Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941

A few years ago I read a short book on the Pacific War written by H.P. Wilmott. For those who don't know of him, Wilmott taught at Sandhurst for many years, and is probably one of the top two or three historians of the Pacific War. At the end of the book there was an annotated bibliography. I always like this, as opposed to a regular bibliography, because the annotations tell you what the author thinks of various sources, and that in turn tells you something about his thinking. But sometimes the recommendation is more direct: you trust the author, and he tells you something is worthwhile. In this instance, he said that he wasn't sure how Pacific War historians got along before the book Kaigun was published. Needless to say I went out and got one. It's not a cheap book, there aren't used copies cheaper, there's no paperback available. It's still worth every penny, and I will tell you below why you need it. There are, of course, a bushel and a half of books about the war in the Pacific during World War II. Many of them note that the Japanese fought the war in an unusual fashion, and most note differences in technology, strategy, tactics, and philosophy. Some of these things are vaguely explained by the differences in Western and Japanese society, but at best the explanations are vague. This leaves a huge gap in the history of the Pacific War. Kaigun fills this gap. The authors basically explain every question of this type involving the Japanese Navy in World War II, from why their cruisers had long ranged torpedoes to why their navy's intelligence was so poor to why they insisted in planning as if the American Navy would act in particular ways (even after it had demonstrated that it would act in other ways). Much of the differences between the Japanese and American Navies stemmed from the fact that the Japanese had to modernize so quickly. This circumstance had background in that Japan had little naval tradition, and no ships really on which to base a modern navy. While this meant that Japanese Naval modernization had many pitfalls, it also had advantages, notably a lack of old traditions and hoary rivalries that plagued other nations' Naval modernization programs. The authors spend a considerable length of time discussing Japan's wars with first China and then Russia in the early stages of their modernization. China proved little challenge in a Naval sense, but Russia was a much more formidable opponent, though the Japanese defeated them decisively. While the war itself is discussed at some length, a great deal of time is also spent discussing the aftermath, and the war's influence on Japan's strategy, tactics, and philosophy in future wars. As far as the authors are concerned, Tsushima was the principle reason the Japanese Navy spent most of the thirties planning for a major confrontation between the U.S. Navy and their own combined fleet. The latter confrontation was apparently modeled rather closely on Tsushima, which was pretty much the sam

In this day of asymmetric warfare, the history of the Japanese navy hardly seems relevant, but this book is so well-written it should be read by all strategists. It very effortlessly opens the eyes of the reader to the transformative processes that brought Japan out of the shadows of an antiquated feudal system into the forefront of military prowess in the span of less than 100 years. That alone merits the read of this book. But it clearly shows how Japan's military intellectuals adapted western thought and technology and fused western military and political rules with the classic ideals of Asian military strategy. There is a lot to be learned from seeing how the process worked in Japan. And in our ever-changing world, there is always a lot to be learned from the successes of others in adaptation and fusion of ideas and strategies.

This is a magnum opus to match S.E. Morrison's 14 volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, or Clay Blair's "Silent Victory" and 2-volume Hitler's U-Boat war, or Lundstrom's two "First Team" volumes. Such are volumes that a serious student of the Pacific War does not fail to read. Add this one. "Kaigun" is the perfect complement to Miller's "War Plan Orange." Why? First, Kaigun fills in the internal history of the Imperial Japanese Navy from its inception to the fatal decisions which led to its destruction. Second, it examines the strategic, doctrinal and tactical thought which drove, or was driven by the technological progress of the IJN. And finally, it explodes a number of cherished myths surrounding the IJN, most particularly its very active part in pushing Japan to war. What this volume can't answer and can't be held accountable for is why intelligent men leading the IJN made the incredibly bad decision to go to war, although it clearly illustrates the strategic calculus used to rationalize those decisions. "Kaigun" also shows (with the clarity of hindsight, or course) why Japan never had a chance of winning its war with the United States short of divine intervention. This is a seminal work and absolutely not to be missed. The technical detail may bore and quail the casual reader, but the serious student and the reader wanting the truth of the matter won't be put off. This is the best English language work available on the subject and should be read in conjunction with "War Plan Orange."

Kaigun Strategy is a book that I had a lot of trouble putting down. This is perhaps strange for a book which discusses things such as the development of dry steam as a more efficient mode of propulsion, change in the composition of steel as it related to battleship construction and other very technical subjects. In a way the book said a lot about the Pacific War that had been said before. Yet in a way it was as startling revelation of the development of Japanese Society from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the second World War. The book is a discussion about the development of Japans Navy. Until 1945 the Japanese spent the staggering amount of 27% of their national budget on the navy. The reason for this lies with the now forgotten writings of Admiral Mahon.Mahon was an American who in his day was as famous as Marx and Lenin. He wrote a history of sea power a book that argued that the reason for the wealth of great nations was the control of an empire through control of the sea. The Japanese were converts to his doctrines and being an island power thought that the key to the national destiny was the acquisition of empire. Kaigun Strategy is a study of how the Japanese Navy tried to develop a navy that would give them preponderance over that of the much stronger American Navy. The book goes into great detail about how the Japanese studied the most modern technology to develop a numerically inferior but well trained modern Navy. The belief in empire and the need to ensure oil supplies put Japan on a collision course with the United States of America.The end of the war has led to Japan sheathing the sword and seeking to build up a strong economy. This has led to Japan becoming one of the richest and strongest countries in the world. How more productive that has been rather than putting most of the national wealth into a Navy which ended up on the bottom of the sea.The book is fascinating at showing that whilst a large amount of Japans planning and development showed tremendous skill and intellect, at the same time ridiculous errors were made. Thus whilst Japan build up a modern fleet and air wing it failed to: · Adopt a convoy system during the war or to arm enough destroyers with sonar equipment to protect its merchant marine. · Did not realise till after the war started that there were not enough tankers in the possession of Japan to move enough oil from its new possessions to keep both the navy and industry going. · Made no attempts to develop code breaking in the way that its Axis Partner Germany and the Allies did. · Were not able to adopt the strategy once it became obvious that the war was evolving into one of attrition rather than a single decisive battle.The book is a fascinating one and shows how the history of nations can be molded by the history of ideas.

I did some of the illustrations for the book, so maybe I am biased, but this book will be read by people interested in this area of naval history for years to come. David Evans and Mark Peattie have researched this work meticulously, (including using previously untranslated Japanese primary sources from the Japanese Self-Defense Force archives) to construct a view of the changing inter-workings of technology, strategy, and tactics in the Imperial Japanese Navy. The writing is excellent, the layout is elegant, and the maps and illustrations (ahem) are superb. The book also contains excellent back-matter in the endnotes, bibliography, and index. A MUST for any serious student of the Imperial Japanese Navy.