On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero

This book is composed of a translation of Xenophon's Hiero, a commentary by Leo Strauss ('On Tyranny') on it, two essays (one by Kojève, one by Strauss) outlining the controversy between them and finally, in the latest edition, the correspondence between them. After reading the essays Kojève and Strauss aimed at each other one comes to suspect that the major difference between the two is how, precisely, philosophy is to rule the world. Strauss prefers the ancient way of moderately (and occasionally) influencing the Nomos while Kojève insists that Nomos (i.e., Law) must be exactly equal to Philosophy - or, more precisely, equal to exactly what philosophy wants of it. Thus Strauss is for 'ruling' while Kojève wants to Rule. Thus it really is very funny how Kojève 'accuses' Strauss of insanity! By this, Kojève only means that if a philosopher does not go forth and change the World he can never know that his understanding is not mere private fancy - that is, madness. Since Kojève believes that in order to be rational philosophy must rule all he accuses the practical moderation defended by Strauss of madness. Of course, one could moderately accuse Kojève's 'Enlightened' dream of One World of the same thing... Thus the argument between them is not whether philosophy should rule - but exactly how it should rule. Kojève believes that without the arrival of the Final Philosophical Artifact -the Universal Homogenous State (UHS)- philosophy is only a private mania. But Strauss says that the UHS will make philosophy impossible. To Kojève, the UHS is a monument to Philosophical Reason while for Strauss it is its tomb. Kojève invites Strauss to join him in making the UHS -it is a great honor!- but Strauss declines because he cannot bring himself to preside over the End of Philosophy. Thus it is very amusing that over the years, thanks primarily to Allan Bloom (who studied with both Kojève and Strauss) and students (of students) of Bloom there has arisen the 'Straussian' neoconservative position that it is the duty of US foreign policy to make the World into good democratic, liberal capitalists in the Euro-American vein. But this 'Straussian' neoconservative position really is at most a hybrid of Kojève and Strauss which leans decidedly in the Kojèvean direction. No? Then have the courage to read the exchange between Kojève and Strauss (Essays and Correspondence) and decide for yourself. For those that only have the old 1983 edition I want to point out, even insist, that the correspondence adds some nice touches to the argument between Kojève and Strauss that should not be missed. For instance, we see here quite clearly how important the Criterion of Knowledge is to Kojève's thought: "As regards myself, I came to Hegel by way of the question of criteria. I see only three possibilities: (a) Plato's-Husserl's "intuition of essences" (which I do not believe [for one has to believe it]); (b) relativism (in which one cannot live); (c) Hegel and "circularity.

This is a good book insofar as it brings to light the relation of (philosophical) thought to society. The Socratic irony found and brought out by Strauss within this book is that society itself tyrannizes thought. Thus Strauss can be seen as turning to the ancients in order to get his bearings in and on modernity. That is, this book can be seen as a response to one of the most profound philosophers of the last century who brought thought and society together in such a way that thought itself seemed (seems?) to be on the verge of extinction; Heidegger. A good companion piece would be Allan Bloom's _The Closing of the American Mind_. Bloom is actually cited on the back of the book as saying it is "must reading." This can be understood insofar as his own book is itself a meditation on the relation between thought and society as well, and thus he seems to be saying that someone like Strauss is necessary for our understanding of ourselves because he (Strauss) in some way understands the ancients better than we do and thereby understands modernity (ourselves) in a way that we cannot.

The writer of the above review has done a great job of conveying the basic arguments and value of Strauss's translation of the Hiero and his discussion with Kojeve. I think that there is yet more to be said. Strauss as a political philosopher argued the case that with Machiavelli modern political thought begins. One cannot help when reading the Hiero to begin to see further, it was already convincingly argued in Thoughts on Machiavelli, how Machiavelli's famous treatise The Prince is in many ways a response to this dialogue from Xenophon. The discussion of tyranny and the "joys" and "protections" that stem from such a life are questioned in the Hiero because of the ramifications of tyrannic rule. Strauss, in typical fashion, articulates and expands on the argument presented in the Hiero. The responses from Kojeve bring the classical into conflict with the most progressive of modern thought, the concept of the universal state. Particularly valuable in this edition is the collection of the correspondence of the two respondents which clarify, and present a more honest argument, the public discourse extant in the formal essays. Read this book as a companion to "The Prince" or studies of Hegel to see the dialogue between "Classical" and "Modern" or even "Post-modern" thought.

This astounding book, On Tyranny, pits Leo Strauss against Alexander Kojeve in the never ending battle of the Ancients against the Moderns. The book begins with the text of Xenophon's Hiero, followed by Strauss's in depth discussion of the Hiero. Then the fireworks start! Kojeve, in his discussion of Strauss's comments, will elucidate his peculiar mixture of Hegelian, Marxist, and Heideggerian philosophies in order to defend the unity of `Tyranny and Wisdom' at the end of history, with some amusing asides on Strauss's tendency to build a philosophical cult. Modern tyranny (Stalinism) is rational, or wise, because it leads to the universal, homogenous state. The state in which everyone -- people, politicians, and philosophers -- will be fulfilled. This state, where the people will be safe, politicians renowned, and philosophers enthralled by the rationality of it all, will happen as a result of historical action, or work. We will be living in a world that we made with our own hands. And, as the conflicts of history weed out ever more irrationalities, we come to feel more and more at home in this fabricated, technological world. This leads to less conflict and more fulfillment. Which means, as Kojeve said elsewhere, "History is the history of the working slave." This leaves some of us, Strauss included, wondering if the only thing more wretched than being a slave would be living as a contented one. Strauss comments on all this in a reply that briefly starts out with a discussion of Eric Voegelin but then turns to the main event. Strauss wants to know how anyone will want to live in this world where everyone thinks the same, feels the same, wants the same. A world in which anyone who thinks/feels/wants differently, as Nietzsche said, goes voluntarily to the madhouse. A world that as Reason is woven into it, Humanity is pushed out of it. His prescription is a return to the ancients, who, as the Hiero shows us, knew that philosophy both could not and should not be realized in time. Otherwise, Humanity will end up engulfed by its own artifacts. Or, as Ernst Juenger remarked, "History is the replacement of men by things.