Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower

"Phantom Soldier" should be on the reading list of every force professional in America--despite author Poole's almost arrogant assertion that Americans do everything wrong. As with most prophets, he overstates the case. For example, Poole keeps harping on how America is focused on "technology" when he means "hardware." Technology is much more than hardware--it is the practical application of knowledge. The tactics and techniques discussed in "Phantom Soldier" are knowledge, practically applied. It is true that American military people brag about "American initiative" while tightening top-down control over the individual front-line infantryman. It is also true that infantry training could be better. The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are changing the military--with large numbers of Internet-savvy soldiers and Marines on-line, tips and tactical techniques are being swapped with a speed that makes the ossified TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) seem AWOL. Many of Poole's recommendations are being put into practice already. There's still a lot to be done. The descriptions of how the Oriental warrior thinks and fights are accurate. As for the details on the battles, there is a lot of room for doubt. Poole said it himself--the Oriental warrior shows a false face, letting us see only what he wants us to see, which is often merely reinforcing our own false premises. But saying that the East is behind the West in technology is inaccurate. Oh, perhaps the hardware in the East isn't as new, but quite often the hardware isn't appropriate to the battlefield. Displaying a false face is a technology. Avoiding the use of electronic communications is a technology to defeat our mastery of the air waves. Hardware always brings new problems to the situation it was supposed to solve--using these new problems to defeat the hardware's advantage is an old technique. The United States infantry has always suffered disadvantages and had advantages over its foes. In the French and Indian Wars, the colonial militia was famous for adopting Indian techniques and beating the Indian at his own game. These techniques were wrongly credited with defeating the world's then-finest army, the British Royal Army--not true. The difference between victory and defeat is often just a matter of perception. Poole brings this out on the chapters concerning Vietnam. It was often the case that both the American and communist forces involved in a battle could declare victory--which flies in the face of zero-sum common sense. Most people would logically conclude that one side would lose and the other would win--and that's that! A significant minority will concede that perhaps both sides can emerge as losers from the same battle. Victory in battle is a matter of achieving specific "successes," such as the western notions of seizing real estate, capturing weapons and personnel, and counting enemy dead. By these metrics, the United States lost the Revolutionary

A "must-read" for anyone who truly wants to understand small unit tactics. Studying the western way of war is only half of the equation. Reading and absorbing the lessons in this book is the other half - the most important half.This well-written and well-researched book is sorely needed in today's U.S. military. To all those blinded by the technologies involved in transforming the U.S. military, or the so-called "revolution in military affairs," this book should serve as a 'reality check.' Poole repeatedly shows how the Western over-reliance on ordnance and technological superiority was effectively countered by adversaries who recognized the West's strengths and consciously decided to focus on small unit tactics and training. Poole's message (some may call it a warning) is clear: the West will never live up to its military potential (or up to its over-inflated militarily superior opinion of itself) if it continues to ignore pursuing the tactical excellence needed to complement its unquestioned technological superiority. The real transformation or revolution in military affairs should be the paradigm shift to ensuring that our individuals and small units are as tactically proficient as they are technologically advanced. This book can help all Western military decision-makers think differently about warfighting and can help save lives on the battlefield.

Phantom soldier" clearly brings the lessons of recent military history to our vision. In these new wars, the lonely American soldier, the nineteen-year-old infantryman carrying rifles with bayonets fixed and grenades dangling from his web gear, must go into the very foreign deadly tall grass and trees, the dark-canopied jungle, the high and incredibly tough mountains, the dense confusing deadly maze of the teeming cities of Asia, and as individuals, in squads and in platoons find the enemy and fight him in his backyard, with this rifle, grenade and bayonet. This is extremely foreign to a young American soldier's experience. These strange tactics, effectively blunts our strength in firepower and forces us to operate in a small-unit infantry war of soldier to soldier, rifle to rifle, bayonet to bayonet; which requires the basic small units, squads and platoons, to be very effectively trained. War stories and movies are very popular, because history and adventure come together, with the thrill of rolling the dice in the most ancient of all of man's activities - war. "Phantom Soldier" vividly presents the actions the infantryman takes to build bunkers, set-up ambushes, attack a fortified and entrenched position covered by machine guns, and react when ambushed. In "Phantom Soldier" these Sergeants and Privates are soldiers of the countries that we fight: Japanese, Somalians, Arabians, Vietnamese, and German. "Phantom Soldier" explains in great detail the very different historical perspectives, living conditions, terrain, resources and worldviews that have produced different ways of warfare. This very interesting and unusual book is about the warfare of these oriental peoples', a war of camouflage, hit and run tactics, ambush, booby traps, sniping and of the "Phantom Soldier", the one we cannot seem to find, but finds us all the time. "Phantom Soldier" dispels the commonly believed myth that battles go to the toughest soldiers, with the most resources. Rather it brings reality to the fore, by showing that it is usually the side that fights the smartest that wins and it is the military strategies and tactics that create these winning methods. "Military strategy" is the overall direction followed in fighting the war, and "military tactics" are the ways the fighting is actually implemented on the ground by the fighting soldiers. This fact is the major intellectual contribution of "Phantom Soldier". John Poole is a recognized and noted expert on the history of small unit battlefield tactics. He explains, that the current American military strategy consists of massing a strong enough contingent of troops and supporting firepower in the form of artillery, air support and naval gunfire to completely crush and overwhelm the enemy in face-to-face confrontations. The famous "set-piece' battle, in which our strategy is simply to blow the enemy up and win. Our current military leaders believe that our industrial might and technological advantage

