On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War

This book is very readable. Almost anyone could pick it up and get through it. Col. Summers writes in a clear, concise style that gets straight to the point. The review of our national policy and military strategy during the Vietnam War is brutally honest and points out the definite limitations on what our armed forces can accomplish and what we, as citizens, should all be aware of when our military forces are sent to war. This is particularly relevant today. The mistakes in the conduct of the war in Iraq become much clearer when you understand the basic principals of war. Understanding the real mistakes helped me strip away the political posturing (which there is far too much of on both sides) from the war and really understand what is happening. Since it seems likely that our forces will be sent to war again within our lifetime it would be very helpful if more Americans understood strategy and national policy better. It is, as Col. Summers makes clear, our army and we should know something about its use. I reccomend this book without reservation and urge you to buy and read it. It is a must read for all Americans.

Col Summers wrote the seminal book on what really happened to America in its involvement in the Viet Nam War. He clearly explains why we could not win it as we fought it and why we were constrained from fighting it to win. He ties these insights to the great philosophers of war (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz). This book was written in the late 1970s and served to greatly becalm the internal turmoil in the US military structure. Instead of "What happened" or "Who betrayed us;" talk turned to agreeing or disagreeing with the different parts of his theory. Most found it to be on the mark.If you want to know why we went in, read "The Pentagon Papers." If you want to know why we were doomed to fail when we did, read this. Well written, not dry or tedious, but complete.

This is the best and primary work on what went wrong with theU.S. military effort in Vietnam. Its biggest shortcoming isthat it does not indicate clearly its origin and importance.This was the U.S. Army War College's commissioned study ofwhat lessons should be learned from the Vietnam conflict. Itbecame the standard text, and the basis for the course, on thesubject, not only at the War College but also at its Navy andAir Force counterparts. These are the institutions where those selected as prospective generals and admirals are trained in the principles of flag-level command. (The book'shistory and importance are described at some length in Summers'sequel, _On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War_.)Following Clausewitz' classic overview, Summers meticulously shows how the U.S. failed to follow established principles of warfare and how these failures led to the bad result.The book's history as a War College study also explains somebiases and omissions. U.S. doctrine emphasized the defeatof the enemy's military, as Clausewitz did; Summers had nochoice but to follow Clausewitz and dismiss or ignore suchwriters as Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddell Hart, who argued for winning by attacking the enemy's will to fight. Yet his opening quote from the NVA colonel, and his selective use ofClausewitz (he quotes Clausewitz extensively on matchinggoals to available means, but not on defeating the main bodyof the enemy), put the real message there plainly enough,if between the lines: the U.S. paid too little attentionto the aspects of war that take place off the battlefield.This book will repay careful study. It certainly did forthe U.S. military, as the Gulf War attests.

Summers recounts an exchange between himself and a former NVA officer some years after the war. It went something like this Summers: "You never defeated us in the field." NVA Officer: "That is true. It is also irrelevant."I recently saw this bumper sticker on a Vietnam veteran's car: "I don't know what happened. When I left we were winning." To find out what happened, read this book. Summers gives an insightful critique of the strategic failure using the Nine Principles of War and the doctrine of Clausewitz.I read this book a few years before the Gulf War, and as I watched that war unfold, I kept "On Strategy's" teachings in mind. It seemed to me at the time that those charged with the conduct of the Gulf War effort were applying "On Strategy's" doctrine chapter and verse. Read the book and review the Gulf War effort, and see if you don't agree.

One of the enduring ironies of military history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank.To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers.ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades.ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoloenic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally.Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs.At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor it most senior commanders for their contributions to victory.A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summars' collar.- - - - - - - - - The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst.