Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship

Robert Nisbet is not usually classified as a historian, he is usually placed in the pigeon hole labelled 'sociologist'. This assessment is, of course, unfair as anyone who has surveyed his 'sociological' writings will attest. Nisbet usually manages to survey sociological and political thought, linking the philosophy and biography of his subject, whether it is Rousseau, Tocqueville or Kropotkin, in his works. So Nisbet was always a "historical sociologist" if such a classification exists. This book however is straight history and Nisbet shows his strength both as a writer and historical analyst. Nisbet's writing is always crisp, clear and precise. It doesn't stray and, like most good writing, it makes for quick paced reading. Nisbet's analysis of Roosevelt's "Failed Courtship" with Joseph Stalin relies on secondary source material, notably the "Complete Correspondence" between Roosevelt and Churchill, edited by Prof Warren Kimball of Rutgers University. He also relies on biographical and memoir material from FDR cabinet members and close advisers. So if there is any 'bias' in the selection of sources, the odds are, if anything, stacked in FDR's favour. Unfortunately for the world the picture that emerges of FDR is not the patriotic portrait or hero of liberal hagiography. FDR had plenty of advice, not just from Churchill, but his own diplomats and foreign policy experts, Keenan for example, warning him of Stalin's ruthless ambition. FDR chose to ignore advice and advisors who contradicted his own deep seated belief that Stalin and the Soviet leadership generally, were deep down merely fellow progressives like himself. Progressives with a nasty predisposition for violence, perhaps that's a fault understandable considering the vile Old Regime and it's old world meddling imperialist friends that they needed to overthrow and outfight. Perhaps this fault might be overcome with example, solid help and understanding from fellow democrats abroad. Well that's how Roosevelt saw things anyhow. Nisbet documents the sound advice ignored and FDR's unrequited concessions to Stalin in detail. FDR believed 'he could handle' Stalin, all that was required was just more noblesse oblige and postwar harmony would be assured. Stalin got FDR's number early, and played him like a fiddle. Eventually it should be possible, one hopes, for documentary evidence from the Russian side to be unearthed to confirm or deny Nisbet's thesis here. Many liberals recoil at any and all criticisms of FDR's handling of the great power conferences, perhaps in reaction to McCarthyite claims and oft repeated right wing condemnations of the Yalta Conference. The usual apologia for Yalta is that the allies could not reverse what the Red Army had achieved on the ground so Yalta, rather than a betrayl, was merely the cold recognition of strategic realities. Nisbet "island hops" both these arguments, thus outflanking both the McCarthyites and liberals. He agrees with the liberal view that by