RE: The Phantom Soldier,I spent over 15 years of my life with the US Army Armor Recon, known as Armored Cavalry. Three overseas tours including the Gulf War, I wish this book had been written then. The problem with today's military is that we forget the lessons of the past wars and we don't keep comprehensive records of tactics and hard earned lessons - Part One, -The Eastern Way of Attack-, Chapter 14, -How Much Has War Changed? Chapter Three, - The False Face and the Art of Delay-. Are some of the exceptional pieces of work in his book, among the chapters. The Phantom soldier points out our strengths and weakness, as well as enemy's on the battlefields of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Korea was one of the most painful wars that the US fought, The Vietnam War, a few short months of training and you were off to war, and that training was mostly marching and polishing boots. The enemy today as seen in Afghanistan, fighting has been a way of life as soon as they can walk. A strong knowledge base is needed more so now that ever. This book will be an asset on the today's battlefield as much as the rifle. I think the ancient Philosopher and Military General Sun -Tzu said it best " One seeks victory before the battle, by knowing oneself and the enemy -. does one defeat the enemy"The author continues to provide hard learned information in his book series, paid for in the lives of Americans. For the worst thing in battle is , How does the enemy fight, and how can I fight him? Stephen E Hughes

Retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel John Poole has written a timely book to help soldiers understand the enemy and to learn how to fight in the post-911 wars. Based on ancient Chinese writings, some only recently made available, historical example, and his own experiences, Poole takes away a large part of the mysticism surrounding the tactics and thinking of the armies of the shadows. Further, he has the audacity to suggest that the American combat forces adapt to, if not adopt, many of these ideas. One of the most chilling passages in Poole's book is a reflection from the 36 Stratagems, a Chinese work relatively new to the West, which translates to: "Kill with a borrowed knife or sword". Further, it is not a big stretch to link the Japanese Kamikazes in World War II to the terrorists' crashing of airliners into buildings at the beginning of this new war. This is not a book for the advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs. While Poole does not reject the RMA, he is clearly down in the weeds where the American fighting man will be. Nor will this book please the cognoscenti who have never seen the face of war, but this is a book that will save American lives. How can these third world armies of the night stand up to the might of the American military machine? Poole's answer is that by using maneuver against an attrition-oriented army, these enemies have been able to wreak havoc. The focus of our asymmetric enemies is squad level tactics and low tech weapons. American Special Forces in Afghanistan have perhaps taken a page from Poole's book in applying the American Way of War asymmetrically to the elusive Taliban and Al Qaeda enemies. Operating from the ground and with indiginous forces, the Special Operations teams adapted to the environment, advised alliance forces, and provided timely direction of some very effective precision air power enabling the ground war to succeed. Clearly, however, as Poole warns, the illusive enemy is still underground, both literally and figuratively, and this is but Phase I of a long war. It is time to revisit the long-enduring fascination with Clausewitz. The new face of war has little relation to Clausewitz, but there are many parallels with Sun Tsu. Before we can begin to fathom the terrorist or the Eastern way of war, we should be compelled to learn more about Sun Tsu and his progenies. Poole points out the major differences between the Sun Tsu and Clausewitz approaches: "While the Eastern commander avoids combat wherever possible, his Western counterpart seeks it". Moreover, the reader is led into a practical description of the Eastern philosophy of the I Ching (Book of Changes), and how it applies to Eastern tactics in a way that is easily understood by the average Joe. Lieutenant Colonel Poole is clearly in the maneuver warfare camp. His mentors include the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF of OODA Loop fame, William S. Lind, author of The Maneuver Warfare Handbook, and Colonel David Hackworth US