Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--And Why It Failed

On July 3, 1865, at the very height of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate General Robert E. Lee did the unthinkable when he launched 13,000 infantrymen across an open field towards the Union lines, where they unsurprisingly butchered. General Lee was considered to have been one of the greatest generals that America has ever produced, if not the greatest, so the question naturally arises as to what he was thinking when he ordered the charge. Up until now, the standard response is that Lee had an off day. In this fascinating book, author and historian Tom Carhart gives a plausible explanation for what really happened at Gettysburg and why. According to Mr. Carhart, Lee's plan did not simply rely on an infantry charge across open terrain, towards an entrenched enemy, but instead counted on a cavalry attack on the Union rear, just at the moment that the Union soldiers would be watching the beginning of Pickett's Charge. Using a wealth of available information, including the massing of all of the Confederate cavalry well beyond Lee's left flank, and numerous first-hand report, he makes an excellent case for his contention. Overall, I found this to be a fascinating book. While the author does admittedly fill the book with copious amounts of background information, he does succeed in keeping it from dragging on too long. Instead, I think it went a long way towards proving his case. I too have never understood the logic behind Pickett's Charge, but now I feel that I do. Plus, it was quite fascinating to see who Mr. Carhart identifies as the real hero of Gettysburg - Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer! I always knew that in times past Custer was revered as a Civil War hero, and now I understand why. So, if you are interested in a new theory about the battle of Gettysburg, then you must get this book. Heck, even if you are just interested in the American Civil War, then this book is for you. It gives a wealth of information about several key participants in that war, plus it includes many details about the cavalry battle that occurred near Gettysburg that is often left out of other history book. I give this book my highest recommendations!

I have just finished reading Tom Carhart's "Lost Triumph," and would like to congratulate him for finally bringing to light Lee's true tactical plan for the attack on the Union lines at Gettysburg on 3 July 1863. In November 1944, as a teenager, I had the honor of spending a day with Mr. Rodensteel (I do not recall his first name), the son of the builder of the original Electric Map in the National Museum at Gettysburg. Mr. Rodensteel, like his father, was a lifelong student of the Battle of Gettysburg, and for several hours that day he shared with me his views on the fighting that took place there. Specifically, he emphasized that GEN Robert E. Lee's plan for the third day included not only an infantry attack against the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge and resumption of the frontal attack on Culp's Hill, but also an attack by cavalry forces under the command of MG J.E.B. Stuart around the Union right flank. According to Mr. Rodensteel, Stuart's flanking move was to commence before the Confederate cannonade began at 1300 hours (1:00 PM), with the objective of striking the rear of the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge and the Union forces on and about Culp's Hill. Lee estimated that Stuart would reach the Union rear at approximately 1500 hours (3:00 PM), the very hour that BG Henry J. Hunt, Meade's artillery commander, anticipating a Confederate infantry frontal assault on Cemetery Ridge, ordered the Union artillery to cease its fire; that halt would allow the gun barrels to cool and the Union artillerists to replenish their ammunition supplies. Mr. Rodensteel told me that when Lee heard the Union artillery cease its fire at that time, he attributed it to the disorder that Stuart's forces were undoubtedly creating after their arrival in the Union rear. Believing that Stuart had succeeded in his assigned mission as part of a combined arms attack against the Union lines, Lee ordered the infantry forward, with devastating results. I am gratified to find that Doctor Carhart's conclusions from his exhaustive research appear to validate what Mr. Rodensteel shared with a 13-year-old teenager on that cold and rainy November day almost sixty-one years ago. During these years I have unqualifiedly accepted Mr. Rodensteel's views, despite not finding other historians of that great battle who have highlighted the importance of Stuart's flanking attack as part of Lee's overall plan, i.e., until Doctor Carhart came along.

Carhart has again out done himself. Dr. Carhart (PhD Princeton)has also remain faithful to his training at West Point, his research and first hand knowledge of combat acquired in Viet Nam set this story above the rest.This book is insightful in a battle that helped define America. A must read for any and all remotefully interested in these men, the battle or war. This is told by a story teller with a unique insight into people and battle.His research has been extensive on the subject. It is his greatest book to date.

I defy any reader with an open mind not to agree that the author of this book has presented a compelling--if controversial-- case for his thesis. And more than a compelling thesis, it is a downright gripping read. Tom Carhart is a West Point graduate, a combat veteran of Vietnam, a lawyer, a Ph.D. in American history, and a military historian with several books to his credit. He draws on all of these backgrounds to explore and explain "what went wrong" on that 3rd day at Gettysburg, where Lee--arguably the most astute and ingenious field general in the nation's history--allowed the so-called Pickett's charge to go forth. Drawing on meticulous research into every document that has any bearing on the subject--many of them documents never studied with such close attention to the details--he slowly marshals his evidence and arguments to support his theory: the disaster that resulted from Pickett's charge cannot be dismissed as simply a blunder, a bad day for Robert E. Lee, but was the result of a master plan that was foiled by the daring bravery of another of America's best known military leaders, George Custer Armstrong. (Just to cite one of the more original and fascinating sources he draws on: Carhart looks at accounts of historical battles that Lee would have studied and then describes those battles and their relevance to Lee's conduct at Gettysburg.) Although a few historians have vaguely suggested that there might be some link between Pickett's charge and some cavalry action elsewhere that day, Carhart is the first to lay this all out in detail. One need not be 100% convinced that this is what happened that fateful day, but Carhart's account deserves a reading by all with any interest in the Civil War and miltary history.

Having long wondered how someone as brilliant as Lee could have launched Pickett's Charge across a wide open field expecting the men to attack Union troops along Cemetery Ridge, I am delighted to find a book which at last poses a good answer. In Lost Triumph, Carhart makes great use of solid primary source material, a detailed understanding of the nature of Lee's military experience and training at West Point, and a solid understanding of battlefield tactics. Whether you agree or disagree with his argument, the thesis is terrifically compelling. And, unlike many academic books, it is presented in fluid, readable prose. Civil War traditionalists, rattle your swords! Those who have difficulty accepting that Lee, who consistently demonstrated creativity and brilliance on the battlefield, had no more in mind than a suicide mission across open ground, or was unexplainedly "let down" by JEB Stuart, will find themselves enticed by -- if not in full agreement with -- Carhart's argument. The forward by James McPherson, pulitzer prize-winning author of Battle Cry of Freedom, says it all: "Thanks to Tom Carhart's painstaking and absorbing reconstruction of events, we now have a clear comprehension of what Lee planned for July 3 -- and why it went wrong. . . .Given the vast number of writings on Gettysburg, it seems impossible to come up with new information and insights about the battle. But Tom Carhart has done it."