Holding the Line: Us Defense Alternatives for the 21st Century

For those interested in learning about the development of our national strategy and defense budget since the mid-80s and how we should direct our strategic focus and force structure towards a more economical and effective end, Dr. Cindy Williams' compilation of articles would be a superb choice.Dr. Williams explains that neither the "business approach", the "NATO and allies burden-sharing approach", nor the "nuclear reductions approach" has achieved the kinds of defense cuts that the government is seeking. She and six other policy experts explain why these approaches have not worked and what kinds of solutions will work for restructuring the armed forces in line with a "selective engagement" approach to internationalism and in line with reconciling policy-in-theory with policy-in-practice. I'm only an undergraduate, so I can't speak to how well experts receive the book, but I found it to be very thorough and timely, despite having been published prior to 9-11. One would be hard-pressed to find a consolidation of the recent history and development of defense spending, budget allocations, and national strategy in another book as well-written as this.

Anyone, whether expert or non-expert, with an interest in US national security strategy, military plans and policies, or federal budget priorities more generally, is likely to find this book a very useful, enjoyable and provocative read. The book argues quite persuasively that US national security requirements can be effectively met without significantly increasing defense spending over the next decade. But one doesn't have to agree with this conclusion to find the book extremely valuable. It's nine chapters, each written by a different expert in the defense policy and budget fields, cover the key issues confronting US strategists and defense planners today. These include three different chapters dealing with how the US military should be reshaped to meet emerging new challenges--like the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles, and the possible rise of China or another peer competitor--without "breaking the bank." Each of these three chapters suggests a very different approach. One envisions a more dominant role for the Army, while the other two focus on enhanced roles for the Navy and Air Force. But all of them would entail shifting dramatically away from the Defense Department's current plans and posture, and living within essentially today's budget levels. One of the great features of the book is that the chapters generally combine broad policy discussions of key assumptions and issues (e.g., US national interests and the role of military force), with concrete, detailed programmatic and policy recommendations (e.g., which new weapon systems to cancel, or accelerate). In addition to the three chapters already mentioned, the book also contains impressive chapters covering the role of US allies, US nuclear forces, and the potential for making the Defense Department more efficient (including a discussion of the practical limits of such efforts). Lastly, this book comes at an exceedingly opportune time--with the new Bush Administration preparing to soon offer its own, possibly very different, and likely controversial, proposal for how the US military should be changed to better reflect post-Cold War realities.