Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary

This book is a gripping read, and it contains new insights into the Cold War, and the authors add some interesting brushstrokes to our historical portrait of Krushchev. Khrushchev has always been a minor hero of mine. I call him a minor hero because one cannot talk about heroism in an unqualified way with a major figure of an absolute government. Beethoven angrily re-titled the dedication of the Eroica symphony, and I agree with his sentiments in doing it, yet it remains possible to admire some aspects of Napoleon's career. All individuals must be judged with an appreciation for the constraints under which they operated, and Khrushchev did some very important things and maintained a kind of idealism, despite its rough peasant expression. Khrushchev did want his people to achieve a better life; he cared a great deal about improving agriculture; he was a sincere believer in the ultimate benefits of socialism; he did not want war; and he did want peaceful coexistence with the West before that phrase became commonplace. Above all, Khrushchev was and remains a very human figure, something that cannot be said of a great many absolute leaders. Khrushchev's role in changing the operations of the Soviet government after decades of Stalin - perhaps the most terrifying dictator of the modern era - was heroic, something I believe he has never been adequately recognized for in the West. But the same man was ready to crush revolt in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The title of the book is absolutely accurate: this is Khrushchev's Cold War. Other actors enter and leave the stage, but Khrushchev shapes the story. In that sense, it is necessarily incomplete as a history of the Cold War. The new insights in the book come from Soviet archives not opened until well into the 21st century. They include who knew what when; the impact of certain events on the Soviet leadership; the real reasons for certain Soviet positions in international affairs; and some of the misunderstandings of American analysts and leaders at the time. In a few cases, the authors indicate that materials are missing yet, so the book cannot be taken as definitive. But the book is indispensable to understanding the Cold War, aspects of how the Soviet Union worked, and the Cuban Missile crisis. It is recommended to all with interest in these subjects and to anyone just wanting a good historical read.

A solid history of the always probing, somewhat erratic, but ultimately war-adverse reign of Khrushchev during the 1950s and 60s. Those wanting to acquire direct insights into the thinking and motives of the leadership of the Kremlin during some of its most important Cold War confrontations with the U.S.--Suez, Berlin, Laos, and Cuba--should buy and read this book. It is a wonder that a hot war was avoided when you are confronted by the authors, Fursenko and Naftali, with the gamesmanship, often played during this period in a vacum of real knowledge, on both sides of the Iron Curtin. It is a further wonder that the bankrupt political and economic system that was the USSR lasted as long as it did.

If - and that is a big if (the book is fully 600 pages long - it helps to fall ill when you read it - I did!) - you have the time and want to invest it for obtaining a first class overview over the great power play during the decade between 1955 and 1965 - the Khruschev era - this definitely is the book to read! Its authors not only provide a refreshingly new perspective to the (more or less well-) known events of, i.a., the first Israeli-Egyptian war, the (Soviet) occupation of Hungary and the Cuban missile crisis, they fully succeed in transforming this period of history into a most plausible and very exciting "story", in fact, into something of a "thriller" (in the best sense of the word). It is the story of a great power desperate to come up to its claim to possess or at least to be accorded equal status with the other - even greater - super-power, the United States or, more generally, the "West". In order to achieve that one goal, almost anything would do, even extreme brinkmanship that several times brought the world close to thermonuclear war. Khrushev is shown as a man to have carried within himself the dominating characteristics of the Soviet Union itself, viz., an enormous inferiority complex, trying to combine it with catching any opportunity that would present itself to bring pressure to bear on the other side, even using or better: threatening the use of force, wherever it seemed this might bring political advantage. Fortunately for the world, this mercurial leader who disposed of the means to blow up the world (or at least: great parts of it) was restrained enough (be it on his own reason, be it by his more risk-averse colleagues within the Presidium) not to actually let the world go "over the brink" but to withdraw each time at the last moment. It is the humiliation of these retreats as well as the sense of responsibility displayed by him in making them which, if anything, ultimately cost him his job and earns him the status of a statesman (rather than merely that of a cunning politician). Against this background, only two - very minor - criticisms: First, there is a really unwarranted "blank space" in the book as regards the European Economic Community (today`s "European Union") whose very creation was decisively triggered by some of the events described in it (Suez; Hungary), by making the European states mercilessly feel their own palsy vis-à-vis the super-powers. It is ironic - and should clearly have been mentioned in the book - to see how the very institution for whose creation Khruschev bore no minor responsibility - would become one of the cornerstones of the West's economic superiority and thus a decisive factor for the eventual downfall of the Soviet Empire. Second, even though this would admittedly go slightly beyond the clear scope of the book (Khruschev's Cold War, restricting its topic to his role as politician), it might have been interesting for the reader to be permitted at least a brief peep behind the veil of

