Philosophy and Social Hope

Rorty is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries not because he offers a new theory or new system, but precisely because he is so good at warning us about getting addicted to theories and systems. For this he is hated by many philosophers, despised by many in the literati, scorned by metaphysicians and clerics (as a nihilist or relativist), and reviled by philosophical purists who believe he gleefully misreads the works of their heroes and masters. But like acid on the dross of idiotic or, to be more charitable, useless ideas which have led many a thinker into the deep and twisted woods of high theory, never to be seen again, Rorty pours out his neo-pragmatist criticisms on the various "isms" that claim to be more in touch with the "real world" than their competitors. What is left after the acid bath is a stark realization that there is little that we have to build a better world than our strenuously forged concessions, compromises, agreements, collaborations, and conversations about what in fact having a better world means. This antifoundational view leaves wholly unsatisfied people who believe that something more concrete is needed to build the world into something more salutary and livable than it was yesterday. Rorty tells the reader that there is nothing more concrete than he or she, that the need for rationalist foundations is a diversion from the true font of social hope and freedom. In this, he surpasses even John Dewey in democratic credentials, although such a claim is seen as heresy in many philosophical circles. Unlike Dewey, Rorty offers no decision procedure for democratic practice. He bids us only to go and be democrats (his preference), or come up with your own good reasons for going in another direction. He will not clobber you with arguments proving the link between democracy and human nature. He will ask you to consider the advantages of his own preferences, and try to convince you to give them a shot. While Rorty does overstate his case, it isn't by very much, for in his view we must shake off the idea that we need more (or will get more) to resolve issues such as cloning, capital punishment, abortion or hyper-nationalism than consensus. Ultimately, every attempt to lay a philosophical foundation, to provide a rationalist bedrock for our choices and conduct, fails. Even the notion of "inalienable rights" is a fiction, but a good one that we embrace because of its use, because of how it organizes the societies that believe in it. Each foundation can be picked to pieces by other arguments and other social imperatives, or other changes in what the culture believes is relevant to itself. Democracy isn't better than Islamic or Christian fundamentalism; it is only better if a certain kind of freedom is more relevant than paradise in the next life. Rorty argues in this volume and elsewhere that we must get over philosophy and theory and instead roll up our sleeves and get to work in publ

This book serves as an excellent introduction to Pragmatism (or at least Rorty's interpretation.) Pragmatism is pretty radical--it challenges basic philosophic assumptions such as the Greek search for truth, as well as the Cartesian self. Consider this quote, which is quintessential Rorty from his essay "Ethics Without Principles": "Just as the pragmatists see scientific progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of appearance which hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, but as the increasing ability to respond to the concerns of ever larger groups of people--in particular, the people who carryout ever more acute observations and perform ever more refined experiments--so they see moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups of people (...) Pragmatists do not think of scientific, or any other inquiry, as aimed at truth, but rather at better justificatory ability--better to deal with doubts about what we are saying, either by shoring up what we have previously said or by deciding to say something different. The trouble with aiming at truth is that you would not know when you had reached it, even if you had in fact reached it. But you can aim at ever more justification, the assuagement of ever more doubt. Analogously, you cannot aim at 'doing what is right', because you will never know whether you have hit the mark. Long after you are dead, better informed and more sophisticated people may judge your action to have been a tragic mistake, just as they may judge your scientific beliefs as intelligible only by reference to an obsolete paradigm. But you can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and ever greater satisfaction of ever more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of something nonhuman luring us human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting more and more human beings into our community--of taking the needs and interests and views of more and more diverse human beings into account. Justificatory ability is its own reward. There is no need to worry about whether we will also be rewarded with a sort of immaterial medal labelled 'Truth' or 'Moral Goodness.'"

This book is yet another good addition to the available texts by Rorty. As he says of debates on the matters he discusses, "I suspect that all either side can do is to restate its case over and over again, in context after context." This he has done, and done well, and it's badly needed.But, as far as I can tell, it remains flawed. No, I don't want to accuse Rorty of some shameful circularity, much less of the inanely conceived offense of "relativism." Rather, I believe that in misdecribing the relationship between philosophy and politics he understates the importance of what he is doing and provides readers wrongly with every reason to ignore it."Most of what I have written in the last decade consists of attempts to tie in my social hopes - hopes for a global, cosmopolitan, democratic, egalitarian, classless, casteless society - with my antagonism towards Platonism." Thus does Rorty begin the Preface to this book, though like all of his books this one devotes much effort to minimizing any possible connection between Rorty's two fields of interest. By the time we get to page 18, he denounces "the idea that you can evaluate a writer's philosophical views by reference to their political utility."This comes after he has criticized the philosophy he opposes as wasting human energy that could serve better purposes, and after he has defined truth in pragmatist terms as what it is useful to believe. Rorty is correct, of course, that a Platonist or a pragmatist can be a democrat or a facsist. But, when he says on page 18 that he finds "the orthodox" to be "philosophically wrong as well as politically dangerous," I think he is mistaken if he believes this to be a coincidence. He is wrong to separate these two characteristics in the case of many Americans today. I think he does so simply because the two things have appeared separately in other people.Call it "contingent" or "historical" or any other number of bad words, but I think it remains the case that much of what is ugliest in American politics is connected in the minds of its proponents with much of what is most metaphysical and morally weak in the world today. People fail to look beyond their narrow groups, declare certain sexual habits improper, decree that "the market" not be interfered with or that the races not mingle, and that dollars constitute protected speech - and they do so, many of them, metaphysically. Homosexuality, they say, is evil because God said so. Of course the two can be separated. Atheists can condemn homosexuality and Platonists can - like many of the characters of the Dialogues - accept it. But the two ideas go together in many minds right now, and removing either one weakens the other. If you turn a Christian gaybasher into a pragmatist, you make him less likely to bash gays (and to accept the valuable teachings of Christianity as opposed to its theism). If you turn a Christian gaybasher into an acceptor of gays, you

Once upon a time, philosophy was not a "science." It was conversation with fellow town members about the best way to govern the town, whether the town should plant corn or rice, what punishment is necessary for a certain crime. This conversation unfortunately found itself getting on within an ever smaller group of people--specialists--who told the town what the best way to govern was, what crop the town should plant, and how they should punish criminals. This is the current state of philosophy. Rorty, in his usual straight-forward, witty, sarcastic tone, deflates, again and again, the pomposity of those who feel as if they are in some annointed position to tell us how to be (for lack of a better word for it). Rorty allows for a choice--options that allow for growth, both in a self-narrative way and within the framework of the national narrative, which Rorty feels must be revitalized if our nation is to be more safe, kind, hopeful, and truly democratized. The cogency of his arguments and the conviction of his beliefs remind the reader that some philosphers (Rorty and many of the his "heroes") do have visions that are not intended solely for those with Phd's in philosophy, but are for everyone to share. A first-rate, concise, entry into one of the most original thinkers of our time.

Richard Rorty has been enlivening the American intellectual scene for two decades now. His prose is fluid, clear, and graceful. This is perhaps his first collection of essays aimed at the average educated reader (as opposed to his fellow philosophers). It opens with a wry mini-autobiography, followed by three linked essays where Rorty, once again, makes his case for American pragmatism. There is also a fine discussion of Thomas Kuhn and a provocative piece about Heidegger's Nazism. The essay on Religion As Conversation-stopper is also first-rate. Unfortunately, Penguin has issued this book on cheap paper and the print font is minuscule-- America'a most interesting philosopher deserves better!