On Certainty (Harper Perennial Modern Thought) (English and German Edition)

On face value, On Certainty is a surprisingly accessible Wittgenstein text, exploring the notions of epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scepticism (idea that true knowledge can be sought but cannot be found) or "knowing" and "doubting", however, the work, on closer examination, cleverly argues these positions in the epistemological tradition from clearly different perspectives, thus On Certainty is more complex than it appears. Written in the last eighteen months of Wittgenstein's life (the last entry days before his death) it is a response to Moore's articles, `Proof of the External World" and "Defence of Common Sense". According to the editors, Anscombe and von Wright, Wittgenstein told Moore that these were his best articles. In entry 83, Wittgenstein writes: "The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference". This is a foundationalist argument, proposing that our knowledge of the world and its truth, belongs to our particular frame of reference - context is everything, underlying all our assertions. Another perspective that Wittgenstein proposes is the position of Relativism: in this view there are no foundations or absolutes, truth changes with the times, circumstances and social conditions. He writes, 65: "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with concepts the meaning of words change." Interestingly, relativism is the perfect tool for the sceptic, because knowledge is depended on time and circumstances, and therefore can be sought, but never found. Doubt itself is depended on certainty, as one must hold a premise in order to reject it. 115: "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." In fact this, really, is the core premise of On Certainty that knowledge can only exist if doubt is possible. Doubt relies on content of what we know, our frame of reference that is inherent in all our assumptions regarding existence. Reading On Certainty is a stimulus for thought, pushing us to analyse our assumptions about knowledge, that truth depends on our concept frameworks through which we view the world. Recommended to all students of contemporary philosophy.

Wittgenstein hastily wrote "On Certainty" in his last days - several places he seemed frustrated that he was unlikely to be able to get his ideas across. However, this work distills most of his work on the foundations of knowledge in a manner that is quite accessible. In fact, this book should have been entitled something like "cutting through centuries of misguided notions" - you only get clarity of vision such as contained in this volume if you are lucky enough to get samadhi from "show me your original face".Wittgenstein used Moore's (in)famous paper that started with "knowing" his hand and then deduced the universe. Wittgenstein showed the inherent fallacy of this attempt and in the process paraded the naked emperor of metaphysics around in all its dualistic glory. For Wittgenstein really attacked the 'mapping' of what is really psychology into the analytic framework of philosophy.Wittgenstein pointed out that doubt is a 'game', in the sense that doubting must follow logical rules. The game runs aground when it attempts to doubt the actual framework - such as doubting your own existence. This is no longer part of the 'game' but instead is simply nonsense or, better, psychology.Wittgenstein wrote the book in his familiar style utilizing short semi-paragraphs to map out his arguments. I find the format quite similar to Eastern philosophy such as Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans and feel it is quite readable. Other people may want to buy Avrum Stroll's excellent "Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty" for a more 'standard' overview of the argments.This is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of philosophy.

On Certainty is an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's thought, especially for those who may be turned off by the terseness and impenetrability of the Tractatus. This piece is still terse by any standard but Wittgenstein's, and many statements are just clever one-sentence aphorisms that float by themselves, seemingly disconnected from the main thread of argument. Assertions are often left unproven, and the numbered-statements style can be tiring. Still, some numbered statements are actually several sentences long (!), and many actually go into detail -- this makes it is somewhat unusual among Wittgenstein's works. As is often the case with philosophers' works, a beginning student would be well advised to proceed into Wittgenstein's works in reverse chronological order. The early Wittgenstein -- of perfect edifices of language and logic -- may be better understood in light of the later Wittgenstein, of social constructs and language games.Where does Wittgenstein come down on the question of epistemological relativism? In classical paradoxical Wittgensteinian fashion, he is both for and against, sort of. He admits that he is certain of some things, and that he often thinks that someone who is not certain of these things (e.g., "This is my hand." etc) as not "reasonable." But he does not go so far as to say there is an objective truth on a Platonic plane. Certainty is more personal than that (a la Michael Polanyi?), and in some deep axiomatic way, has to be taken on faith. We are ultimately certain of things just because we are certain of them, and, as Wittgenstein writes about the statement "this is my hand," any evidence we could muster to support such a statement is not as strong as the original statement itself.Overall, this is a fascinating look at the interplay of language, belief, and epistemology, from one of the 20th century's master philosophers.

A very important book for understanding the current debates about the nature of consciousness. W distinguishes between being certain of something because it is certainly true, and being certain of something because nothing would make sense without it.Very readable, for W.