Power at Sea, Volume 1: The Age of Navalism, 1890-1918 (Volume 1)

I really liked this book. I have to admit, I'm no expert on naval power and haven't read many of the books on the topic. Indeed, I find that my lack of knowledge of some of the technical aspects of naval warfare hurt my understanding. But the book has some tremendous insights. At first, I had trouble deciding exactly what the book was about. Rose discusses doctrine, training, how officers act and are chosen, how the ship mates thought and acted; however, he also talked about grand admirals, naval colleges, plans, and technology. After reading it, it is clear that the book is about EXACTLY what it is called -- naval power. And to Rose, everything matters, all of the aspects mentioned above. In essence, Rose appears to be a great believer that naval power is profound, but it must be used correctly. The navy must be built for the purpose it is used, and leaders and sailors must be trained and work to that end. The book begins with, perhaps, the overestimation of sea power. Mahan's theories were universally believed, and the history of fleet building before WW1 is so linked to international power politics that it first reads like a book on Political Science. Over and over, the folly of breaking these axioms is displayed. The Germans build a powerful navy, and then don't use it. Rose agrees that Germany's building the large fleet inevitably lead to conflict with Great Britain, a horrible mistake, since Germany's natural enemies were France and Russia. Conversely, unlike many authors who make the same claim, Rose is even more critical of building the fleet and not ever using it. Rose discusses how a large and bold use of the fleet could have worked and been decisive. But the German fleet wasn't made to fit a doctrine and wasn't used to supplement the strategies of war. We also learn about heroes that aren't household names. The brilliant American Admiral, William Snowden Slim, and the genius of Japan, Sato Tetsutaro. I suspect there is a lot here to disagree about, but my son and I have been talking about his theories for weeks.

I am a little amazed when I realize how much I learned playing board games as a child and I doubt I'm alone. For example, I'd guess plenty of kids learned the fundamentals of world geography from Risk. While reading Volume One of Lisle Rose's Power at Sea, I kept going back to my days with Battleship: this book is a history of the ships from that game: destroyers, submarines, cruisers, battleships (of course), and even in a limited sense (for this volume), aircraft carriers. Volume One is subtitled The Age of Navalism and covers 1890 to 1918. The starting point is significant in that it's around the beginning of the era of steel clad ships driven by steam (although there were predecessors even in the Civil War with ships like the Monitor). The Age of Sail in warfare was over. The concluding point is more easily defined: the conclusion of World War I. Prior to the Great War, the navies were beginning to develop more and more powerful ships, particularly battleships and their smaller, faster cousins, the cruisers. Governments became obsessed with the strategic value of these fleets, but the transition was far from painless: besides beings expensive, they were generally untested. Although other countries are discussed, the three nations most discussed are Britain, Germany and the United States. Britain had the biggest navy, the better to support its far-flung empire. Germany, with ambitions of its own, decided that a strong navy was important to remain competitive with Britain. The U.S. developed greater strength primarily to protect its interests in the Americas and the Pacific. When World War I broke out, the naval conflict was untested ground (or ocean) for all involved, and it became obvious that there were significant problems with battle strategies; too much naval brass still though in terms of sailing ships. In addition, both the German and British navies were very aristocratic, with officers treated very well and most regular sailors mistreated. The U.S. Navy, while not perfect, was more respectful to its crews (due in part to the more democratic principles of the country in general). In fact, Rose depicts the U.S. as looking the best of the big navies in World War I. This is not a perfect book. For one thing, I found Rose's writing slow going at times, though it did eventually pick up. Another issue is that he is focuses so much on the big picture we don't get much of a picture about how life was on these ships; yes, we are told that things were rough, but for the most part, we only see the ships from the outside, not how they looked from within. Finally, Rose assumes a basic knowledge of ships on the reader's part: if you don't know what distinguishes a cruiser from a destroyer, he doesn't provide much beyond the most basic details. With these caveats, this book is still good and informative and should be appreciated by those interested in learning about naval history.

This book is a history of global sea power during the critical period from the last decade of the 19th century through World War I. Lisle Rose keeps his book manageable in length while broad in scope. The rise of Japan to dominance in the Asian Pacific through sea power and its resulting threat to the United States share equal billing with the nation-states of Europe and the navies of the Atlantic. We are led through a review of the importance of sea power as a tool and manifestation of waning colonialism and rising industrialism. This allows for insights into the huge technological and cultural shift from the Age of Sail to the mighty dreadnaught and the new era of undersea warfare and air power. The stubborn resistance of social stratification from an aristocratic past to the adaptations required by rapid advances in technology and industry is explored, which is to say that the common seaman is not ignored. We are continually reminded that his training and treatment were often archaic and unjust, although he was, in the final analysis, the true source of naval power. Rose leaves plenty of time for the theorists and titular leaders, egos and all, but their roles are placed in a large perspective. There is a liberal sprinkling of anecdotes and quotations, which add interest and bring history alive. We are, for example, deftly told that the American navy had an underside along with its justifiably proud past when we learn that a young George Dewey, later to become famous at Manila Bay, once "found over a hundred men in chains between the guns and rioters in possession of part of the lower decks." Along with the sweep of history there is technical review of naval design, production and budgeting in readable form. Rose does not exaggerate, but his engaging style serves to highlight his dramatic descriptions of the tensions, uncertainties and horrors of sea warfare. This is a thoughtful, well-written book, which will be fascinating and informative for navy buffs and historians, as well as those who just enjoy a good read.

As a former naval officer and, for the last six years, a docent at the USS Lexington (CV-16) museum, I have had a strong interest in the history of the US Navy for some time. I found Dr. Rose's first volume of Power at Sea an outstanding read. What I particularly liked was that, rather than a dull retracing of each and every historical event, it was an easily read, fascinating, and insightful foray into how the major nations used, or misused, sea power during the age of the battleship. The book unifies the different threads of naval development into a consistent whole and, in the process, brings to light areas of influence the average reader may not have considered. I recommend this book as an enjoyable addition to the library of any person interested in the naval history of the battleship era regardless of their academic background.