The Grand Strategy of Philip II

"The Grand Strategy of Philip II" is a rare book. On the one hand, it is a convincing scholarly reassessment of Spanish imperial policy during the pivotal late 16th century. In that sense, the book is written to the high standards of the academy: exhaustive primary research - much of it in the original Spanish, Latin, Italian and French - and close consideration of competing theories from previous, notable works on the period. On the other hand, the book is an exemplary work of modern strategic studies, with a dash of business school case study analysis. This is a piece of academic history that cites such distinguished and diverse authorities as Peter Drucker, Carl von Clausewitz and John Lewis Gaddis and uses a broad range of historical analogies - from the Vietnam War, the Second World War and the US Civil War - to illuminate and contrast critical points. The end result is one of the more compelling works on strategy written in the past few decades. Geoffrey Parker very much wrote this book in response to Paul Kennedy's poor treatment of Philip II and the decline of the Spanish empire in Kennedy's enormously popular and influential 1987 book "The rise and fall of the Great Powers." On the surface, Parker seeks to refute the conventional academic wisdom that Philip II had no grand strategy in any sense of the term. While the issue of "grand strategy" is discussed throughout, the book really revolves around Philip's planned 1588 invasion of England, which featured the legendary Spanish Armada and ended in utter catastrophe before it really began. The book is broken into three more-or-less equal components. The first section offers a fascinating overview of the world Philip lived in and the unmanageable world of paperwork and decision-making that he created for himself. Parker is none too kind to Philip in this book. Most of the challenges and failures of Philip's half-century reign Parker attributes to Philip's insistence on the centralization and compartmentalization of all information and decision-making (Parker openly compares his style and system to that of Hitler). Parker suggests that if Philip had been born 500 years later in similarly privileged circumstances, he might have been an awful CEO of a family-owned business. One of his great faults, in Parker's estimation, was his "zero-defects mentality" - the fear of failure that so dominated his actions that it paralyzed his ability to act on anything but certain knowledge. Parker describes stunning scenes of Philip working 18-hours-a-day like some Wall Street attorney, hunched over a mountain of papers and embroiled in the most arcane details of imperial appointments and financial management (of which he had little understanding). Much has been made of the long time it took for messages to travel from place to place in the 16th century. Parker argues that it was more the uncertainty of communications that presented the truly vexing problem of the age, not necessarily the

The author weaves this chapter in Spanish history with ease. The result is very impressive. Comparisons to other periods in history prove very enlightening, especially those related to the follies of micromanagement.

This very good book is an examination of Philip II's methods of foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, this is a detailed look at the governance methods of the most powerful monarch of the early modern period and is illuminating on how states and monarchs functioned during this period. This detailed examination is possible because of the extensive documentation surviving from much of Philip's reign including a huge amount of his personal correspondence and own state papers. Parker is a leading expert on Philip and early modern Europe and a good writer. Philip emerges as a man with many admirable features, in some respects, a model King. Clearly intelligent and well educated, he was remarkably diligent, spending many hours per day engaged in state business and was very conscientious about his responsibilities. While his work capacity and attention waned in his later years, he was able to sustain a prodigious work load over a period of decades. If there can be said to be a heroic bureaucrat, it was Philip. Given the huge extent of the world wide empire he inherited and the wide array of challenges he faced with a relatively primitive supporting bureacracy and poor communications technologies, Philip did surprisingly well. There were, however, significant limitations, some structural, some a function of Philip's personality. The enormous diversity of the empire creates a huge variety of problems, and policies useful for on part of the empire could be destructive for other parts of the empire. The relatively primitive administrative apparatus made these conflicts difficult to reconcile. This system demanded an active and hard working autocrat at the center and while Philip did well in this role, it was simply not humanly possible for one man to shoulder the burdens he assumed. As Parker makes clear, many of Philip's problems were inherent in the nature of monarchy in early modern Europe, though of greater magnitude because of the scope of the empire. Philip's personality added additional significant problems. Philip, like many autocrats, was a micromanager who had difficulty in discriminating when to delegate and when to be personally involved. This often led to inefficient formulation and execution of policy. He was also intensely pious. His dedication to orthodox Catholicism led him to policies that were sometimes counter to the pragmatic interests of the empire. This is certainly true of his failure to deal successfully with Protestantism in the Netherlands and the Dutch Revolt. His faith also led him to the conclusion that when things were uncertain, divine providence would somehow provide. This religous assurance was probably personally comforting but didn't help the Armada overcome key tactical obstacles during the attempted conquest of England. Parker provides some comparative perspective by comparing Philip to other contemporary monarchs, particularly Elizabeth I of England. He also tries to develop a more g

Geoffrey Parker's study of Philip II is a landmark. In this penetrating analysis, Parker has successfully distilled and tied together four decades of modern scholarship on strategy, decision making, and organization theory with an original evaluation of Philip of Spain's motivations, priorities, and execution. Gone are the nationalistic generalizations and the structural excuses. Structural and institutional factors get coverage, but the real story is in the man at the top, who had to make the decisions, good and bad.Parker starts with a discussion on the strategic culture surrounding Philip, to include his "strategic inheritence" from his father, Charles V, the massive information network over which Philip presided (and the irresistable temptation to micro-manage), and the 'messianic imperialism' context that was of Philip's own making.Messianic imperialism is the backbone for the rest of the book, which deals with the formation and the execution of grand strategy. Parker clearly evaluates Philip's strategy v. the Dutch and the English. For reasons that he explained early in his preface, the Mediterranean theater gets shorter coverage, but it is clear that the Med. concerns were never far from Philip's mind. The French Huguenots also don't get as detailed treatment as they could have gotten, but Parker's summation of the results of Philip's policy towards France is still satisfying.Parker makes many allusions to strategic and policy issues of the recent past, and it is clear that Philip's problems were not all the different in scope, if not in scale, than those faced by political and military leaders today. Philip's inability to discipline himself to focus on one event to see it through to completion, his inabiltiy to keep himself from micromanaging decisions from over 600 miles away, and his inability to see past his divine mission to perceive reality will all strike familiar chords.Bottom line: Great history, great interpretation, great analysis. It has got to be a classic in the field.

Some people still insist military tactics apply to business. Once I took a public relations course, and our textbook was Clausewitz's treaty on war. If you want to avoid mistakes, to design a sound and practical strategy for whatever your business, then read Geoffrey Parker. In this book, Philip II is judged through the lenses of planning, and most importantly, of results and achievements. Why did Philip failed in his great enterprise? To make decisions is not only a matter of information -Philip was well informed of affairs- but of judgement, passion, and careful coordination with those who execute decisions.