The Nuremberg Raid: 30-31 March 1944

The Nuremberg Raid by Martin Middlebrook is an outstanding description of a British bombing raid against the city of Nuremberg. In telling this story, there are two major sections, the lead-up to the raid and the raid itself. The section leading up to the raid tells the general history of British bombing in WWII, what drove the British to bombing at night, their track record bombing at night, and there recent targets. In addition, Mr. Middlebrook gives us a description of Bomber Command, it's men and their aircraft along with a similar description of the German forces. The heart of the book deals with the actual raid itself. In these chapters, Mr. Middlebrook goes thru painstaking details about the bomber-stream and the events that occur to the bomber-streamer. In here, we learn about how this is the deepest penetration by the British, how the German night fighters responded to the raid, and how the raid was not compromised before hand. Mr. Middlebrook gives excellent details on the shoot down of most of the 96 bombers lost. Of particular interest was how British bomber pilots thought that the German had a gun that fired scarecrow shells (they exploded so as to look like a bomber being hit, in actuality, it was British bombers being hit by Schrage Musik). Also of interest was the British use of Serrate Mosquitoes to intercept the Germans. This is an outstanding book. Once more, Mr. Middlebrook has hit a homerun. I'll give this one 5 out of 5!

This is an energetic, fascinating story of a Bomber Command raid on Nuremburg that went tragically wrong. Weather, routing, German response, winds, etc. all went against the British effort to result in the largest loss of aircraft in Bomber Command's history--almost 100 aircraft out of almost 800 that took off. Worse, the Germans did not suffer any significant damage. Middlebrook, author of several bomber force WW2 books, mixes documentary evidence and personal interviews to great effect. More importantly, Middlebrook uses this Nuremburg raid to demonstrate 1) the inherent dangers of any Bomber Command operation; 2) why the seemingly inhumane area bombing tactics were what they were; and 3) the courage and endurance of bomber command (and German) airmen. Middlebrook balances every aspect of the air war history very well. His books have an excellent strategic overview, while focusing in great detail on the specific events over the several days in question. He does not go into too much detail on any one aspect; they are all balanced very well. These include personal recollections, technical characteristics, organization, official orders, and his personal commentary. In this book he especially emphasizes the tragedy, and my point of view the greatest loss, of the bomber command effort: that their own countrymen disdained and looked down upon their sacrifices and efforts. As Middlebrook notes the men of Bomber Command fought longer and lost more people (about 25,000) than the greater acclaimed Battle of Britain pilots. It is hard to read just one of Middlebrook's bomber books; they are complementary and I recommend all of them equally.

This is probably Martin Middlebrook's best-written account of an RAF Bomber Command Operation in the Second World War. Middlebrook wants the reader to believe that Air Marshal Harris, the commander of Bomber Command, was correcting in pursuing his night-time area bombing philosophy instead of trying to hit military or industrial targets with precision daylight strikes. Throughout, Middlebrook's sympathies and admiration for the brave RAF bomber crewmen that he knew from his youth are clear. Yet this book pushes a point of view that borders on religious or zealous faith, rather than a level-headed assessment of the facts. What pushes Middlebrook over the edge of reason here is the nature of his subject. While Middlebrook's other bomber books on Hamburg, Berlin and Peenemunde covered costly but successful operations (more or less), the raid on Nuremberg in March 1944 was an unmitigated disaster. RAF bomber command suffered its heaviest losses in one night of the war and inflicted negligible damage on the enemy. Middlebrook begins with several very informative chapters that detail the bombing campaigns in Germany during 1939-1943, the composition of the bomber units that would take part in the raid and the German defenses. As usual, Middlebrook is very thorough and the order of battle is very detailed. However, shows a very profound bias toward area bombing throughout and it starts in assessing the three major raids just prior to the Nuremberg raid. Middlebrook makes a very important point when he states that, "even in non-cloud conditions the bombing results on Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Berlin had been poor ...bombing photographs indicated that not one aircraft released its load within the city's limits!" The point is that RAF Bomber Command did not have the capability to destroy cities because they couldn't hit them and that Air Marshal Harris knew this but continued on with an area bombing campaign that had degenerated into random killing. Wars are won by killing the right people at the right moment, not by killing randomly. The pre-mission briefs to are covered in great detail and it appears that the intent was to deceive the crews about the nature of the mission, the strength of the enemy defenses and even the weather. The night chosen for the attack was poorly suited for infiltrating a 700+ stream of bombers across Germany due to the illumination from the moon and lack of cloud cover, but Harris ignored these facts and the crews were filled with overly-optimistic estimates. It is also significant that Harris chose an aim point in Nuremberg well away from the MAN tank plant (Middlebrook fails to mention that it was producing 100 Panther tanks per month at that time) and the SS barracks in the city and instead placed it in a residential area that he expected would burn well. The crews were told that the target was the tank plant and SS barracks. Middlebrook follows the take-off of the massive bomber stream, all the supporting o

Mr Middlebrook has done more with this book than chronicle what was arguably the costliest raid the RAF staged during WW2. More importantly, it's a look at the daily operations of RAF and German aircrews late in the war. The RAF had standardized their tactics, and the Luftwaffe switched from a rigid to a fluid system of control for its nightfighters. Excellent first-person accounts illustrate the points the author makes throughout the work. The original edition was published in the early '80s with a short update concerning rumors that Ultra revealed the raid was compromised; to protect this intelligence source the raid was allowed to proceed. This "conspiracy theory" is as untrue as the persistent myth that Coventry was destroyed for the same reason. In actuality there are a myriad of reasons why a mission might be cancelled; it's extremely unlikely that the Germans would have connected a cancellation of the Nuremberg Raid with intelligence concerning their defenses. The only area where the book is wanting is the chapter(s) concerning "Butcher" Harris. Research since the book was written has shown that he was obsessively committed to bombing cities-to the point of insubordination on several occasions. Anyone else would have, and should have, been fired. The book doesn't address any of these issues. Contrary to what other reviewers have said, the Bombing Offensive was not "propaganda driven". Bomber advocates such as Harris, as an extreme example, felt that the sacrifice their crews were making would definitely shorten the war-maybe even end it without the need of invasion. Sadly, they held to these views even when events were showing that the offensive was not causing the damage expected, and a re-think of the entire bombing strategy was in order. Highly Recommended.

Middlebrook dispassionately examines the British campaign to avenge the bombing of English cities begun by Hitler in 1940. By 1943, the tools available to 'Bomber' Harris were far more destructive than any used by the Luftwaffe. For all our moralizing, the war had entered a stage of revenge raids: 'you bombed our city with 100 tons- I will bomb yours with 1,000'. Due to propaganda, people demanded it. So each day's papers carried the box score: 900 bombers dropped 5400 tons and lost 24 planes doing it. What lies buried in this absurd score are the statistics; Airmen had less than a 25% chance of living through a tour. Their bombs often did not hit find any target; but when they did, non-combatants suffered and died. Thank God we live in a more enlightened age!