The book is very detailed and examines the critical 1955 to 1963 period of the Cold War largely from the viewpoint of the Soviets. The authors had access to documents not before released, including minutes of the Presidium meetings. The authors portray the Soviet leadership in a new light with most members of the Politburo seeking to avoid any conflict with the United States and unwilling to follow Khrushchev on his more dangerous adventures in Cuba and Egypt. It is evident that neither the Soviets nor the communist block were unified in seeking world domination. Rather, the communist leaders were largely constrained by the same political concerns as American leaders. There is also very interesting information towards the end regarding the CIA's role in bringing the Baath party to power in Iraq.

THIS IS ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS THAT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN LATELY ON ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL PERIODS IN HISTORY: THE COLD WAR. THE AUTHORS HAVE USED NEW DOCUMENTS FROM THE FORMER USSR AND HAVE SUCCESSFULLY BUILT A FASCINATING NARRATIVE ABOUT THE BAD GUY, KHRUSHCHEV. IT SEEMS THAT HE HAS MADE USE OF ALMOST EVERY POSSIBLE RUSE IN ORDER TO INTIMIDATE HIS MAIN ADVERSARY- THE USA.WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT HAD HE SUCCEEDED, THE WORLD WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN CONDEMNED TO SUFFER THE AGONIES OF A THIRD -AND NUCLEAR- WAR.I REFER TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WHICH HAD BEEN AVERTED THANKS TO THE SERENDIPITY FACTOR : THE CIA FLIGHTS OVER CUBA HAVE DISCOVERED AND SUPPLIED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND HIS STAFF THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE ON THE (NUCLEAR) MISSILES IN CUBA. THE AUTHORS ALSO DIVULGE KHRUSHCHEV'S MODES OF THINKING ABOUT OTHER COLD WAR FOCI , NAMELY:ASIA(LAOS) AND AFRICA( CONGO). HOWEVER, ALBEIT HIS BRINKMANSHIP TACTICS , KHRUSHCHEV PAID A HEAVY PRICE AND WAS ULTIMATELY MADE TO RESIGN( ALTHOUGH WE ALSO READ ABOUT A SINISTER PLOT TO REMOVE HIM EARLIER- A PLOT THAT FAILED BECAUSE HE FOUND OUT IN GOOD TIME). THE AUTHORS' STYLE IS LIVELY AND VIVID, AND THEY MAKE USE OF MANY PRIMARY MATERIALS -INCLUDING NEW DETAILS ABOUT THE INTERROGATION UNDERGONE BY GARY POWERS AFTER HIS PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN. THEY ALSO POINT OUT AND SEND A ( HIDDEN ) MESSAGE TO US ALL: IF A COUNTRY OR A SUPERPOWER DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH HUMINT SOURCES-AND RELIES MAINLY ON ELECTRONICS OR HIGH- TECH IN ORDER TO GET RAW INTELLIGENCE- THE CHANCES OF GETTING IT ARE SLIM INDEED. LET IT BE A WARNING TO THE USA THESE DAYS WHILE IT IS FIGHTING TERRORISTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THIS GLOBE.