Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings

1. Translation. --Very competently translated, intelligently selected, ordered, and compiled with appropriate footnotes and introductory material for context; occasionally pedantic, but expected given an Anglophone audience. Anyone with a reasonably informed background in German history and culture will find them superfluous or distracting at times. 2. Style and Content. --Aphoristic minefield and a wealth of apothegms which, though self-evident, bear common sense in mind whilst offering relevant judgments and insights. The cultural context MUST be taken into account --his moral and political 'takes' are not "personal idiosyncrasies" and certainly not pernicious or odiously 'conservative' in any meaningful sense. What is presented is a straightforward, morally informed, politically wary scepticism which dismisses heedless flights to passion when appropriate --no small feat in the shadow of German Romanticism and the Paris Commune. These attitudes held by von Moltke do not exist in a historicist vacuum. 3. Politics. The conduct and organization outlined by von Moltke is particularly interesting when compared to the German military-political performance under the Nazi regime: they are utterly opposed in all respects. It would seem that the Austrians eventually would serve Prussia its just deserts within the ruins of the Second Reich via the Austrian corporal Shickelgruber, with his inveterate hate and distrust of all things monarchist, Prussian officer core and aristocracy; a provincial proletarian bigot unraveling hierarchy, weight of rank, and multi-ethnic culture of hundreds of years in the making. A not often accessible creature of balanced political-economic insight in fine translation, get this affordable volume!

This is an excellent review of Moltke's work. It's clear and lucid and strikes upon those areas where Moltke's thinking influenced later strategic minds. It's one weakness is its lack of period maps. The book has a strategic section followed by Moltke's field account of some actual action that serves as an example of the theory just discussed. But unless you are familiar with the detail of 19th century geography for Austria, Prussia, France, and Denmark then much of the description is far from helpful. You'll get far more out of this book if you have already read "Koniggratz" by Craig and a history of the Franco-Prussian War.

Prussia gained ascendancy over Austria and thus dominion of Germany through the art of war by one of its ablest commanders, Moltke the Elder. With Austria defeated at the decisive battle of Koniggratz (1866), Prussia stood alone for the coveted leadership of Germany; therefore, when France declared war on Prussia (1870) to prevent German unification, ironically this afforded Prussia the opportunity to fulfill its destiny. Napoleon III intended to cut Prussia off from the southern German republics; however, Prussia called the other German republics to arms, not for defense, but for a joint attack against the French vanguard, in French territory. The French seriously underestimated Prussia's capacity to rapidly deploy its seemingly disparate forces into one cohesive whole. How did Prussia accomplish this epic task? At the strategic level Prussia was able to marshal all of its forces under one central command, but at the tactical level the subordinate commanders were permitted the greatest independence possible to take the initiative (Selbstatigkeit). Moltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that `strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and `central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that `interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During th

Count Helmut von Moltke was perhaps the greatest military leader during the period between Napoleon and the First World War. Moltke shaped the way that the German Army looked at war up until 1945. What was important to Moltke was not a set of rules or principles, but rather a way of thinking. Initiative and control were stressed, "when in doubt advance toward the sound of the guns". . . While he had great respect for the Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whom he had limited contact with as a young staff officer, Moltke rejected several of Clausewitz's most important concepts, perhaps the most eventful being the place of the military in strategic decisions made during time of war. For Moltke the military should simply be allowed to fight the war to the finish at which time the political leadership would be allowed to negotiate the peace. Clausewitz saw war as the continuation of politics by other means, meaning that political decisions did not end with the commencement of hostilities but continued. The editor of this book mentions several similarities including one that upon closer study is in reality another break between the two outlooks. Referring to Book 6, Chapter 8 of On War, he mentions that Clausewitz wrote, "that all strategic planning rested on tactical success alone, because only tactical successes could produce a favorable outcome." Moltke obviously agreed since he thought, "strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory." However if one actually reads that chapter in On War one comes away with a different impression since Clausewitz's view is far more nuanced than that of Moltke. Clausewitz had experienced terrible defeat and great hardship during the struggle against Napoleon, having served with the Russians during the fateful campaign of 1812. It was the experience of that campaign which showed Clausewitz the importance of a Fabian strategy (denying battle, allowing an enemy to exhaust himself through exertion). Thus Clausewitz writes, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather that the tactical decision should be considered the operative principle. . . That is why we think it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and that -whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not - this is in all cases the fundamental basis for the decision."Moltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial e

The book shows von Moltke to be a prophetic genius. One wonders whether the German generals who joined the French and British in ordering lemminglike frontal assualts during the First World War read his works... he predicted the effectiveness of modern firearms during the 1870s. He also projected the ineffectiveness (or worse) of the United Nations and League of Nations (see page 25). Principles of management include acceptance of responsibility by a single person (p. 26) and delegation to the frontline manager (p. 77). Moltke's advocacy of delegation belies the stereotype of the Prussian Army as mechanistic and rigid. The book contains some echoes of von Clausewitz' "On War," which von Moltke undoubtedly read. Page 22 gives the FULL context of Moltke's infamous statement, "Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a pleasant one." (He continues, "... who can deny that every war, even a victorious one, inflicts grevious wounds on all involved?") -William A. Levinson http://www.pic.net/~wlevinso "The Crisis Manager"