Historians' Fallacie: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought

David Hackett Fischer's thesis is that there is a tacit and analyzable logic of historical thought and that historians can improve their historical thinking by applying this logic to their work. Historians' Fallacies is a successful attempt to make history a discipline better governed by reason. Fischer notes that history is mainly a problem-solving discipline; the historian asks pertinent questions and then develops a logical paradigm to answer them. He acknowledges that history will never be an exact science but it is his goal, by a careful examination of common historical fallacies, to develop a type of logic. Method is necessary in history, and logic makes a method more rigorous and useful. The historian must follow rules to write good, "scientific," history. Fischer reveals his ultimate goal in his conclusion. He discusses the goals of history and makes an eloquent apology for the historian. He astutely notes that social scientists have never found a justification for history, making illogical arguments to justify their interest in the past. Calling history "fun," saying that history should be studied because it "is there," and stating "everyone needs to know facts" are three poor reasons for a defense of history. Likewise, claiming history provides a creative outlet and that it could prove useful for the future are spurious speculations, at best. Fischer's apology of history explains that as history becomes more logical, it becomes more useful to society. History can clarify the contexts of contemporary social problems and can help with forecasting, allowing us to discuss future issues before they arrive. History offers theoretical knowledge, helping social scientists understand past conditions that best brought, say, stability and peace. A recognition of these conditions could help calm today's times. History helps people understand who they are, and by giving them an identity, frees them from the tyranny of the short-sighted present. Most importantly, history helps people conceptualize today's problems in today's terms. Effective solutions to problems in the past could well prove disastrous if applied to similar problems today, and an understanding of history lessens this threat. Logical history is necessary to useful history; the two are inseparable. Fischer's self-proclaimed reason for writing this book was the lack of logical analysis in history. He believes that many historians hold a bizarre hatred towards logic, known as "misology." Despite this anti-intellectual attitude by historians, the use of history as an academic discipline and a social science demands a logical and scientific approach. The analytical philosophy of history is helpful for developing historical thought, but insufficient to actually create the logic that historians need. Fischer takes that next step in his book. Fischer explains his thesis by taking the reader through the three major steps of a historian's method: inquiry, explanation, and argument. Inquir

Fischer presents a detailed and trenchant look at the problems of historical explanation in this fine book. It is certainly one of the best history books I've ever read, although it's not a history book per se, since it's really a critique of the different explanations historians use. Fischer discusses probably about a hundred or more of these, so you probably won't be able to remember them all, but if nothing else, you'll be more alert to the more common and egregious types of historical errors, and overall, the book is a useful analysis and reminder of the problems and difficulties of writing history. In that regard, it's still a very interesting and worthwhile book.Some of the fallacies I already knew from philosophy, such as the pathetic fallacy, the fallacy of composition, the post hoc fallacy, and so on, which are already well known. But then there are plenty of others with more abstruse names, such as the "the fallacy of the hypostatized proof." My one complaint enters here, since Fischer would have benefited from a knowledge of logic and philosophy, since he sometimes gives names to fallacies that are well known in logic and philosophy by a different name. But overall, this is one of the best books on the methods and philosophy of history I've read, and it should probably be required reading for every student of history and professional historian alike.

Review of Fischer, _Historians' Fallacies_This is a much-read classic. It is well-written, well-organized, fair-minded, and packed with ideas applicable to all sorts of discourse in addition to the writing of history. It is also full of wit. An example: "Historical science presently hovers naked and trembling on the edge of quantification, with Clio in the huddled, hesitant posture of September morn." p 104. Strictly speaking, a fallacy is an error in an inference. Less formally, though, any mistake even in informal reasoning is today referred to as fallacy. Fischer took many of his fallacies (that is, their labels) from others; for example "tunnel history" from J. H. Hexter; "the fallacy of the hypostatized proof" from Perrll F. Payne; "the fallacy of the mechanistic cause" from R. M. McIver; and so on. Others, like the post hoc fallacy, or the confusion of correlation with causation, are in the public domain. But by far the majority of the some 100 fallacies he isolates are labelled as such by himself. Somewhat unfortunately for those in other disciplines, Fischer's examples are without exception from his own field of American History.Since I like the book so much (and every serious reader ought to have it), I will just mention some negatives.Fischer's main weakness is an apparent ignorance of philosophy, and it shows up in several places. Although there is a mine of thought in Chapter VI on fallacies of causality, Fischer seems to have no idea what the problem is with causality in philosophy (p 165), but plops down finally in favor of its reality, and necessarily uses it in the remainder of the chapter. (After all, there can be no fallacies of causality if there is no causality.) He deals nicely with the many euphemisms historians use for a sort of "disguised" causality, and, indeed, it seems to me that causality (no matter what it is called) is a sine qua non of any historical writing whatever. On p.177 we encounter the "fallacy of identity" - the idea that a cause must resemble its effect. Here again he seems unaware of philosophy entirely. This is of course a classic principle. But Fischer is talking about a different idea, which is indeed fallacious, namely the idea that a big cause must have a big effect, and the converse. Oddly, for Fischer, the opposite of reductionism is not emergentism, but "indiscriminate pluralism" ( p 175) - i.e., too many causes.Fischer also seems to have no conception of metaphysics, and thinks that an infinite variety of logics are possible on the same footing (pp. 263-264). He seems not to realize that "Western" logic has undergone various modifications of the same principles with which it began. Fischer himself, then, can be accused of relativism here and there, though he cites it as a fallacy or at least as wrong-headed.Fischer is himself fallacious at one point, the fallacy involved being perhaps included somewhere under his categories (though I did not find it): it consists in regarding an

I've read this book cover to cover once and dipped into it on average once a month over the ten years since I first found it. It sits on my shelf with my other "correctives", such as Orwell's "Politics and the English Language". Fischer makes the same points about rhetoric as Orwell at greater length and with far more wit. But, Orwell is the better writer.Yes, as one reviewer says, Fischer rants a bit, but amusingly and with dead-on quotations from his victims. One will think twice about the errors Fischer cites, if for no other reason than to avoid Fischer's next edition.Fischer is quite even handed. The first felon he cites was a professor of mine -- and Fischer's -- as an undergraduate. A more generous critic and historian -- and human being -- one won't find. But there he is.I cannot think of a better gift for anyone who takes persuasive prose seriously. No writer should be without it.

This is a classic that should be read by anyone interested in history. Fischer has created a typology of the kinds of errors historians make. He explains each clearly and entertainingly, drawing on examples from the works of eminent historians. I wonder if other historians still speak with him. If you like books on clear thinking, this one is a must for you. It can help anyone think and write more clearly.