Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan

I found Mr. Wittenberg's approach, as though conducting a grand jury inquest, original and fascinating. I only regret his neglect of Sheridan's activities in the Western Theater which also require reexamination. At Perrysville, Sheridan had orders only to secure water without bringing on a general engagement, but he pushed on further, thus precipitating the battle which Buell had planned for the following day (Buell was caught offstride). After stout early resistance, Sheridan quit at Murfreesboro, ignoring Rosecrans' order to get ammunition and return to the battle, while Palmer, who at one point was also desperately short of ammunition, whose division suffered higher losses than did Sheridan's (25.4% vs. 20.72% ), fought on. At Chickamauga he left the field with a division and didn't return, although ordered to help Thomas, fighting for his life at Horseshoe Ridge only a couple of miles away. Instead he feinted at a return, and then spent the rest of his life arguing that, yes, he had returned, sort of (Halleck thought he did great). At Chattanooga Sheridan got a late start in the charge up the ridge and was beaten to the top by at least 15 minutes. In order to polish his profile, he then ordered a wasteful pursuit in the woods in the the dark, ran into a trap, and got some men killed unnecessarily (Grant praised his initiative). We don't learn much about the trap in his report, but we do learn he thought he was one of the first to reach the crest. After the war it would turn out that he had his own way of winning the hearts and minds of Southerners in New Orleans (kind of surprising even Grant), and of dealing with Indian overpopulation in the West (Schofield and Sherman stood squarely behind him). If you want to read a detailed analysis of Sheridan's performance at Chickamauga, google "Sheridan's Ride at Chickamauga."

Wittenburg writes a very compact critical book on the military skills and ethics of Phil Sheridan. The author writes in a concise fashion presenting factual detail centering on the most important moments of Sheridan's career. After a review of Sheridan's early career including the near bayoneting of a senior classman at West Point, the author spends virtually the remainder of the book on Sheridan Civil War career offering rather severe critiques of Sheridan's military ability as a cavalry leader and tactician, as an unfair supervisor of subordinates, his inability to follow orders, his inability to tell the truth abut early forays and his failure to recognize the contributions of subordinates. Although this does appear to be pretty harsh treatment of Sheridan, Wittenburg presents the information in a flowing economic narrative that sets up the final chapter's evaluation as a virtual summary of points categorically describing Sheridan's weaknesses. The author virtually starts with Sheridan's failure not to bring on an engagement at the battle of Perryville, to his inability to follows Meade's directions to open the road to Spotsylvania to his possible bypass of Grant's original orders for him to join Sherman. The author notes thst Sheridan's typical veteran post Civil war memoir glories in abundant hyperbole that speaks of frequent victories over southern horsemen. Sheridan's most interesting conflicts are personal with Crook, Averell and of course the cataclysmic collision with General Warren at Five Forks. However, in spite of the numerous criticisms, Wittenburg acknowledges that in the final theater during and after Five Forks, Sheridan was relentless in pursuit of Lee's retreating army earning accolades. And perhaps this last phase balances the book in that although Sheridan had his faults and ego, he had a certain ruthless drive that could truly make war hell for his his opposition in the valley or Indians and he could apply total war when the end was near. Grant's respect for Sheridan at the end seems to be at its zenith when he tells Sheridan that he may sack Warren with total authority and discretion. Of course Sheridan sacks Warren most likely without facts or reason but more so for perception and past negatives that Meade did not hold Warren accountable. Sheridan and Warren are perhaps the most interesting pair in conflict during the Civil War other than Jefferson C. Davis and William Nelson where the former assassinated the latter. Wittenburg's critiques may be controversial but they are well presented and many are well proven. But the debate is still on in the end because Grant has full confidence in Sheridan and with Sheridan brimming with confidence and his well-supported cavalry force, he literally pulls the plug on Lee's valiant and hopeless attempts at escape. A well-written book with controversy but the best part is that the book challenges your thought professionally leaving room for argument.

Little Phil: A Reassessment Of The Civil War Leadership Of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan by civil war historian Eric J. Wittenberg is a 272 page examination of the legendary Union Army general. This controversial study challenges the existing literature on Sheridan arguing that his war record has been commonly overrated. Informed and informative reading which is confidently recommended to Civil War buffs and academia alike, Little Phil is a provocative, iconoclastic, well written study that will enrich and enhance our understanding of one of the Union Army's most famous yet fallible officers.

