The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature

Regarding the so-called "power conspiracy" theories--which Chomsky has refuted several times, both in print and in lectures--proponents of those theories argue not, e.g., that there are meetings between the Board of Directors of Exxon-Mobil and their major stockholders--of which there certainly are. No. Conspiracy theorists argue the case for some grand, overarching subterfuge. That is, e.g., monthly meetings between the CEOs of the New York Times, the Washington Post, et. al., Exxon-Mobil and the other Fortune One-Hundred Corporations, and high-level D.C. administrators, etc., examining all of the data on dissident factions, major protests, D.C. legislators and jurists exhibiting opposition to status quo policy making, etc., and then plotting to coordinate counter-intelligence measures to maintain their own entitlements, etc. And, all this, considering the fierce competition, and predatory tactics amongst the Players themselves, i.e., to, daily, unman--i.e., castrate, economically speaking--any (viable or not) competitors. And, we have not even touched upon security leaks, etc., the threat of which would be ever-present (consider the thoughts of a disgruntled Player who felt cheated in a recent "deal"), and which would prove calamitous, to say the least. Nor have we entered into the equation the very real presence of trans-national Players, whose interests impinge upon our own--from hour to hour, in fact, if one considers the realities of the various Exchanges in major world markets. Is this possible? Consider the enormity of such an ongoing effort--and it would, of necessity, have to be ongoing, since the rank-and-file are in a state of information exchange, revision, flux, etc. Again--is it possible that a grand, overarching subterfuge does, in fact, exist? Well, since anything is quote-unquote possible, let us, then, consider--more practically--what is likely, i.e., within the context of: What is really needful for Power to maintain its prerogatives and entitlements? To differentiate Power from Player: Power itself, we would do well to remember, is no respector of persons. That is, Power will readily forego the participation of this or that particular Player, but Power itself will not be as readily undermined. At this point, Players within the Market/State/Media complex do not need to "conspire" in order for Power to exist. That is, Power, in the parlance of Social theorists, is "libidinous." "Libidinous" is a Freudian term referring to the libido, the sex drive, or sexual desire--an apt comparison. Power is libidinous--an often mindless, material striving...for its own sake. "Libido" and "desire" can be subtle drives, but none the less real for their subtlety. And, similarly, Power, as an illegitimate (i.e., non-justified), entity--i.e., Power, as the exercise of self-serving control by the few over the many--that has not been successfully opposed, or contravened, once rooted, will continue. It's as simple as that.

The Chomsky-Foucault Debate On Human Nature collects and presents an integral debate held between two of the world's top intellectuals, Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, held in 1971 (during the height of the Vietnam War) to wrestle with the ancient question: Is there such a thing as "innate" human nature independent of our experiences and external influences? In addition to reproducing the debate verbatim, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate On Human Nature includes later writings by each speaker: "Politics" (1976) and "A Philosophy of Language" (1976) by Noam Chomsky, and "Truth and Power" (1976), "Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Rason" (1978) and "Confronting Government: Human Rights" (1984) by Michel Foucault. "The concept of legality and the concept of justice are not identical; they're not entirely distinct either. Insofar as legality incorporates justice in this sense of better justice, referring to a better society, then we should follow and obey the law... Of course, in those areas where the legal system happens to represent not better justice, but rather the techniques of oppression that have been codified in a particular autocratic system, well, then a reasonable human being should disregard and oppose them, at least in principle; he may not, for some reason, do it in fact." Highly recommended, and a welcome contribution to library philosophy shelves.

I didn't know about this debate between these two on this subject--what a find! I am reading it now, and a line of friends are waiting for their turn.

It is now widely conceded among post-modern/post-structuralist circles that Foucault broke the back of linguist-political scientist Noam Chomsky in this televised debate on Dutch television. Perhaps this conception further contributed to Chomksy's disdain with the French intellectual community entire in subsequent years. Nevertheless, regardless of one's political/philosophical disposition, this is an endlessly fascinating debate, between two thinkers working as "tunnellers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other's direction" (2), to use the moderators' description. The debate begins technically, Chomksy addresses his discoveries within the domain of cognitive linguistics, and Foucault outlines his historical research into the sciences in Western civilization. Chomsky is a self-described rational `Cartesian,' a philosophical disposition largely rejected by post-modernity after the detruktion of Western philosophy by Martin Heidegger. Foucault, on the other hand, (who began as a major Heideggerian) seems to adopt a Nietzschean disposition; he rejects Chomsky's assertion that a genuine concept of human justice is rooted biologically in the human species. Rather, that our knowledge of morality and human nature are always necessarily rooted in social conditioning. Chomsky actually fails (here as well as elsewhere) to really confront the philosophy of Nietzsche, who necessarily put a dent in all forms of socialism, whether democratic, libertarian, or totalitarian. To illustrate Chomsky's elusiveness: "FOUCAULT: it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it. CHOMSKY: I don't agree with that. FOUCAULT: And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice" (54-55). But Chomksy replies by reasserting his belief that there must be an absolute basis in which notions of human justice are "grounded" (ibid), however, he relies once again solely on his partial knowledge of what `human nature' is.

Helps the reader easily grasp both authors divergent and convergent insights on language. The material on politics was enlightening.