Lees Last Campaign

This is a general type book that covers Grant vs. Lee from the Wilderness to the beginning of the Petersburg campaign.It does not cover the Petersburg campaign.There are a few general maps,and due to the books' scope they aren't detailed.It is however an excellent overview of the campaign and the personalities involved. At times Dowdy seems to contradict himself when he evaluates Sheridans' cavalry manuevers and finds them ineffective and wasteful of manpower. Later he points out that Lee was often in the dark in regard to Grant's manuevering because he coudn't get any information.Could that be because Sheridan had pretty much destroyed Lee's cavalry?Since intelligence gathering is one of the prime functions of cavalry what other reason could there be,other than Lee's cavalry wasn't up to par.Maybe Sheridan wasn't as ineffective as Dowdy purports,albeit in the "fog of war" mistakes are made,even distrous ones. Then Dowdy slights Grants aim to destroy Lee's Army and points out that after 3 months of sidestepping Lee's army,Grant had to settle for a seige at Petersburg that cut Richmond off.Lee's army Dowdy points out was still intact when it settled into defensive works at Petersburg.Key words here'"Defensive Works"(nuff said) Dowdy also insinuates that Grant was "cheating" because he had so many more men and supplies.What and standing behind entrenchments waiting for the enemy to "bloody himself" beyond redemption isn't.It's clear from the book that after the Wilderness Lee's offensive power was exhausted in a stalemate and Grant(by cheating) could still move forward(or sideways)?Still despite Dowdy's bias,the book is great and smooth reading. Also this book focuses on manuevering of armies and offers criticism of the Generals of both armies manuevers.Is it any wonder that after the war was over the next 20 or so years were spent in a Court of Inquiries trying to figure out who to blame and who to clear.At least there was no paperwork involved in the Confederate high command involvev.(100% guilty for losing the war).The confederate inquiry,after the war, was more a "slap in the face" on a Richmond street between Confederate commanders or worse,pistols and daggers.More likely an impotent rage,"cursed not loudly,but deeply",to quote MacBeth.

This is a very good book on the Overland Campaign of 1864. It is the story of the great campaign between Lee and Grant. The author writes very good character sketches of Lee, Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill. He also tells about the lower level officers of the Army of Northern Virginia. He does show bias against Longstreet who he does not think very highly of. Grant fans will not be too happy with some of the narrative. But it is a book about Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia not Grant and the Army of the Potomac. For the flip side of the coin I highly recommend Bruce Catton's "Surrender at Appomattox" which is an excellent account of the Army of the Potomac in these campaigns.

An excellent work that in my opinion captures the essence of the Confederate failure. Dowdy debunks the myths of Grant the butcher and the subsequent "Lost Cause" explaination that the South lost the war due to the overwhelming superiority of Northern numbers, industry, weaponry and supply. Dowdy places the blame with Jefferson Davis, Braxton Bragg, the CSA War Department and to some extent on P.G.T. Beauregard. The decentralized defensive strategy adopted by Davis, led to the inability by General Lee and other CSA field commanders to sufficiently concentrate the forces necessary to defeat the Union armies.

The author writes a simply marvelous history of the great generalship of an almost god-like Robert E. Lee. Read how sheer numbers, not superior leadership, allowed U.S. Grant final victory. Although I think this book is out of print, I would highly recommend any history or Civil War buff to search hard for it. They will not be dissapointed.