Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare

I think this book originated as recordings of lectures. The sentences are so involved you have to reread them 3 or 4 times to get the point. Sometimes the grammar doesn't make sense. Two examples: page 141 "From Stalin's perspective it made the sense of desperation to maintain an armed truce with Hitler as long as possible." I have reread that sentence many times, and still have no idea what it means. Page 257: "As for what would come next, sufficient unto the day was the evil thereof." Mr. Showalter obviously knows military history and tanks and wrote this book for someone with existing knowledge of both. For example page 238: "The complete worthlessness of the Maus as a fighting vehicle in the context of WWII needs no elaboration." There are no pictures, and only 5 very simple maps. There are no references, as if Mr. Showalter is reciting from memory. I am on the other end of the spectrum from Mr. Showalter and was looking for an introduction to the reasons for the German victories in WWII, and details of the Eastern Front beyond a `march to Moscow`. The books' title suggest the lightning attacks revolutionized warfare. There is no doubt German panzers revolutionized the second world war, but he never answers the question of how they did it as the Allies had tanks also, and in the end, the panzers lost. The book is about the Russo-German war; Generals being replaced, lack of logistics, and incredible losses on both sides. That's not to say the story is not true, but the title is misleading. Is it revolutionary if you lose? The battle of Kurst during July 5-17, 1943 needs more detail, if as Showalter says: "The battle of Kurst established the conditions for the rest of the Russo-German War." (Page 253). And on page 268, Prokhorovka was "the greatest armored battle in history" (Showalter disagrees with this) a little more description of the battle would have been nice. I also had to look up Bocage to realize what he was talking about. Mr. Showalter raises as many questions as answers. Such as: why wasn't German logistics better able to support the tanks? What aspect of war was revolutionized by the panzers? Why were the panzers sent to occupied France for refitting? Where did all those endless Ivan bodies come from that overwhelmed the lightning attacks? "Massed infantry, massed armor, and massed artillery hammered at the same points time after time, until nothing and no one remained to send forward..."(Page 275). What was the Russian battle plan for the KV-1 monster tank? Was the capture of Moscow irrelevant as he says, or would it have ended the war on the Eastern Front? Would the allies have won if Russia had sued for peace in 1943 (page 254), and Germany could then send its armies to the single front in the West in 1944? Was all the replacing of Generals justified, or did it just lead to confusion, and more involvement by Hitler? Even with the grammar, and raising questions that no one can answer, I would highly rec

Dennis Showalter is a renowned World War II scholar and his unparalleled depth of knowledge on the subject at hand is clearly evident in this book. I have been avidly reading military history for four decades and while I am not as familiar with the Eastern Front and Spanish Civil War as I would like, I could not find fault with Showalter's research. Showalter's tremendous breadth of knowledge translates into accounts of battle that explain why events began in a certain manner, how those dynamics influenced engagements during battle, and what occured in the wake of a particular fight. His command of both descriptive writing and analysis is impressive. An example might suffice better than my own description of this book's contents: On the Fighting around Gembloux during the 1940 campaign in France between Erich Hoepner's XVI Panzer Corps and General Rene Prioux's French Cavalry Corps(p. 118 - 20): "Rene Prioux had nothing of Joachim Murat or Jeb Stuart in his professional makeup. He was too worried about the Luftwaffe and his own lack of air cover to undertake even the limited spoiling attacks originally enjoined by his superiors. The result was a head-on, two day encounter battle that began around the village of Hannut on May 12. In a fashion prefiguring the behavior of Israeli armor in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, 4th Panzer Division attacked with more energy than tactical sense, and took heavy losses from French artillery fire and armored ripostes. The SOMUAs in particular, boldly handled in company strengths, proved an unpleasant surprise as the greenhorns of the 3d Light Mechanized Division came away victors on points from a good day's work. Fuel shortages also hampered the German deployment to a point that Hoepner, instead of continuing to probe opportunistically for weak spots, decided to reorganize, resupply, and mount a two-division set-piece attack the next day. A ball peen hammer is a good tool. A nine-pound sledgehammer is also useful. Guderian might have done it with more finesse, but beginning a little after noon on May 13, 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, around 560 tanks all told, struck 3d Light Mechanized Division on an eight-mile front. There was bitter fighting in defended villages, with riflemen clearing strongpoints and tanks bypassing them whenever possible. Survivors of disabled French tanks fought on with pistols against armor plate. A captain of the 35th Panzer Regiment described two observers in a water tower engaging tanks with rifles until "shot full of holes like sieves." It was not until 3pm that the German tanks reached open ground, only to face a series of armored counterattacks. French tanks seemed to be everywhere at once, bypassing the panzers and engaging the infantry, forcing the tanks to turn around and bailout their comrades. The close-gripped seesaw fighting featured small German armor-piercing shells ricocheting harmlessly off French turrets and hulls. The 6th Panzer Regimen

Dennis Showalter, a professor and noted author, has written a well researched and interesting book on the history of German panzers and the subsequent war doctrine that was built around this lethal weapon. The history starts at the beginning near the banks of the Somme in WWI and deliberately evolves through the dark days of the 1920s and into the 1930s when Hitler's influence escalates. The author develops the history of the panzer, its war doctrine and follows the evolution of new models and their increasing capacities as well as the increasing popularity and recognition of the value of this "new" weapon. Guderian may have been the most vocal proponent of the panzer but there were others, like Volckheim, Rabenau and Fritsch, that promoted panzers and mobile warfare. With each new panzer model, Volckheim would critcize the gun barrel for being too small and puny. The large barrel panzer that had power and distance would win the war. He would be proven right. By 1939, Germany had an arsenal of Mk IIIs and some Mk IVs to deploy and a blitzkrieg doctrine that would conquer much of Europe and intimidate most of the world. (I've wondered what would have happened, if it would have made a big enough difference if Guderian had Panthers instead of Mk IIIs driving toward Moscow in late 1941 or Hoth driving north toward Stalingrad in 1942.) The author doesn't present a daily chronology of battle events but does provide an interesting overview of how tanks or tank commanders influenced key battles of the war. Some of the key battles include Kiev, Moscow, Tunisia, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, Kursk, Korsun, Vitebsk, Brody and the Ardennes Offensive. Some of the key commanders discussed are Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner, Kleist, Kluge, Model, Manstein, Rommel and Rundstedt. Some of the key panzer units were also discussed: Das Reich, Totenkopf, LAH, Lehr and others. The Spanish Civil War is also included as a training program for German tank commanders as well as the Russian side of tank warfare. The author compares the strengths and weaknesses of the Sherman against the Panther, Tiger and T34. The author even mentions the German prototype called the Maus that weighed 188 tons and sported 10 inch armor. The author also discusses the psychological makeup of Hitler and how he influenced the extravagant designs of the Panther and Tiger. Sorry to say there are no illustrations or photos of the different tanks discussed. There are no maps of the battles discussed. There is also no Notes or Bibliography which is surprising and disappointing. Even though the presentation is excellent, there isn't any ground breaking new material in this volume so people who are already well read on the war or on tank doctrine may not learn a lot but it would be a terrific book for beginners, intermediates or collectors.