One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964

In 1958, Fidel Castro and his band of guerillas successfully overthrew the despised Batista regime in Cuba. At the time, Castro was a question mark for US policymakers. He actually was invited to visit the US and gave a speech at Harvard. However, his domestic socialist reforms caused consternation in Washington, while the communist affiliations of his leading supporters (e.g. his brother, Raul, and Che Guevara) created outright alarm. The authors infer that in 1958 Castro could have gone either way, i.e. communist or non-communist. However, Washington's thinly veiled distrust and eventual outright hostility against him supposedly pushed him into seeking Soviet support. The book then continues, following Castro's ascension to power, his increasing fear of US-backed invasion, and his greater and greater demands for increased Soviet protection. Surpisingly, the Soviets initially had as little interest in Castro's Cuba as Washington. However, the Cold War was on, and Kruschev was eager to project Soviet influence at the expense of Mao's communist China. And what better way to assert Soviet prestige than by establishing a Soviet communist beachhead just off America's shores. As the US stepped up its belated and ineffectual covert operations aimed at destabilizing and eventually toppling the Castro regime, Castro sought ever more Soviet economic, and especially military, assistance. One of the Soviet's first major successes was in implementing the block surveillance program. Arms shipments became greater, more frequent, and more obvious. However, Soviet-Castro relations became endangered by one of Castro's rebellious communist lieutenants, and the Soviets were stymied by their deficiency in ICBMs. Thus, Kruschev made the fateful and audacious decision to deploy Soviet medium and intermediate range nuclear missiles and bombers in Cuba. Much of the rest of the story is well-known. American U2 reconnaisance flights over Cuba reveal the construction of Soviet missile and bomber bases. Kennedy goes on national TV to alert the US public to the crisis and gain support for potential military action. Behind the scenes, a deal is desperately sought to end the crisis. Ultimately, Kruschev publicly agrees to remove nukes from Cuba, while Kennedy privately agrees to reciprocate in removing American missiles from Turkey. The book reveals a great deal about how strongly individual personalities affect history and national leadership. It also demonstrates how completely inept and unrealistic the CIA's operations were in Cuba. There were a few times during Castro's rise to power that the US had a chance of courting him; however, their own ignorance of Cuba's internal politics assured they would never capitalize on it. From my standpoint, the entire crisis could have been easily avoided by resolute leadership in the White House - either make Castro an ally, oust him when he was still weak, or guarantee that Cuba will not be military threatened by

This is the best book I have researched on the subject matter of communist influence and power strugle within the Cuban Revolution. It also clearly depicts its evolution from a nationalist revolution to a dogmatic communist regime and executor of Soviet policy in the Americas.

Naftali and Fursenko have really exelled themselves in this book. I have recently done a college project on the crisis, and found this book to be the most informative and educating out of the 13 other books on the topic that I read. Thanks alot guys, you really helped!

In One Hell of a Gamble, Fursenko and Naftali cut to the heart of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the surrounding politics. Due to the end of the Cold War, they were able to obtain many first-hand accounts of the superpower rivalry from the participants themselves. Using this newfound knowledge, they craft a timeless account of the behind-the-scenes politics that formed the backbone of US-Soviet relations during the Kennedy era. A chilling perspective is offered on how close the world really came to nuclear annihilation in the fall of 1962. Congrats to Fursenko and Naftali for producing a gripping work that I highly recommend to all students of the Cold War or politics in general.

An absolutely fascinating background to an international crisis that nearly brought the planet to nuclear annihilation. This book has special relevance for anyone in the military at the time because it rounds out the picture of how those in positions of responsibility perform under pressure. From personal experience on the operational level, one witnessed a remarkable and understandable change in persons facing ultimate consequences. As at the top, most performed well, bringing a focus to their tasks previously not thought possible while wondering what motivated Krushchev to take such a gamble. The book serves to answer some of the questions. Interestingly enough the authors reveal that "Castro's July 26 movement was a coalition of professionals and Cubans of all political persuasions who were tired of decades of authoritarianism and official corruption," only to be replaced by a totalitarianism modeled on Soviet Russia. From a Canadian perspective, it makes the policy towards Castro understandable, given that the man's meglomaniac quest for unquestioned adoration and economic handouts drove him to him to accept nuclear-armed missiles to achieve those goals. The madness of it and Kruschev's compliance startling reveals the weakness in political leaders to perceive the ultimate consequences of their actions. This book reveals it on both sides of the equation. Highly recommended