Monty:: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

I was an American History major in college and have been a WWII buff since the '50s first reading "Life's Picture History of WWII" at age 7 when it was published in 1950. I have read constantly and voraciously about the war since then. I've read biographies of FDR, Churchill, Marshall, Brooke, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Stillwell and King, among others. Most of my reading has been by American authors and most have denigrated Montgomery. I have not read this condensed version of Montgomery's life but have read the first two volumes of the set by the author. It has been an eye-opening experience for me. I find the author to be extremely fair, so far (I have the last volume on order and am eager to read the author's take on th '44 to the end of the war given my knowledge of Arnhem, and the Antwerp estuaries which have always been Montgomery's two biggest blunders in my eyes.) Having read other accounts of the Normandy invasion I found it eye-opening that the invasion was truly Montgomery's brainchild. He stepped in after the allies piddled around with an inadequate and unrealistic plan and applied his considerable knowledge and experience as the only truly successful allied general.The author is not at all hesitant to point out Montgomery's failings, which, as a person were considerable . However, Montgomery as a tactician, strategist and commander of the allied forces up to and through the Normandy landings was brilliant. American authors and Generals have criticized him and tried to puff up the American players but the Americans were inexperienced amateurs with truly inflated senses of their own competence. This is especially true given their lack or minimal amount of combat experience. The great Marshall felt that America should have immediately invaded Europe and felt hood-winked by the British who kept putting it off. However, had the Americans not gotten experience, the hard way, through their blundering in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, an early invasion would have been a catastrophe. Eisenhower, in particular, lacked combat experience and had an exaggerated sense of his own battle abilities. Witness the fiasco of planning for the invasions of Sicily and Italy. The Ardennes, Huertgen Forest and Patton's set battles, such as Metz, are further examples of American military leadership's overconfidence and arrogance. Montgomery put his experience as the only successful allied commander into use by revamping and organizing the floundering Normandy invasion preparation. His strategic vision was perfect and his dedication to that vision against the vacillation of Eisenhower, Churchill and others and the plotting of rivals was exemplary and the reason for the success of the invasion. As Americans, our propaganda machinery has downplayed the Commonwealth effort, has glorified the American effort and it's leaders, and has made the invasion out to be solely the result of American planning and execution, with the Commonwealth armies prese

With access to his private letters, diaries and other papers, author Nigel Hamilton takes the reader from the birth of Montgomery in 1887 to his promotion to Lt General and command the Eighth Army in 1942. The remainder of Montgomery's life is covered in a second volume of this book. Whilst the author has produced an exceedingly fine account of the life of Montgomery during the years in question, for me, the book stands apart from other works because of previously unpublished material and previously unseen photographs. Pictures of Montgomery as a child, boy, young officer, family man, and in every rank up to Lt General are an important part of the history of this one man - and they are all here. Of the many thousands of officers and soldiers present, how ironic that a "Lt Colonel" Montgomery should just happen to be photographed standing in front of Winston Churchill during a Victory Parade in 1918. Elsewhere, there are many other historic photographs which include such notable figures as Secretary of State for War (1939) Mr Hore-Belisha and a young Major A. E. Percival (who as Lt General Percival in 1942 was to surrender Singapore to inferior Japanese forces!) to name but two. There are also several encounters with Churchill both before and during his time as Prime Minister. And so it goes on. Hindsight is, of course, a fine science, and there are many interesting events which the historian (and even the amateur psychologist!) might now regard as the reason why Montgomery became what he became and did what he did. There was his strict upbringing as the son of a Reverend (later Bishop) both at home and abroad, public school, formative years in an army of Empire and the events of World War 1 which almost claimed his life. Much later (1936) there was the tragic death of his wife. Altogether, this is an absorbing account of how Montgomery became a very important General. For me, the book reveals the very best that Montgomery ever was. Perhaps this is because the book stops before he became a Field Marshall and, therefore, before he became so full of his own importance he felt he could treat all and sundry with utter disdain because of who he was. I would suggest this book is an important addition to both British history and the history of the Second World War - and an excellent read to boot. NM

With access to his private letters, diaries and other papers, author Nigel Hamilton takes the reader from the birth of Montgomery in 1887 to his promotion to Lt General and command the Eighth Army in 1942. The remainder of Montgomery's life is covered in a second volume of this book. Whilst the author has produced an exceedingly fine account of the life of Montgomery during the years in question, for me, the book stands apart from other works because of previously unpublished material and previously unseen photographs. Pictures of Montgomery as a child, boy, young officer, family man, and in every rank up to Lt General are an important part of the history of this one man - and they are all here. Of the many thousands of officers and soldiers present, how ironic that a "Lt Colonel" Montgomery should just happen to be photographed standing in front of Winston Churchill during a Victory Parade in 1918. Elsewhere, there are many other historic photographs which include such notable figures as Secretary of State for War (1939) Mr Hore-Belisha and a young Major A. E. Percival (who as Lt General Percival in 1942 was to surrender Singapore to inferior Japanese forces!) to name but two. There are also several encounters with Churchill both before and during his time as Prime Minister. And so it goes on. Hindsight is, of course, a fine science, and there are many interesting events which the historian (and even the amateur psychologist!) might now regard as the reason why Montgomery became what he became and did what he did. There was his strict upbringing as the son of a Reverend (later Bishop) both at home and abroad, public school, formative years in an army of Empire and the events of World War 1 which almost claimed his life. Much later (1936) there was the tragic death of his wife. Altogether, this is an absorbing account of how Montgomery became a very important General. For me, the book reveals the very best that Montgomery ever was. Perhaps this is because the book stops before he became a Field Marshall and, therefore, before he became so full of his own importance he felt he could treat all and sundry with utter disdain because of who he was. I would suggest this book is an important addition to both British history and the history of the Second World War - and an excellent read to boot. NM

