Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776

To many observers, American foreign policy appears schizophrenic--an odd mix of high-minded idealism and crass realism. On one end, American hegemony has coincided with an unprecedented degree of geopolitical stability and material prosperity; on the other, America has started fights when none existed and has meddled where it did not belong. In other words, some see America as a beacon, others as a beast. It is little wonder that the exercise of American power, most lately in Iraq, has proven so controversial.This ambivalence was well captured by Senator Fulbright who wrote that, "The inconstancy of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the crusader spirit." Walter McDougall, of the University of Pennsylvania, tries to cast light into these American contradictions by looking into the Old ("Promised Land") and New Testament ("Crusader State") of its foreign policy. Mr. McDougall's purpose is to dispel certain myths surrounding American foreign policy and unify seemingly inconsistent traditions. The former goal is achieved through a meticulous reading of primary and secondary sources; for example, Mr. McDougall renames the hallowed principles of the Old Testament: Liberty for Exceptionalism, Unilateralism for Isolationism, Expansionism for Manifest Destiny, and the American System for the Monroe Doctrine. The New Testament is similarly described in four traditions: Progressive Imperialism, Wilsonianism, Containment, and Global Meliorism. What connects these diverse traditions is the belief that foreign policy should never compromise liberty at home. What is more, these traditions coexist in the American mind and influence its foreign policy. In that sense, argues Mr. McDougall, simple dichotomies between realism and idealism miss the mark; American foreign policy is at the same time "good, bad and ugly." Only after appreciating this reality can one hope of understanding the basic tenets of American foreign policy and make sense of its apparent schizophrenia.

McDougall attempts to outline "The American Encounter With the World Since 1776" in his small volume, "Promised Land, Crusader State." Such an ambitious promise could never be fulfilled in such a small space given that there is little agreement about how to characterize "America's encounter with the world" and the effects that encounter has had on the lives of Americans (both good and bad).McDougall imposes a paradigm on American foreign affairs which is easily seen from his table of contents. McDougall tries to shoehorn the history of American foreign relations into these eight traditions (divided into two testaments), and does so with surprising results. However, such a paradigmatic book will always suffer from the fact that some things just don't fit and that there could be other paradigms that would be more useful.Still, McDougall brings attention to two important areas. First is the need for America to have the "moral high ground" when conducting foreign affairs. It is not enough for America to simply engage in games of power and politic, especially since such tactics were part of the Old (European) World and that America was the New ("exceptional") World. Second, McDougall leaves open the question of whether various historical actors were "heroes" or "villains." This critical look at the foreign policy decisions made by people such as Jefferson and Wilson allows the reader to safely criticize their history without feeling "un-American."Standing alone, this book would rank a 3 star rating, but if the value of this book is enhanced if one already has a background in the history of American foreign policy or is reading this book in conjunction with other background materials, hence a 4 star rating.

McDougall identifies 8 different traditions in American foreign policy, which fall into two "testaments." The "old testament" consists of traditions such as liberty, unilateralism and the American System. Essentially, it involves Americans perfecting their own country and looking towards their own part of the world as the place they need to be most concerned. The "new testament" consists of such traditions as containment, expansion and meliorism. It calls for American to play a much broader role in the world's affairs, although for different reasons. McDougall does not purport to have written a comprehensive diplomatic history as to explain it and how it might be used to conduct future diplomacy. "Promised Land" is not highly ideological - some will find his questioning of the Marshall Plan's success and attack on foreign aid infuriating. Others will be unhappy with his assertion that the US is perhaps well served by its participation in the UN and Nato, as long as the USs ability to act unilaterally when necessary is not impeded. For example, he points out that Washington's famous injunction was against "entangling alliances" rather than all alliances and that those which serve the US interest without limited its freedom of action are consistent with Washington rather than opposing it. In perhaps the most interesting "revision" of the entire book, he repudidates the notion that America has ever been an isolationist nation, saying that it really was a concern for our ability to act unilaterally that was at issue and points to a long history of interventionism to protect US interests dating back to Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates. Finally, the book explains the role of religion in the changing nature of America's policies from that of a promised land where we would lead by example primarily to one where we would be more willing to intervene.

Since America won the Cold War, there has been great confusion over what principles should guide our Foreign Policy. The options range from the isolationism of Pat Buchanan to the interventionist nation-building of Bill Clinton. Anyone wishing to understand the ongoing arguments should read this terrific book. McDougall's compelling thesis is that there is a fundamental dichotomy in US Foreign Policy, with two competing doctrines each influenced by four different themes. There is the Promised Land (or Old Testament) impulse, which is based on four key traditions: OLD TESTAMENT (Promised Land) Exceptionalism (focus on liberty at home, avoiding entangling alliances) Unilateralism (as opposed to isolationism) The American System (Monroe Doctrine) Expansionism (Manifest Destiny) This was the prevailing approach to foreign policy--designed to protect America's liberty and independence from the outside world--until 1898 and the Spanish American War, at which point a New Testament gained ascendancy, likewise guided by four traditions: NEW TESTAMENT (Crusader State) Progressive Imperialism Liberal Internationalism (Wilsonianism) Containment Global Meliorism (reforming other nations internal problems) The adoption of the New Testament policy marked the triumph of the "do-gooder impulse" and represented America's desire to influence the rest of the world and try to make it a "better" place. Given this context, we can see that Buchanan and Clinton are representatives of two great historic trends in American thought; what remains is for us to decide between the two. After presenting the historic development of each of the eight traditions, McDougall concludes with a chapter on whether each would serve us well now. The only New Testament tradition that he sees any value in is Containment. In fact, he treats Containment well throughout the book. It seems as if he's a little overawed by George Kennan (the father of Containment). In particular, he gives the policy credit for defeating the Soviet Union. While he does criticize the price paid (huge debt, internal dissent, etc.), I believe that he overestimates the policy. First of all, if containment did work, it too 36 years to do so and that is simply too long. Second, it would seem that you have to consider the Reagan Era policy to be quite different than what had come before, especially the active support of counterrevolutionary movements in Soviet Bloc countries (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola). Generally, the discussion of how US policy won the Cold War is somewhat weak. But his final conclusions, that we should return to the Old Testament--taking care of our own internal problems; being prepared to act unilaterally, if at all; remaining strong