Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Machiavelli

Imagine what it would be like if scientist or physicians were to rely on a text written over 150, let alone 2,000, years ago as the most valuable source of introduction in their profession. Yes, Masters on War is an academic book, while military history & strategy enthusiast should still find many topics interesting. The hypothesis of the author is that the basic logic of strategy is universal. Which should appeal to the non academic reader too ... it's not light reading though! For a lighter Military Strategy reading, but without loosing depth, there's the masterful written book 33 Strategies of War. As the saying goes, military collected more genuine intellects and risk thinkers than most if not all other professions. The author won't let down the ambitious reader.

This book is a comprehensive analysis of classical military thought. Although some would argue that this book is for military scholars, I beg to differ, and, heartily suggest this book to any First Year Student of Military Studies. It will greatly assist you in your comparison and analysis of theory and theorists and will also give you a comprehensive understanding of the universal logic of the principles and tenets of war. This is a great book. Dr. Terry Tucker Combined Security and Transition Command-Afghanistan

Michael Handel's third and final version of his "Masters Of War" may be the most accessible analysis of classical military thought available to the military professional or academic. Handel's patient, methodical, side-by-side textual analysis of the works of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz overcomes the deceptive simplicity of Sun Tzu's precepts and the equally deceptive dense verbiage of Clausewitz's "On War." The result is an enlightening exploration of what may be mankind's most complex and most dangerous collective activity. For all its wastage and terror, war continues to be a final arbiter of the destiny of nations and ideologies. Handel's work is an intellectually challenging read designed for the military professional or academic. He examines important concepts such as the centers of gravity, the correlation of ends and means, and the relationship of military and political objectives through a compare and contrast analysis of the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. The writings of some other authorities such as Mao and Jomini are cited where especially relevant. Handel's prose is straightforward. He uses examples from a broad range of military history to illustrate his points. The author, who died in 2001, completed his revisions for this edition before the start of the Global War on Terrorism. Nevertheless, both classical military thought and Handel's analysis continue to be relevant. This book is very highly recommended for the mid-grade military professional, especially for those studying at the intermediate service college level, and for the military academic seeking a broader understanding of the operational and strategic levels of war.

The best side-by-side comparison of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini strategic thought one can find. Included is Mao's strategic approach to completely round out classical perspective on war and strategy. The single best reference for understanding the similarities and differences between the masters of strategy.

is how I would describe Handel's 'Masters of War'. This however should not deter the keen reader from purchasing the book as it is indeed a wonderful, clear and interesting read. In the course of his analysis, Handel sets out to compare and contrast the different schools of thought that 'the greats' developed, with particular attention being paid to Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Perhaps this is where the text comes into its own for the academic. If one was to consider writing a study on the conduct and role of the military in this day and age, this book brings not only Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz, but also Jomini and Machiavelli into focus. The student will hardly require a more comprehensive guide to different schools of thought for the construction of their essays. In conclusion therefore, I would reaffirm my belief that this text would prove invaluable for any classical military analyst trying to find a text helping and perhaps reducing the amount of time devoted to sifting through Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' and Von Clausewitz's 'On War'. However, taken out of this context, although highly readable, it is perhaps beyond the requirement of the casual reader whom might be better served reading abridged texts of the originals first.