This book makes such a strong case for Monty's military genius one might suspect partisanship (and the author acknowledges a warm personal friendship with him), yet it also seems unflinching in its depiction of his flaws (abrasiveness, egotism, and great coldness in dealing with certain family members). Its depiction of some of the brightest stars in the American military pantheon (at least those that Monty had to deal with) is extremely unflattering. Eisenhower in particular is depicted as completely removed from the realities of command in the field, and whose meddling interference in Monty's D-Day masterplan could well have cost the allies the war. The book is quick to concede Eisenhower's talents as an administrator and as a tactful coalition maintainer, but argues that he had little grasp of the battlefield, and that little grasp proved to be a dangerous thing. Patton and Bradley fare somewhat better.I was very skeptical when I approached this book, since it challenged every preconception I ever had of Monty, that of the overcautious, slow, egocentric pedant who only cramped the styles of the Pattons of this world. This book changed my views. While in no way glossing over the Montgomery ego, time and again it cited examples of Montgomery putting the objective first, of repeatedly assuming the role of play-maker for Bradley and Patton in Normandy and Sicily, because that was what made the most military sense at the time.Somehow, Hamilton succeeds in reconciling his depiction of the abrasive, egotistical, pompous, Montgomery with the military visionary who never lost sight of the ultimate end nor of the sacrifices that had to be made to attain it. The picture is of someone with all the elan of Patton yet a far greater feel for the individual soldier. Initially I was very uncomfortable with his depiction, yet at the end of the day one has to admit, Monty was at the helm when the allied armies won two of their most spectacular victories in the west, El Alamein and Normandy. What's more, the adversary Monty defeated there, Rommel, was by no means the 3rd Reich's "B-team". Hamilton argues those victories were the result of careful planning combined with a keen grasp of battlefield realities.The book is well-argued. The author has clearly paid close attention to his source materials, noting that one military aide to Eisenhower even falsified a key diary entry that casts Montgomery in a somewhat more negative light. That pretty well destroyed the credibility of that aide for me, whose diary is relied upon unquestioningly by many other noted historians of the war.The book is lively and well-written, with an occasional touch of humour to enliven what is a massive torrent of military information. It begins in the aftermath of El Alamein (November 5, 1942) and runs to the autumn of 1944, including the rest of the African campaign, the invasion of Sicily and Italy proper, and the Normandy campaign. The book also conveys a keen appreciation of the perso

Before the current resurgence in the love of history, I searched in vain for this book in countless new and old book stores. Every new city we went to, I would look for it. I had heard the American viewpoint on Montgomery, I had read Patton's version, but I wanted to hear Montgomery's version. As a Christmas present, there it was under my tree one year, and I devoured it in several days, even though it is incredibly detailed.After reading the book, I felt I understood the man, the forces, the secret drives that made the General who he was.He had a rather cold, lonely childhood, and was an aloof, intelligent loner. The Battle of Dunkirk was the point at which he could no longer tolerate those he felt inferior to him, regardless of his rank. The absurdities of the waste of manpower of machinery, the inefficiencies of command by family name became clear to him. Here Montgomery rose to his highest success, a man who's destiny and abilities were matched by fortune to the time. He succeeded in defying the befuddled outranking superiors, took control, and performed brilliantly at El-Almein, a battle won almost exclusively by his strategic flanking movements.El-Almein; however, became the soothsayer to his Achilles heel....his extreme egotism. After El-Almein, he felt himself invincible and always correct regardless of the consequences for his men or the battle. His main focus after El-Almein was to preserve his legacy and reputation and to take credit for any favorable action by anyone, anywhere.He was personally responsible for one of the two largest largest European debacles of the war: the Bridge Too Far. (The other being the inexperienced Eisenhower's debacle at the Kasserine Pass.) By sheer force of will, against the advise and counsel of many others, Montgomery forced an ill-conceived plan of the largest paratrooper drop in history with poor supplies, lack of artillary support, and a sheer waste of some of the finest men available. Even when it was evident that his plans were horribly inadequate, he refused to allow a strategic withdrawal, abandoning troops to their fate.Whether politically correct to say or not, it seemed quite evident from the book that there was a strong presence of homosexuality in Montgomery's inner circle. Whether Montgomery was gay, bi, or neuter is impossible to say, and the fact that he procreated is irrelevant.What is sad is that with his sycophantic inner circle, he could not be dissuaded from ill-conceived plans. He became the McClellan of World War II, sitting with troops that could have been used elsewhere, squandering supplies that could have been put to use for Patton. Any other General would have been replaced after the fiasco of Operation Market-Garden. MONTGOMERY would have replaced any general of his that had carried out such an ill-conceived plan, then refused to halt when it was evident it was an abject failure.Read the accounts of the Paratroopers who had to fight the actual battle, the SNAFU's th