Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March

Adam Zamoyski truly brings to life the entire campaign of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The style of writing is so captivating and truly X-Rated in many areas (so vivid and gruesome). Gives very good account of how Napoleon can amass so a huge army only to loose almost 90% of it to war, starvation, summer heat (at first) and to "General Frost" (at last)..... How could a man of Napoleon's talent succumb to so many bad decisions in war? Read on! Such a great read indeed!

This is a wonderful book. Contrary to some of the other reviews, Zamoyski's scholarship is sound in every respect. Although this story had been told in English, French, German and Russian many times before, this synthesis adds value. Those who have read other accounts of this disastrous campaign are encouraged not to let their knowledge of the topic keep them from the new insights offered in this book. Zamoyski does a masterful job of showing the reader how the myths of this campaign came to be--General Winter, the almost mystical celebration of the Russian Spirit, the hubris of Napoleon--and then provides rare insight into the rest of the story. Zamoyski relies on a broad array of previous scholarship, including extensive use of memoirs, as well as new sources. His account of the retreat is perhaps the best that exists in English today. The collapse of the French army in this account is more the result of a complex of factors whose origin lay not in the brutal and bitter Russian Winter--but rather in serious military and logisitic miscaluculations by Napoleon prior to and during the campaign. In one sense, this campaign reflects Napoleon's generalship at its worst, and in a situation where he needed his best effort most. Nevertheless, from the first pages one feels that one is reading about a doomed army as a litany of errors and mistakes begin their dark parade toward Moscow and then back again. This book is not for the squeamish. The horrors of the retreat are simply unimaginable. Recent archealogical evidence in Lithuania supports Zamoyski's speculation that the remains of the Grand Armee literally had a sort of group nervous breakdown around Vilna that ensured the death of many thousands who seem to have made it mirculously out of Russia...only to die in the first place they thought themselves at last safe from the cossacks and the winter. A great read and great prose, this book is recommended for the widest possible audience.

Adam Zamoyski's "Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March," bears a spot-on title. Focusing essentially on Napoleon's campaign against the Russians starting in the late spring of 1812 through the early winter of 1813, Zamoyski's history as unsparing in its criticism of Napoleon as it is unwavering in its graphic depictions of the horrors inflicted on soldiers of both armies. Zamoyski spends the opening chapters of this excellent history relating the bizarre confluence of pride, paranoia, and ambition that brought France and Russia, erstwhile allies, into this bloody war. Under Napoleon's leadership, France had conquered virtually all of the European continent. Russia under Tsar Alexander had watched France's growth with a mixture of awe, appreciation, and worry. (Even though he was an ally of the Tsar, Napoleon was a dangerous radical whose existence and success undermined the absolutist Russian monarchy.) Thanks to a foolish dispute over the control of Poland, Napoleon and Alexander entered into a ridiculously juvenile round of face-saving, posturing, and threatening. Unfortunately for millions of Europeans, when two emperors draw lines in the sand, everyone else gets their noses bloodied. Wounded feelings and pricked egos (not to mention missed opportunities) soon saw Napoleon on the march against Russia, leading a polyglot force of well over 300,000 soldiers (which would be supplemented by hundreds of thousands of reinforcements). The popular legend of Napoleon's march into Russia is that the horrors began on the return, during the long, hard slog of the Russian winter. Zamoyski uses impeccable scholarship and a command of letters, diaries, and weather reports to show that Napoleon's force was getting wiped out on its march *into* Russia. Napoleon's "Grand Armee" was used to marching across western Europe, where its numerous villages and fertile soil made living off the land an easy prospect. Trundling over the endless plains of Western Russia, on the other hand, brought the painful reality of starvation and exhaustion home to thousands of Napoleon's soldiers even before they fired a shot. Zamoyski points out that Napoleon's invasion may be the most politicized event in Western civilization. He attempts to debunk the myths that have grown up around both sides, and generally Zamoyski is successful in this effort. The Russian generals, while they may have beaten Napoleon back, do not deserve any great praise because a lack of communication and initiative allowed Napoleon to escape numerous traps. Napoleon also merits heaps of criticism, as he fails to make the superb strategic and tactical decisions that built his French empire. But what elevates "Moscow 1812" above mere rote history is Zamoyski's ability to marshall all the tales of carnage, waste, and epic suffering on both sides. I'm not sure what fate was worse -- to be a soldier or a horse -- on either side of this conflict, but suffice it to say that both man and equine suf

Most people would remember the outline of Napoleon's march and retreat from Moscow. The horrendous battle of Borodino, the Russian Scorched Earth policy, the burning of Moscow, and the horrible condition of the French army at the retreat. This book fleshes all of this out and provides an enormous wealth of detail and color. The various personalities of the people involved are quickly portrayed as are all the events that lead up to the war, the battles, and the aftermath. The story is one of continuous miscalcuations and blunders. First in the run up to the war, and then throughout the various phases of it. If it were not so sad, one would probably hoot with laughter at the inept handling of the Russian armies and at the continual in-fighting that plagued their general staff. When the author describes Kutuzov and his continued countermanding of orders so that a unit commander would suddenly see a portion of his command veering off. Or, when Kutuzov himself is upstaged and his plan for an ambush at Borodino being subverted by his underlings ... The famous Russian "scorched earth" policy is presented as simply another thing that came to be by mistake .. it was not a planned effort. On the other side, we have a scarcely more coordinated view of the French. Murat is depicted as positively stupid in initially bringing together a cavalry force of 40,000 and then basically casting it away for no gain until it is no longer a viable force when desperately needed. Napoleon's consistent missing of vital information which could have turned the battles and created complete victories. Finally, the complete inability of the French to supply their own armies due to miscalculation and hubris is astounding. Through all of this, the author does an excellent job of placing personal recollections from letters and diaries of the junior officers who experienced the horrors and deprivations of the actual combat and manuevers. All of this is wrapped up in a prose style that is very approachable and makes the whole topic an absorbing read. This is the way history should be read and taught!

Zamoyski has written an excellent account of Napoleon's invasion of Russia. According to Zamoyski, Napoleon invaded Russia in order to prevent an emerging independent European power that the nationalist in Germany could follow and also because Russia was breaking the Continental System. Russia declared war on France due to the French backing of Polish independence. Zamoyski is critical of Napoleon for committing too many troops to the invasion which strained the logistical system and impeded the advance of the French army. Also Napoleon missed many opportunities to surround the Russian and committed disasterous frontal attacks at Smolensk and Borodino and should have retreated from Moscow earlier in order to avoid the Russian winter. However, Zamoyski depicts the Russian high command as being plagued by constant infighting and missing chances to surround the French army. The main weakness of the book is that Zamoyski is too critcal of the Russian army and ignores important reforms in the Russian army such as a Corps system and a general staff which is mentioned in the works by Frederick Kagan. Nevertheless this book is a highly readable and informative account of Napoleon's Russian campaign.