Invasion: The Roman Invasion of Britain in the Year Ad 43 and the Events Leading to Their Occupation of the We

John Peddie, a retired British infantry officer, has attempted to re-construct the Roman invasion of Britain in 43 AD by extrapolating from the fragmentary accounts of Cassius Dio and Tacitus. The author uses "inherent military probability" to fill in the many gaps in the historical record and thereby produce a coherent campaign narrative. The account starts with a chapter on Julius Caesar's expeditions to Britain in 54-55 BC, which gave the Romans their first direct experience of that island. However the bulk of the book concerns the invasion of 43 AD and Peddie addresses this in six chapters, from the initial landings in Kent to the capture of Caratacus, the British rebel chieftain in 51 AD. Although later rebellions in 61-70 AD are mentioned they are not detailed. I was dissappointed by the lack of an aftermath chapter that covered the following decades of Roman expansion in Britain. Using the fragmentary information available, the author attempts to re-construct the Roman order of battle and he uses contemporary logistic information to support his claims. A chapter on the Roman army and its logistics and a further appendix on Roman logistical matters are quite interesting. There are a number of sketch maps used to depict the possible flow of the campaign, but few overall campaign maps. The author has written with British audiences in mind and American readers will find it difficult to identify many of the small terrain features in the Kentish and Essex countryside that the author uses as references. Better maps and diagrams to show alternative Roman courses of action would add greatly to this account. The author also uses photos of modern-day Roman re-enactors and terrain views to support the text. While the terrain photographs are good, the use of re-enactors is questionable. For example, a photo of "Roman troops on the march" show re-enactors wearing full armor with shields; however, unless contact was expected, Roman infantry were unlikely to march any great distance wearing full battle gear. One of the few times that Caesar was almost defeated in Gaul occurred when his troops were ambushed during a river-crossing and the troops were not wearing all their equipment. While the author's use of "inherent military probability" is a laudable effort, it is also fraught with potential pit-falls. What may seem logical to a 20th Century military mind, conditioned to the time-space conditions of industrialized warfare, may not have been apparent to a military mind in the 1st Century. At one point, the author notes that one Roman legion was "next to be found marching against the Deceangli of north-east Wales, an inexplicable and isolated operation which apparently bore no relationship to any obvious, established plan." The author seems baffled because a full legion went on a punitive expeditionary to punish a minor Welsh tribe, while rebellion was brewing in other more important areas. I would refer readers to Susan P. Mattern's

Detailed analyses presented in a very readable style. This is a must read for any student of Rome or Britain.