Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967

Quandt's Peace Process is a terrific encyclopedia of American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. I found it engaging, thoughtful and fair. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in American diplomacy toward the Middle East.

The Peace Process in Israel and Palestine is not going to come anytime soon. Israel has not given up its land and the Palestian people refuse to stop fighting for their homelands. It is a terrible state of affairs because the Israelis are getting so much military funding from the big Western governments such as the US and the Palestinians have not only the seen the destruction of their homeland but they have also witnessed the incredible destruction of their people. This book is a summary of all the major agreements since the 1946 UN declaration of the state of Israel up until the Camp David peace talks in 1996 during President Clinton's campaign. It is pretty good at describing the basic ideas of the peace accords but gives no new information on the diplomacy.

This book provides an excellent analysis of the American involvement in the Arab Israeli conflict. It categorizes the conflict's resolution as a process evolving towards peace. The book picks up in 1967 with American involvement in trying to resolve the six day war and the aftermath where the Arab countries began thinking about a resolution to the conflict. The 1973 war marked another turning point in the conflict and the US response began to crystallize and become consistent with a possible solution. It became clear that the Soviet Union's quiet acquiesce would be necessary. The American negotiations are very clearly laid out in this book and the author does an excellent job of establishing motive. This is a wonderful book if you have a good knowledge of the conflict. For those seeking that history I would recommend Benny Morris book Righteous Victims. This book really shines in the Nixon and on era where the author clearly categorizes the diplomatic efforts of the Kissinger Shuttle, Camp David Accords, the Oslo agreements and the Road Map. Overall the author is fairly unbiased and places blame where appropriate. The one place where this is lacking is in the analysis of George W. Bush. While Bush has done little towards solving the crisis the second to last chapter is more about the war in Iraq and why it was a bad plan than why it detracted from the ability to focus on the Arab Israeli conflict. Despite this it is still the best book we have on American diplomatic history in this conflict and well worth the time to read if you want to understand the conflict.

If you are a patient reader, and want to know how the United States has been involved in the Mid-East Peace Process since 1967, this is an amazing book. It helped me understand the roots of anti-Americanism. The later presidents are subjected to more analysis by Quandt than the earlier ones.

This detailed account of the American peace process in the Arab Israeli conflict is written by William Quandt, who has served Nixon and Carter on the National Security council.Quandt tells what diplomatic moves the United States made to bring peace between Israel and the Arabs.The account begins with the Six Day war. After the Six Day war the Arabs wanted Israel to give back land they had taken and justice for the Palestinians. The Israelis wanted peace and the Arabs to recognize Israel's right to exist. But the Israelis had no intention of giving up land, and the Arabs were not likely to recognize Israel's legitimacy Tension existed in the Middle East until war broke out again in October 1973. Kissinger had ignored the Middle East until then, after which he negotiated continually in the Middle East under Nixon and Ford to bring peace to keep the Soviets from exploiting the chaos. Carter started negotiations in the 70s, after Begin began construction of settlements on the lands captured in the Six Day war, indicating that the lands would be permanently held by Israel, making peace with the Arabs much more difficult. Carter worked hard to gain peace between Israel and Egypt which cost him in domestic politics. Carter mentioned the Palestinians for the first time in the negotiationsUnder Reagan there were a lot of plans, but little was accomplished. After the Gulf War Bush restarted peace negotiations, hoping that the Palestinians support of Saddam Hussein would weaken them, and the collapse of the Soviet Union would remove support for the Arabs. Quandt ends with an account of Clinton's attempts at peace in the Mideast.Quandt concludes that certain conditions must be met to gain success. There must be a realist appraisal of the regional situation, presidents like Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan considered Mideast policy as part of US Soviet relations. The President and his top advisors must work together in the negotiations, not like in the Rogers plan. There must be domestic support for American policy, a problem for Carter. Success as a mediator depends on a feeling for both process and substance. There must be quiet negotiation and preparation for negotiations. Pressure only succeeds if carefully exerted. Timing is crucial for successful negotiations.Because this book is about the peace process between America and Israel, there is almost no information about the domestic politics of any countries, especially the Arab countries. This book includes a good bibliography, and some good maps.