Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan [Large Print]

I was quite surprised to find a lot of interesting information in this book that I had no idea about. I am not very familiar with the pacific campaign in WWII nor about the political complications that existed between the three/four parties mentioned in this book, but in the end I'm very please I read this book and have a new outlook on the Soviet involvement with the end of the war in the pacific. While many like to believe that the two A-bombs were the main reason for Japan's surrender and acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation the reality of the matter is that the Soviet entry into the war played the largest role. Reactions in Japanese high officials diaries attest to the fact that while the A-bomb was a surprise the invasion of Japanese controlled territory by Soviet forces was a great surprise and the event that finally forced the Japanese to rethink their stance in the war. Even after both A-bombs were dropped there were still those in Japan that wanted to keep fighting but the fact that they could no longer negotiate through the Soviet Union made them reconsider and listen to those who wanted peace at whatever price. All in all a good investment for a new point of view on the war in the pacific and a very interesting and gripping story of how the war came to an end and what role(s) Roosevelt, Truman, Stalin, Hirohito, and many others played.

Prof. Hasegawa's painstakingly researched work shines new light on the diplomatic games played as the War in the Pacific came to an end. Reading archival documents in English, Russian, and Japanese, many available for the first time, he is able to shed light on the rationale behind the dropping of the A-Bomb and Japanese efforts to end the war through Soviet mediation. The documented evidence Prof. Hasegawa presents is truly shocking, and shows the debates within all three governments regarding how the war would end. While some might disregard this book as 'revisionist', disregarding any new research and evidence that might question accepted narratives, anybody who is truly intersted in reading top-notch scholarship on one of the most important events in modern history should not let this book pass by. Prof. Hasegawa is one of the most respected Cold War historians in the world, and this book only cements his scholarly reputation.

Cold War expert Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa does an exceptional job of addressing the still-asked questions about the end of World War II. At 60 years and counting, the guilt and hand wringing continue vis--vis America's use of atomic weapons against mainly civilian targets in Japan. Were "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" really necessary? What about the Soviets and their eleventh hour invasion of Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin? Hasegawa rightly answers these questions, but he perhaps downplays a little too much the impact of the atomic bombs in ending the war. He cites one official source that acknowledged a persuasive jolt from the Hiroshima bombing, even if it turned out to be in combination with the Soviet invasion -- a one-two punch, if you will. In any event, Hasegawa argues convincingly that neither alone was decisive and that the Soviet offensive produced more dread than the destruction of Hiroshima. Also, his condemnation of the atomic bombings carries even more weight with respect to Nagasaki. Given the hindsight of Hiroshima, it was dubious to resort to this second bombing. Like the first, it would prove to be indiscriminate in its effects and, as Hasegawa contends, it was politically motivated. Hasegawa's "Racing the Enemy" offers a broader view than the usual line about the atomic bombs ending the war. However, one ought not to fault President Harry Truman too much, for he no doubt faced a moral dilemma. Either way, atomic bombing or invasion, the buck would stop with him being responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, the majority noncombatants. Historian David McCullough raises an important question in his biography of Truman: "How could a President, or the others charged with responsibility for the decision, answer to the American people if when the war was over, after the bloodbath of an invasion of Japan, it became known that a weapon sufficient to end the war had been available by midsummer and was not used?" What transpired after it was used is another story. Without the benefit of hindsight, however, the decision-makers could go only by the results of atomic bomb testing in the New Mexico desert, described by project chief Major General Leslie R. Groves as "successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone." Carefully researched and yet refreshingly easy to read, Prof. Hasegawa's "Racing the Enemy" contributes much to solving the riddle of the end of World War II. However, as good as it is, Hasegawa's book alone is not the last word. No single source says it all and "Racing the Enemy" should be read with other fine histories of the War in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It is a welcome and needed addition to current scholarship, in my opinion, and offers much to the serious student of the War. Rev. Dennis J. Mercieri, alumnus of Holy Apostles Seminary in Cromwell, CT, and Gulf War veteran

A thought-provoking book that examines the frantic political and diplomatic efforts in three capitals (Moscow, Washington and Tokyo) as World War II closed down. The description and explanation of the race by the USSR to control the Kuril Islands, a strategic area still in dispute today, was especially enlightening to me. While I continue to think Truman's use of the two atomic bombs was more consequential to the political decision of the Japanese elite's accepting of U.S. surrender terms than is the view of Professor Hasegawa, I am convinced by the professor that the concurrent shock impact of Stalin's final military moves is the major key to understanding the ultimate wrenching decision made in Tokyo.

A brilliant analysis that not only fills in the many blank spots that existed with regard to the end of the war in the PTO, but also for the first time offers a complete and concise narrative of the decision making process simultaniously going on at all three major players. Hasegawa convincingly argues that it were not the atomic bombs that made Japan surrender (they were even resigned to receiving more of the same - testament to the effectiveness of LeMay's conventional bombing campaign, which in Tokyo alone killed more people in one night than died at Hiroshima ), but the prospect of Soviet occupation and the specter of communism. Faced with that alternative, the emperor rather preferred to surrender to the Americans. Truman tried to keep the Soviets out by dropping the bombs early but failed to appreciate that a modification of the unconditional surrender terms regarding the status of the emperor might have accelerated Japan'surrender more than the bombs would do. A must read for anyone interested in the history of WWII and/or the atomic bomb.