Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information

Greg Treverton has written a much needed overview of the national intelligence process and correctly identified the challenges which face the US, in a post-9/11 world. His views of the world beyond 2010 are quite revealing and his challenges to the intelligence community to assess threats to the US are precisely focused. His views on the major intelligence entities reveal urgent modifications of structure and process, if the intelligence community is going to regain relevance with national customers. As a teacher of intelligence process, specifically as it relates to strategic warning, I believe this book is essential reading for anyone who aspires to be a true intelligence professional. This book will help even the wisest analyst understand how to maximize available sources and methods. The quest to provide the best possible intelligence is a goal which must be achieved.

There are other books on intelligence reform--the best being those by Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman and by Loch Johnson--but this book is very special because it is written by an insider who has come to grips with the imperative for change and who is able to articulate the case for change in a way that others have not. This is arguably the single best and most elegant presentation for why our $30 billion a year intelligence industry must be turned upside down and shift resources away from secret satellite technology and toward analysis, analytic tools, and access to open sources of information. The author very correctly focuses on the fact that intelligence is about getting useful tailored information to the policy consumer, not about secrets per se. He is perhaps the best spokesperson for the view that the old paradigm--collecting secrets at great expense about a single enemy--must be replaced by the new paradigm--making sense of vast quantities of information that is not secret and covers a diversity of constantly changing targets. He correctly focuses on the selection and intelligent analysis of information rather than the collection of isolated secrets--on making the most of open information. The book is rich with anecdotal examples and makes a compelling case for dismantling the current intelligence stovepipes while simultaneously dismantling the culture of secrecy that prevents the sharing of useful information, not just within the Nation (e.g. with state and local law enforcement) but with coalition government and non-government allies of the moment. The author, a past Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and a learned man with deep ties to Harvard, the Council on Foreign Relations, and RAND, concludes on a bitter-sweet note that demands Congressional and Presidential reflection. He firmly believes that both the intelligence community budget and as much intelligence analysis as possible should be made public and be in the public service. This book is highly recommended, and could-together with the the other intelligence reform books published in the past two years--reasonably be used as the starting point for a complete make-over of the U.S. Intelligence Community.