Science, Truth, and Democracy

This concise and clear book is an extended essay examining the role of science in democratic societies. Kitcher is a well known philosopher of science and this book is an attempt to move philosophical investigations of science as a general phenomenon beyond the relatively narrow epistemic concerns of most philosophy of science. Despite the relative brevity of this book, Kitcher has a relatively ambitious agenda. He wishes to examine the epistemic credentials of science of an enterprise, to explore the consequences of the epistemic reliability of science in terms of its social functions, and to sketch out the proper way democracies should deal with science. Kitcher is particularly concerned with steering a valid course between 2 opposing, almost caricature positions; the view that science has virtually unique moral value and is largely insulated from social influences and the view that science has weak epistemic foundations with the research agenda and results driven by pragmatic and authoritarian concerns. Kitcher espouses what he terms modest realism; a definite endorsement of the epistemic validity of science with a strong fallibalist orientation. The section of the book in which he deals with attacks on the epistemic validity of science is one of the strongest portions and his fallibalist realism is a strong position. Kitcher, however, suggests that while the methods and achievements of science are definitely valid, the choice of research problems and programs is, however, driven strongly by other concerns. In this sense, Kitcher sees science as hardly insulated from social and personal concerns and in important senses capable of being manipulated in potentially sinister ways. Kitcher is very concerned with the ways in which science and scientific knowledge may be abused to the disadvantage of disadvantaged members of society. Kitcher attacks the idea of the moral purity of scientific investigation and the highly arbitrary (and really impossible to defend) distinction between science and technology. Kitcher's proposed approach is what he calls "well-ordered" science in which selection of research programs, the actual selection of individual projects, and use of knowledge generated would be the subject of some form of inclusive deliberative democracy to ensure socially appropriate scientific investigation. I want to stress that Kitcher is no starry-eyed idealist, this is not a serious reform proposal but rather an intellectual device to measure how far we are away from a really democratic approach to science, an intellectually useful instrument. This brief sketch doesn't do justice to Kitcher's careful development of his arguments, including some useful examples. One example used is the experience of the human genome project, whose development and governance Kitcher demonstrates as violating his concepts of well-ordered science. Kitcher's arguments, however, are problematic in several respects. Its hard to disagree with the

I recieved everything it said it would be... on time ! the book was a logic book... be warned...

Philip Kitcher again shines as a well informed philosopher of science. This book can be regarded as a sequel to his magnum opus _The Advancement of Science_. It deals with the relativists and antirealists quite well, though does presuppose some familiarity with these debates.However, I find that Kitcher's new position on the nature of science and its relations to society at large suffers from an apparently glaring oversight. He tells us that those who have a stake in the outcome of scientific research should have a say in how it should proceed, be funded, etc.Since we have long known (and Kitcher himself is aware of the fact) that the outcome of basic scientific research is unknown, i.e. we do not know what position (if any) it will affect, we cannot realistically adopt Kitcher's suggestion. His proposal is emmently sensible in technology, where the goal is not to know but to change or prevent change. But the history of science shows that the proposal of making basic science sensitive to people's interests _that_ way will not work. Further, it is vague, even if it could be done: how do we determine the effect? Christian conservatives like Philip Johnson would curtail or slow research into evolution because he feels it is socially undermining; biologists and other scientists (rightly) regard this as distressing. Science *should* puncture illusions, as Kitcher points out happens. On the other hand, if the "say" is simply to be a sort of "gripe session" where people can say their piece to scientists, this is a recipe for squabble, or worse, just ignoring people, which is the (perceived) problem in the management of science now.(I think actually that the insistence from some that science is alienating because it is undemocratic is wrong, but that's another story.)One should not read this book, however, without a grasp of some of the issues this review sort of brings up. As another reviewer said it is sort of for the academic. I wish that weren't so: but sometimes we academics have to debate amongst ourselves a bit first, before popularizations come out. Of course this is just some of the same concerns again ... and around we go.

I am impressed with Kitcher, actually stunned. This book needs to be read by every politician in office. The fact that our government does in fact function much better than middle east gov's is due to separation of church and state, but now what we need is to really incorporate that idea, especially with a little more truth. The science of life is accepted as Kitcher mentions as irrefutable by all, but the truth of it is jet lag, not really here. I say yes, read this book, to anyone. I want to recommend another book very similar to this but in entertaining format which puts this subject across well, SB 1 or God By Karl Maddox.