As stated in other reviews of this work, this book by noted cavalry historian Eric J. Wittenberg will challenge both established history as well as the preconceived notions of the reader. It is heavy-handed at times in criticism of Sheridan, but perhaps that is as it should be. For far too long, Sheridan's so-called "accomplishments" have gone down in history as unquestioned. Scholars will learn little of the truth of an operation or engagement by reading his official reports, and his Memoirs provide some of the best fictional reading the Civil War has to offer.It is about time that a skillful researcher has balanced "accepted" history concerning this man with arguments of such a critical nature. Perhaps the true history lies somewhere in between - but one fact remains, and that is that Mr. Wittenberg is truly the first modern writer to take on the teflon persona of a man who, inarguably, crafted his own career out of the dust left from ruining others'. Several fine American Civil War officers went to their deathbeds under the crushing defeats by Sheridan - not on the battlefield where they belonged - but within interpersonal relationships. Sheridan destroyed careers for no reason other than his own desire to capture the glory won by others. It is high time that he be taken to task for his shortcomings and ineptitude.Sheridan certainly had a great deal of assistance, as well. He didn't have the power to accomplish his aims alone, and Wittenberg deftly exposes this as well. For anyone who is unchallenged by today's "coffee-table" type works that espouse the traditional legends surrounding those who made such an impact on the history of this country, and desire instead to be forced to both re-think and reevaluate those notions, this work will be a treasure to them. Wittenberg's book is no less than an in-your-face attorney's arguments against these notions. As with any lawyer worth his salt, all he or she asks is that you have been impressed enough by the presentation of evidence to intelligently form your own opinion. And ask yourself if what you've believed all along is your own opinion or that of another. In causing the reader to think that deeply, Mr. Wittenberg has accomplished his aims in the way they are known to be honorable - with the credit due to none other than himself.Read this book. It will train you to ask the deeper questions and explore for yourself how history should remember those who shape it.

At the close of the Civil War, by wide acclaim the three top Union generals were Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan. Although the reputations of Grant and Sherman have fallen and risen again a number of times, Sheridan's standing as a great general has gone almost unchallenged. Until now. Eric Wittenberg is a recognized authority on Union cavalry operations in the Eastern Theater and, based upon his earlier studies, he concluded that Sheridan's high reputation was undeserved, being a product more of Grant's blind faith in his subordinate (and Sheridan's own blatant self-promotion) than anything "Little Phil" actually did. Wittenberg by profession is a trial attorney and, as he openly acknowledges in his preface, this book is essentially a legal brief, setting forth his thesis that Sheridan has been over-rated and presenting the evidence in support of that thesis. He also states that he anticipates that some will not agree with him and that he looks forward to the debate to come. Sheridan's career is described in four chapters, one dealing with the antebellum period and the first three years of the war, and then one each for his service as commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac during the Overland Campaign and the early weeks at Petersburg, for his independent command in the Shenandoah Valley against Jubal Early's forces, and finally for his conduct of the pursuit of Lee's army to Appomattox. (For the Overland and Shenandoah periods, Wittenberg awards poor marks to Sheridan, but gives him a high grade for the Appomattox Campaign.) Together, these four chapters comprise a succinct but comprehensive history of Sheridan's Civil War operations. In addition, special chapters are devoted to Sheridan's harsh treatment of subordinates (George Crook, William Averell, and Gouveneur K. Warren), his frequent disobedience of orders, and the conspicuous distance between truth and what Sheridan wrote in his official reports and memoirs. There is also a final summary of Sheridan's flaws as well as his virtues. And Wittenberg does not deny that Sheridan was superb at motivating his men for a maximum effort and in building their confidence, recognizing that "Little Phil" did indeed make important contributions to ultimate Union victory, even if not as substantial contributions as traditional history has contended.Readers familiar with standard assessments of Federal cavalry operations in the Eastern Theater during the final year of the Civil War (Stephen Z. Starr's history of the Union cavalry comes to mind) may be startled by Wittenberg's quite negative appraisal of that activity. Disputing Sheridan's claim of nearly unbroken success against the forces of Stuart and Hampton during the summer of 1864, Wittenberg contends that only Yellow Tavern can be counted as a Union victory. And Wittenberg concludes that Sheridan was consistently outgeneraled in the Shenandoah and that only his overwhelming superiority i