Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg

There are several excellent reviews of this book in existence, and I focus my review mostly on details not covered by them. This review is based on the 2004 hardback edition. Industrial capacity is the key to modern warfare, and the extreme asymmetry (using modern parlance, and not Zaloga's) favoring the Germans began at that stage. Up to WWII, Germany had manufactured 1.4 million motor vehicles against Poland's 33,000 (p. 32). Germany was in a position to outspend Poland, in military matters, at 30:1 (p. 22), despite Herculean efforts by the latter. Nominal static asymmetry in such things as airplanes, tanks, and artillery favored the Germans at approximately between 4:1 to 8:1 (p. 23, 31). But, since German weapons were more modern, the effective static asymmetry was easily 10:1 or more. Since only 65% of Polish forces had been fully mobilized (p. 39: as a result of western pressure for Poles not to "provoke" Hitler), the effective static asymmetry became even greater. Finally, owing to the fact that the German forces enjoyed greater mobility and modern communication (e. g., p. 32, 67, 70), they could use their arms more effectively than the Poles could whatever little they had. Owing to these tactical advantages, the dynamic asymmetry favoring the Germans became much greater than the effective static asymmetry already in their favor. Zaloga discusses the failure of the British and French to live up to their treaty obligations towards Poland in 1939: "Hitler had hoped that Britain and France would abandon Poland altogether. Their timid response left the Poles to their fate. France threw away one of its great strategic opportunities, as German forces in the west were too thin to repulse any full-scale assault. German officers interviewed about the campaign after the war expressed their firm belief that if France had struck with force in September 1939, its army would have reached the Rhine in a couple of weeks, and possibly won the war. France would have faced a far different army in 1939 than the one it confronted a year later." (p. 65) Ironic to the "Polish lancers charging German tanks" canard, the Polish cavalry had actually discontinued the use of lancers well before WWII (p. 7, 30)! Zaloga traces the origins of the German-propaganda tale (pp. 42-43), which unfortunately has proved to be so enduringly believed. (Myths survive when they meet needs. This one fulfilled the need of Poles to remember their struggle against a vastly technologically superior foe. It also met the needs of Polonophobes, as it ostensibly supported their prejudicial views of Poles as impetuous and stupid.)

I have collected a number of books on the Polish Campaign, but I have to say that this is the best, despite its short length. It not only gives an excellent overview of the campaign, but disproves a number of widely held myths (Polish cavalry charging tanks, Polish air force being destroyed on the ground on the first day) and covers a number of small unit combats in detail. I particularly enjoyed the description of a polish cavalry brigade stopping a panzer division on the first day. Talk about standing that myth on its head! The book also gives a good (if brief) description of the opposing forces. If there is a shortcoming, it is this last. I would have liked this section to be longer but, given the format, that would be unreasonable. There are plenty of sources on the German army; if you want to know more about the Polish forces, you can buy "The Polish Campaign 1939" by Zaloga and Madej (used) for 3 or 4 times as much. Otherwise, buy this book.

"Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg" is written by Steven J. Zaloga and illustrated by Howard Gerrard. In this 96 page volume, the author concisely outlines the German invasion of Poland, which began WWII. This includes: opposing commanders, opposing plans, opposing armies, the campaign, and the battlefield today. Throughout the entire book, there are many black-and-white photographs and several color maps. This is an excellent resource for those interested in the events and related issues of the German invasion of Poland in September 1939.

I was very pleased with Osprey's Essential History number 107, Poland 1939, Birth of the Blitzkrieg. Finally, an easy to read, concise, inexpensive book on the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany, and the beginning of World War II. I was impressed by the amount of detail that is crammed into this small book, and by the quality of the information as well.The author puts to rest some of the "romantic myths" about the Blitzkrieg in Poland: namely the idea that the German Luftwaffe destroyed all of the Polish airforce while they were still on the ground, and that the Polish cavalry, armed with lances, would routinely take on German Panzer tanks! While many of the Polish planes were destroyed while on the ground, many survived and dogged the German planes throughout the month long conflict (even if they were outclassed by the more modern German planes). The Polish cavalry, an elite force, trained with lances, but the author rightly discusses the tactics used by them, that is that they fought dismounted as rifled infantry.I was also impressed with the beautiful illusrations in the book as well, especially the one of the Polish artillery train blasting some Panzers!The only information lacking in the book was that of the Polish brigade, who retreated on foot and escaped from the German and Russian armies, and retreated to Tehran and lived to fight again.

In the Osprey Campaign series volume, Poland 1939: the birth of Blitzkrieg, Stephen Zaloga, a renowned expert on armored vehicles and eastern European military affairs, continues his tireless effort to bring the facts to Western eyes of the opening round of the Second World War. Readers familiar with Zaloga's 1985 full-length book The Polish Campaign 1939 will recognize the antecedents of this volume. Zaloga, an American who has enjoyed extensive access to Polish historical archives, seeks to de-bunk the myths about the Polish campaign of 1939 which were perpetuated by wartime Nazi propaganda and post-war ignorance caused by the Iron Curtain. Myths such as the tales of Polish cavalry charging German tanks with swords and the destruction of the Polish air force on the first day of the war are clearly exposed as falsehoods designed to boost Nazi military prowess to the world. As usual, Zaloga brings his extensive analytic skills and language skills together in concert to produce a valuable piece of research that would otherwise be unavailable to most English readers. Zaloga begins with a short introduction, a section on the origins of the campaign and a campaign chronology. In standard Osprey Campaign series format, Zaloga then has three sections covering opposing commanders, opposing plans and opposing armies, which comprise nearly a quarter of the volume. The campaign narrative itself, covering all major air and ground operations in the Polish theater between 1 September - 6 October 1939, is fifty pages long. Zaloga concludes with a four page aftermath section, notes on the battlefield today and a rather detailed guide to further reading. Ground order of battle information for the Germans, Poles and Soviets is provided, but there is unfortunately no listing of air units. This volume has five 2-D maps (dispositions on 1, 7 and 17 September 1939 and two on the Bzura River counterattack) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (the Polish defense of Westerplatte, the Battle of Mokra and the Battle for Warsaw). There are also three excellent color battle scenes: the cavalry defense at Mokra, a Stuka attack and street fighting in Warsaw. The overall graphic quality of this volume, including the numerous photographs, is excellent. There are many strong points in this short volume, even if much of the research is merely a refinement from his earlier volume. In particular, the defense conducted by a Polish Cavalry brigade at Mokra against the 4th Panzer Division on 1 September demonstrates that the initial German use of armored units in combat could be clumsy and costly at times. Zaloga makes a good point that initially the German Luftwaffe was doctrinally un-prepared for close air support missions for the army and instead could only employ pre-planned strikes determined by the air staff; after two weeks of war the Germans slow introduced the close air support techniques that would be successful in 1940-1941 (does this initial inability to