Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction

Neil Levy's little book on moral relativism is a real gem. He seriously considers all of the major arguments for and against moral relativism, and gives them much closer attention and care than one would expect in a book written for a general audience. At no point, however, does the prose become overly technical and dry.Having concluded that most of the popular objections to moral relativism beg the question, Levy goes on to advocate a pluralist account of value, which he admits to be a mild form of moral relativism. For Levy, there may be many genuine values, but it may be impossible to optimally pursue all of these values at once. Therefore different moral systems which promote different -- but still genuine -- values, will not be subject to objective criticism.Does this render us impotent to criticise other societies? Not so, thinks Levy. Even though we may recognise that other societies have genuine values which they are seeking to promote, we often have grounds on which to criticise their practices which do not amount to saying: "You are promoting the wrong value". Rather the criticisms can be of the type: "You could promote those values better by adopting this policy"; or "You have inadequate evidence to claim that policy P promotes value X better than our policies -- and ours also promote value Y."This would be a great book for anyone interested in the application of moral philosophy to political issues such as multiculturalism and tolerance, as well as for undergraduates in philosophy. Academics who want to make a quick start in the area should find it useful also.