Napoleon III

The reign of Napoleon III is one that is often unjustly ignored. Overshadowed by his uncle, Louis Napoleon eventually went on to rule France for even longer than his namesake, and had no less profound an impact on the map of Europe as well. In this book, James McMillan provides a great introduction to the man, as well as a refreshing examination of his use of power in managing France through a period of dramatic political change. Born in 1808 to Hortense Beauharnais and Napoleon Bonaparte's brother Louis, Louis grew up in itinerant comfort, as his family drifted around western Europe in the years after the Restoration. Though possessing only a minor claim to be the heir to the Bonaparte title, Louis found himself catapulted to prominence by the deaths of Napoleon's son, the duc de Reichstadt, and Louis's elder brother. These early years were spent plotting and positioning for a possible return, with two failed coups and a period of time in prison. Though these early efforts subjected Louis to much ridicule, McMillan argues that they helped to solidify Louis' claim as Napoleon's heir, something that would pay dividends later on. The opportunity came with the collapse of the Orleanist dynasty in 1848. Portraying himself as the defender of order, Louis Napoleon won election as the president of the Second Republic, then used the same arguments to become emperor four years later. McMillan skillfully challenges many of the standard, ideologically-driven interpretations of Napoleon's reign, arguing that Napoleon was a pragmatist first and foremost. He discounts the traditional view of both the early and later years of the Second Empire, arguing that the early years were not as repressive nor the later years as liberal as many previous historians believed. McMillan applies a similar revisionism to Napoleon's foreign policy as well. He notes that most European leaders feared that the return of a Napoleon to the throne of France boded ill for peace. Yet while desiring revision to the post-Napoleonic settlement created by the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon III did not want change at any price. Indeed, his preferred venue was the conference table rather than the battlefield, and many of the wars that France fought (most notably in the Crimea in the mid-1850s) were the consequence of the intransigence of his opponents. McMillan gives high marks to Napoleon's conduct of foreign affairs, which until 1864 added luster to his - and France's - reputation. The turning point in Napoleon's fortunes came with the Danish war. Faced with a resurgent Prussia seeking to unify Germany under her leadership and with the consequences of many of his earlier decisions (such as the occupation of Rome) coming due, the emperor lost his "aura of success." While McMillan attributes some of this to bad luck, he also faults Napoleon's judgment, arguing that his idea of what a "Napoleonic" foreign policy should be led the French emperor to make a series of terrible deci