On the Origins of War

There are a lot of books that focus on battles in virtually all of the wars, but very few that actually focus on how wars came about. Usually, a book on the war spends a few pages discussing the origins in passing, then quickly moves on to the war itself. This book is very different, and focuses on how wars come about. The writing is terrific and the author's insights are very insightful. The sections of this book explaining the origins of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are especially good. In addition to history readers, I would recommend this book to those looking for books on leadership and crisis management, because the author focuses on the decisions made by leaders on both sides of various conflicts and explains how those decisions, in light of the existing circumstances, led to an often unintended outcome.

There are a lot of books that focus on battles in virtually all of the wars, but very few that actually focus on how wars came about. Usually, a book on the war spends a few pages discussing the origins in passing, then quickly moves on to the war itself. This book is very different, and focuses on how wars come about. The writing is terrific and the author's insights are very illuminating. The sections of this book explaining the origins of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis are especially good. In additon to history readers, I would recommend this book to those looking for books on leadership and crisis management, because the author focuses on the decisions made by leaders on both sides of various conflicts and explains how those decisions, in light of the existing circumstances, led to an often unintended outcome.

Mr. Kagan compares the origins of four wars, the Peloponnesian War, the First World War, the second Punic War, the Second World War and a crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, that did not lead to war. Mr. Kagan main point is that most countries involved in these wars had no real want or need of war, and indeed, the steps taken by the leaders to avoid war often lead to war. He recommends an aggressive foreign policy approach in which potential adversaries clearly know your intentions. His description of the Cuban Missile Crisis in particularly instructive. American's military strength is far greater than the Soviet Union but President. Kennedy is a very indecisive, always afraid of miscalculation. First, the Bay of Pigs was a flop and an embarrassment. President Kennedy then tries to show Khrushchev how tough he was in Vienna but comes across as very weak. Mr. Kennedy then takes no action on the Berlin Wall. Khrushchev is now certain that Kennedy can always be pushed and so sends missiles to Cuban. War was only avoided because of Americans "great military strength that brought safety in the crisis."Highly recommended.

If you are at all interested in international relations, politics, or war as subjects for study, why haven't you read this book? Kagan, without ever pressing home some pet thesis, lays out in detail the events leading up to four wars that were and one that wasn't. Aside from learning many lessons from these individual histories - states and individuals almost never truly want war, "honor" construed as a potential or actual presence in international affairs (deference, prestige, etc.) often winds up being crucial in triggering a conflict, wishful and idealistic thinking or a failure to recognize a threat to a rival nation's security or honor have often contributed mightily to growing conflicts, and many others - one will also get a vivid, in-depth account of some critical moments, accounts that are likely to stick in your mind better than a more general history. While some of Kagan's points may seem to lean toward the trivial when taken out of context and looked at in the clear light of day, it is the very fact that over many years and many events, a slow buildup toward war involves these very things - that at the time are much harder to see clearly - that contribute to movements that end in war. To see the many missteps in detail in these cases is fascinating. With the exceptions of Chamberlain and some of his cronies, and especially Kennedy, very few of the men in this book come off as anything approximating downright foolish; nevertheless, in these pages you will find many men, through many small mistakes, leading their nations to war.

I have read Thucydides and I wondered how anybody could write about the causes of that war anywhere near the quality of Thucydides. But Kagan did it. His chapter on the Peloponnesian War was so intersting that I read it and the World War One chapter twice! He really shows the reader how one event leads to the next to the next and finally to the outbreak. His thesis about how World War Two started was clearly proven. The Cuban Missile Crisis was another very interesting chapter. He reaveled details in such a way that I wondered how Kennedy can be considered such a great president. I thought the Second Punic War chapter could have had some more work, it was very short and was not as in depth as the other four chapters. His choices for the wars he used are excellent. It was great how he kept interlocking the Peloponnesian War and World War One and how he showed the many similarities between the Second Punic War and World War Two. His students must be so lucky to have him as a teacher. He proves his point in this enjoyable philosophy book.