupted. The final chapter (8) is about what should be done. It's not the most fascinating part, but it may be the most important. Peters present a nine point approach that seems well thought out, but in my view, her biggest strategic contribution is her thinking on how to attack the drug business. "Twelve percent of the Afghan population lives off the poppy trade. Destroying their livelihoods overnight [poppy eradication]—before providing alternatives—would ... turn more Afghans against the United States. ... The goal should be to cut or eliminate profits for smugglers and financiers at the top." Unfortunately she only goes a little deeper than that, but I think she's headed in exactly the right direction. As Peters has proved, Afghanistan is a narco-terror state, and we need to fight both parts at once--the narcotics business and the terrorist who profit from it.