Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases

Since the fall of communism in the late 80s and early 90s, new democracies have embraced constitutional courts exercising judicial review. Given the vicious attacks upon courts in the US, one often wonders why anyone would adopt constitutional courts with the power to attack the result of the democratic process, and push its own policy. Ginsburg presents a compelling answer: new democracies turn to constitutional courts as a source of political insurance. When creating a constitution, parties will be more willing to create a court when the political future is uncertain, where they predict that they will likely be in the minority and thus may require extra protection to ensure that the other party(s) will not be able to abuse them. Where a party believes it will be in solid control in the future, the court will likely be weaker because the dominant party would not want to limit its own powers. Ginsburg examines this theory against three case studies of Mongolia, Korea, and Taiwan; the experience of these three countries strongly supports the political insurance theory. This interesting, original work presents judicial review as an integral part of democracy especially in countries without prior democratic experience. Additionally, Ginsburg examines courts in areas that have received little attention in the US, thus, anyone interested in non-western constitutionalism should check this book out.