Military Errors of World War Two

The only trouble with writing a book on the errors made in WW II, is deciding which ones to throw out. The amazing thing is that after all was over, we won. The book is well organized and tries to apply some structure to the errors, but it could easily be twice its size. For instance where is Kasserine Pass, the Hurtgen Forest, the whole strategic bomber campaign (well, part of that is covered here), Operation Cobra (where the highest ranking American officer, Lt. Gen. McNair, was killed by our own Air Corps).

This is an excellent book that covers the major errors of military operations in WW II. Mr. Macksey does a good job of seeing the strategic errors of all sides in the war. He goes far beyond the tactical evaluations and points out the principal thinking errors that resulted in key outcomes in the various campaigns. The author is not shy about saying someone was a dunderhead. On the other hand he is objective about why that person was making tremendous errors. "Bomber" Harris, for example, is castigated for his handling of air operations and his misguided belief in how the bomber forces were to be used. He (Harris) did not value scientific evidence as to how to achieve the best results at the least cost. Harris was apparently motivated by the desire to expand the air force and make it the decisive factor in the war.Macksey does not point out often enough how correct action on one side lead to errors on the other. He does discuss this factor at length, but he often omits it in the analysis of key events. The battle of Midway for example, which he covers very well, omits any discussion of the risk taken by Nimitz in committing his entire carrier force to one battle in one area against a clearly superior enemy force. It should also be remembered that Nimitz did this after the US Navy and its allies had been taking a terrible beating for six months. The Japanese had blasted the US Navy at Pearl Harbor, destroyed the allied fleet at the Java Sea, hammered Port Darwin and embarrassed the US Navy in the Philippine landings and other places. After this unending spate of disasters Nimitz still remained confident he could beat the Japanese at Midway. And he put all his resources into one attack. Macksey correctly points out that if the US has lost big at Midway (which it well could have) the result would be Japanese hegemony over the Pacific for at least another year with all the attendant problems that would bring.So the outcome at Midway went far beyond the Japanese doing things wrong, it also meant the US Navy had to do a lot of things right even after the series of defeats and setback of all kinds that it suffered.One other matter should be noted. Mr. Macksey's writing style is hard to follow. His book is not an easy read. His sentence structure is very complex and his serpentine prose makes his conclusions hard to follow.Still, it is an excellent book with a good deal of stretegic thought analyzed and compellingly set forth.

Whilst other reviews might criticise this book for not going into enough detail, it does work out as either a good foundation for further study, or simply as an interesting insight. It covers most aspects of the war, providing unbiased and clear points, with summaries to help simplify the arguments. It demonstrates the sudden changes and shocks that this new, technological world war presented each of the powers, particularly the stubborn Japanese Imperial code, and how the ordinary soldier was affected, often fatally. The book presents a range of careful individual personal profiles, mirroring the events, that so-often suffered from similar flaws, and in turns leads to an intriguing summary of the simple problems that were magnified into major flaws in planning and procedure. This is a good textbook, or a good read.

Military Errors of World War Two, is a fine addition to anyones book collection, detailing many of the main battles and events which took place during WW2.The accounts of the Russian conflict are excellent, pointing out many of the flaws which are evident today, but were missed by the Germans over confidence.My main gripe is the lack of depth for each area covered. The book should have contained maybe 3 key battles during the war and explained the errors with these in some depth.Aside from this, a recommended book.