Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World

I'd like to note, first of all, that I didn't find Searle as uncharitable as some of the other reviewers here. He did give a few low blows, but I think his arguments appeared as straw-man's because rather than refute a lot of the other claims, he was integrating them subtly: dropping off parts which were unnecessary and then using the leftovers to create a greater and more encompassing theory. He never goes into depth of why he finds the parts of theories credible that he does, as this book is not intended for deep analysis. The reader must simply take Searle's word for it at times to understand what he is getting at (Searle does provide a nice "Further Reading" section at the end for readers who are more interested in the "why's" behind his arguments). Which leads me into the content of his book... This book is a modern introduction to more recent philosophical issues. Searle sums up in the first chapter most of the out-standing problems in the field that remain unsolved from the last few hundred years. These include the mind-body problem, skepticism, realism, and issues relating to consciousness such as binding and intentionality. Searle has an interesting perspective in that he tries to alleviate conflicts by "going behind the issue and merging premises." With this method he finds complete theories that integrate many perspectives that before seemed contradictory. The writing of this book is not as thick as his other works. Most of his language is quite precise and his arguments are logically spelled out. The analogies are simple for easy understanding; more advanced readers will probably want to contemplate further implications of Searle's ideas than he discusses. Searle is yet another voice in the last few decades that has shown a tendency towards integration to solve logical issues. This seems to be a trend with many other authors, and might be called the "leading edge" of philosophical thought right now. The book takes the reader from step one, and slowly builds up a view of reality that integrates mind, society, and language exquisitely. And if you happen to be a proponent of one of the many theories Searle disagrees with, try to be patient, and see where he's going. He does use a condescending tone now and then. But other than that, recommended...

About fifteen years ago, Mortimer Adler wrote a slim volume, "Ten Philosophical Mistakes," which received little attention. Adler was deemed not a professional philosopher and was thus summarily dismissed. Moreover, he argued cogently for a return to what in philosophical parlance is know as "naive realism," but all the chic thinkers then, and now, debunk such a world view as archaic and not very interesting. It didn't help, perhaps, that Adler repeatedly appealed to Aristotle and Aquinas to justify his positions - whether these sages have something to contribute or not.Now comes John Searle, a very professional philosopher and a distinguished professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He's written a great many books, some of which have been standards in the field of language and psychology throughout the world. He's Oxford trained and is widely respected. And, like Adler, he has a few philosophical mistakes he'd like to clear up. And does so incisively against those who attack the external world, mind, consciousness, intentionality, society, and language with clarity, elegance, style, and wit. Unlike Adler, he applies the Anglo-American style of analytic philosophy, the most rigorous intellectual approach, but one doesn't need to know logic to understand the force of his compelling arguments.In many ways, this is Searle's best book. Not because it is a detailed examination of every philosophical nuance, but because he brutally demythologizes idealism and all attending -isms that have no foundation, no raison d'etre, no excuse, other than the "will to power" to force _their_ reality onto others. In 161 short pages he turns many philosophical "puzzles" into enigmas of someone else's making, not perplexities we have to live with. It's a refreshing and enjoyable read. I only hope time will bear the fruit of Searle's views on ethics, one field in which he has been curiously silent.

This book is an excellent summation of Searle's thought. The first section is an attack on antirealist (i.e., there are no facts in the world independent of facts we construct with thoughts and language) strains in contemporary intellectual circles that is right on the money. The next section reiterates Searle's position that consciousness is a biological phenomenon and the product of the brain. While I think that Searle avoids ontological issues, his main aim is to do away with the Cartesian (i.e., the mind is a distinct substance from matter) framework that haunts the mind-body debate.Finally, Searle presents his thoughts on how social and institutional facts (like "money", "points in a ballgame", "marriage", etc.) enter into the world. The conclusion of the book talks about what the role of philosophy is and how philosophy makes progress. That is, Searle explains the importance of philosophy.

John Searle has presented brilliantly original basic theories in the philosophy of language, mind, and the nature of institutional reality. This book summarizes this work, and very importantly, shows the interconnections and hierarchical arrangement of his ideas. Those new to Searle should read this as *the* introduction to his work; those familiar with his work will profit from the arrangement of all of his theories into a single, fully integrated, philosophy.

In this somewhat informal presentation, philosopher John R. Searle condenses a lifetime-to-date of thought on various issues surrounding the so-called "mind-body" problem. The solution to this problem, he contends, is to regard mind as a natural phenomenon that depends causally on the brain but also has causal powers of its own (much like such macro-properties of matter as "solidity" and "color"). In this way, he argues, we can do justice to the empirical facts without falling into either of the twin errors "dualism" and "materialism," both of which he ascribes to an inherited philosophical language that is frankly better dispensed with. He summarizes his views on consciousness and "intentionality," quickly but precisely describing the essential features of mental activity that set it apart from other natural phenomena. On this foundation, he builds his theories of speech acts and socially-constructed reality, never losing sight of the fact that each of these depends on a "background" of what he calls "external realism" (the view that there is a given reality that exists independently of our minds, which he correctly notes is not really a "view" but the implicit basis on which _all_ "views" are held). And there are other delights along the way: for example, we are also treated, in summary fashion, to Searle's engagingly straightforward defense of the aforementioned "external realism" (presented more fully in the three closing chapters of his previous work, _The Construction of Social Reality_). All in all, this highly readable, entertaining, and thought-provoking volume by an eminent modern philosopher succeeds in its aim of restoring, and even somewhat advancing, the ideals of the Enlightenment against a modern/postmodern onslaught of obfuscatory antirealism. It should lead satisfied readers to investigate the rest of his works, to which this volume is a valuable introduction and which they will find equally brilliant: Searle does philosophy as it ought to be done.