Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World

At the end of World War I, between January and July 1919, many of the world's leaders gathered In Paris to draw up a peace treaty and to plan the formation of a League of Nations. Although hundreds of delegates arrived from nearly every would-be state in Europe and from as far away as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, most of the important decisions at the Paris Conference were made by Woodrow Wilson, England's Lloyd George, and France's Georges Clemenceau, with Vittorio Orlando of Italy playing a secondary role. In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) Wilson's uncompromising idealism, Lloyd George's lack of confidence, and Clemenceau's fears of German reemergence, the Conference assembled a treaty that "grappled with huge and difficult questions," and, MacMillan argues, "if they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse." One thing is clear, however: regardless of their rightness or wrongness, expertise or incompetence, the peacemakers made decisions that resonated for the rest of the century and still echo in the 21st century: between Serbia and Croatia; among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus; throughout the Middle East (especially Iraq and Palestine); across the African continent; and in the Korean peninsula. Because of the importance of the Treaty of Versailles on subsequent events, "Paris 1919" is essential--and riveting--reading for understanding the world today. At times, the conference proceedings display all the gravity of a game of Risk. The major participants repeatedly exhibit an appalling ignorance of geography, an artlessness in dealing with non-European powers, and (for all their talk of self-determination) a callousness towards territorial viability. During one of the Conference's nadirs, when the future of Asia Minor was thrashed out, Arthur Balfour exclaimed in disgust: "I have three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there and partitioning continents with only a child to take notes for them." MacMillan acknowledges that the "offhand treatment of the non-European world" caused serious problems that we are still paying for today. And, among many other examples, she indicates how actions taken at the Peace Conference led to the horrifying destruction of Smyrna three years later. By the end of such a fascinating narrative, one that almost insistently seems to portray the superpower leaders as unsophisticatedly idealistic and patronizingly egocentric, it is still startling for the reader to come across this argument: "The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame" for World War II and the subsequent rise of Germany. True, MacMillan makes a strong and convincing case (as have other historians before her) that German reparations were not as injurious as many have claimed. She further argues that the real problem was not the treaty itself but that it "was never consistently enforced." But this begs the question: what good is a treaty that, as she repeatedly indicates, never had a chance of enforcement? I think wha

For the last couple of weeks, since finishing "Paris 1919", I have grappled with writing a review that would do justice to a book that is not only excellent reading, but also has the potential to reshape the way a reader views current events. Rather than wait longer for the writing muse who refuses to appear, I will take the more direct approach and simply write, "Buy this book and read it. It will afford you a greater understanding of international events unfolding in the world today." Margaret Macmillan is an exceptional history writer: engaging, direct and interesting (sometimes even funny), but also a wide-ranging thinker who see and explains the vast sweep of history as well as the apparently minor ripples. She juggles the enormous cast of characters in the drama that unfolded in Paris, 1919 and explicate the myriad brought to the major players at the peace conference. Her knowledge of world history and her ability to explain it concisely are fully illustrated in her explanations of the various ethnic claims for land and self-rule individual; her ability to compare and contrast these claims is extraordinary. She quickly reduces the Big Five to the Big Four, as the Four themselves did when they eliminated the Japanese representative from most of the debate and negotiation - he could barely follow the mostly English conversation anyway. Her descriptions of the Big Four (who eventually operated, without Italy, as the three), though apparently honest and precise, are hardly flattering:*Wilson, preoccupied with his Fourteen Points and convinced that all would be well if the peoples of the world were allowed to practice self-determination (even though the definition varied depending upon the case and people)*Lloyd George, determined to expand the British Empire at all costs, but who proved, ultimately, to be the mediator between Wilson and Clemenceu*Clemenceu, torn between extracting vengeance on Germany (in the form of reparations and a land buffer) and expanding French holdings*Orlando, whose overwrought, weeping behavior eventually embarrassed the other three and led them to exclude him from many major decisions, eliciting further weeping and an eventual walk-out (followed by a less-than-noble return)That these four thought they could accomplish the multi-pronged task they assigned themselves - to deal with the defeated Germany, to establish national boundaries that would help ensure future world peace and to establish an organization to help enforce that peace - now seems naïve. As Ms. Macmillan illustrates, the participants appear to believe they could accomplish their goals. However, as she also illustrates, time and again, as each the discussion on question reached a stalemate, the Four either delayed a final decision or deferred the question to a committee for further study. As a result, many decisions remained unresolved while others had less-than-satisfactory solutions.She neatly and convincingly debunks the theory that the financia

Six months that changed the world, indeed. It is not often these days that a subtitle for a work of history that claims so much (and they often do) is actually accurate. Margaret Macmillan, in Paris 1919, backs up her subtitle completely in this brilliant work of history. The book examines the Paris Peace Conference in all its glory and all its infamy. Four, and sometime only three, men sat in a room and decided the future of the countries of the world and the fate of millions of people. It is both that simple and, equally, that complicated. This book brilliantly portrays these men but also, with just as much genius, many of the lesser officials who attended on behalf of either themselves or their (sometimes prospective) nations. So many sources are used, from either official documents to private letters, from so many countries that the book feels all-encompassing which is appropriate considering its vast topic, even, god bless the author, the little colony of Newfoundland finds space for a mention. This book will be the one to challenge in this new century concerning the peace conference as Keynes' was the one last century. A very impressive work and highly recommended.

There's an old adage that posits that the real outcome of a war is to teach one to hate one's allies more than than opne's enemies. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Olwen MacMillan and Richard Holbrooke outlines why this old adage exists. The book covers the 6 month period in mid 1919 where the victorious allies of WW I converged to carve up the spoils of war and how this exercise set the stage for most of the subsequent conflicts of the 20th century.While the book focuses on the Big Three Personalities of this exercise--Wilson (United States), Lloyd George (Great Britain), and Clemenceau (France) who dominated the critical aspects of the Paris Peace Conference-this focus doesn't detract from providing an encompassing review of the entire process as well as a detailed analysis of the devastating results of the conference. It delineates all too clearly how the best intentions can be overwhelmed by both insatiable avarice as well as unencumbered and unchecked egos in conflict.This is a timely book. As we are poised to invade Iraq and effect "regime change" it would be wise to look at a previous exercise in managing post war victory to be reminded of both the complexities as well as the risks involved in such an undertaking.Although an expressly historical tome, this is a well written and fast paced read.Probably the best historical work I read in 2002. Highly recommended.