Gallipoli

In every war between two coalitions of nations the military people are faced with a decision. Do they marshal all of their resources against the most powerful of the enemy coalition, knowing that if they can defeat that nation, the others will quickly fall as well? Or do they adopt a holding strategy against the strongest and attack the weakest, hoping to knock it out, dealing a psychological blow to the enemy coalition and perhaps turn the defeated nation against their former ally? Winston Churchill was an adamant believer in attacking the weakest member of the coalition. In the Second World War he constantly repeated his strategy of attacking the "soft underbelly" of the Axis, lobbying for an attack against Italy and in the Balkans. However, while that attack did knock Italy out of the war and turn it against Germany, the Allied movements up the Italian peninsula were a brutal slog and in many ways harder going than in Western Europe. Churchill's belief was not new to him; he had advocated the same strategy in World War I where he pressed the idea of an Entente attack against Turkey to open the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles. That battle is known to history as Gallipoli and it was controversial from the beginning. However, in this case Churchill was most probably right. Had the Entente attack been pressed strongly from the beginning, or if the Entente forces had been lucky enough to have the Turk officer Kemal elsewhere at a critical time, the Entente forces would have been victorious. Such a victory would have opened the straits to Russian shipping, propped up the Russians, kept Bulgaria out of the war on the side of the Central Powers and perhaps even brought it in against Turkey and brought Greece firmly in on the side of the Entente. Unfortunately, the attack was a terrible failure, after fighting aimlessly but with great ferocity for nearly two years, the Entente forces were removed from Gallipoli. This book chronicles all the "what might have been" scenarios that could have happened as a consequence of the Gallipoli campaign. Of all the "sideshow" battles that took place, it is probably the only one that could have made a real difference in the outcome of the war. In reading this book, you cannot help but feel for the plight of the common soldier in this campaign. After the battle degenerated into a stalemate, the soldiers could do nothing more than try to survive to the next day. The deprivations and constant shelling meant that they had little in the way of resources and could be wounded or killed at any moment. Furthermore, it was another case of the leadership putting the soldiers into a position where they could not possibly win yet not having the courage to acknowledge it and then doing something quickly. While the soldiers were eventually evacuated, it took many political deaths and machinations before it happened.

Anything Moorehead wrote was golden, but this is arguably one of his best books. This has been reissued numerous times and it remains a classic. It is particularly good in its description of of the initial naval campaign and the general strategic overview. Although Gallipoli has rightly served as the emblematic battle where it is popularly thought that ANZACS were unduly sacrificed by the British in attempts at vainglory, Moorehead would be the first to acknowledge that there is no evidence that Australians were selected for slaughter over any other troops. The British (and most World War I strategist from all nations) were equal opportunity killers. In reality there were many more British troops committed, and killed, than ANZAC troops, and French losses were also considerable. Moreover the strategic aims were laudable. They were very nearly achieved. The bungling was not in the design, but in the fact that it was allowed to continue long after the jig was up, the British contained on the Penninsula, without a faint hope of forcing the straits with naval power. Moorehead, although an Australian, never bashes the British at all in this book. His exposition of Sir Ian Hamilton is also very incisive and offers a real glimpse into the mind of this man (a commander who felt for his troops, more than most in WWI) The fact that he was sacked, never to wield command in the field, is also testament to the fact that mistakes were made. Churchill's role is less clear. His initial idea was brilliant. He also did not want to commit land troops, thinking it too costly. He believed that the Royal Navy and her allies could force the straits and be shelling Constantinople within days.... And they very nearly did it. Unfortunately as Moorehead recounts, the political pressure of losing large, expensive battleships to mines was a price the British Cabinet would not allow Churchill to indulge and the pressure for a land based campaign therefore rose. It is really a pity because Churchill wanted one more chance to force the straits from the sea. There is every indication that he would have been successful and the costly land war averted. Plus ca change for Churchill. PS: The cover photograph in this edition actually shows Canadian troops going over the top in a latter Somme Battle. Seems they could have easily found some original British or French pictures from Gallipoli itself??! I guess cover art was more important.

I first read this text at age 19 in 1960 and was most impressed with its narrative skill and ability to bring to life the historical characters involved. I have since reread it and remain satisfied with Mr Moorehead's ability to make the events vivid and touching. I was especially impressed with his re-enactment of the actual landing, the incredible amount of equipment the youngsters had to carry, the reason the ships remained so distant from shore (afraid of touching bottom)the sense of distance those in charge had from the events they were supposed to be controlling, and the tragic sadness of it all. I was also impressed with the amazing courage he described the Turks as having so that the reader is not given the impression that the allies were just "better chaps" than the "Turkish infidel". Now at the close of the fifties in racist Australia at the time of communist and Asian indeed foreign paranoia this was refreshing and somewhat liberal to a young mind. One of the best and most enjoyable reads on World War One.

Alan Moorehead's Gallipoli was the book that lead to the famous Australian movie. The book deals really well with all aspects of the campaign, from the British/ANZAC/French point of view to the Turkish/German viewpoint. It is an entertaining read and despite this really brings home some of the unique horror and heroism of this battle both on the peninsula and at sea. There were some omissions but that is not surprising considering the scope of the book. I thoroughly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in not only the battle but in the Great War as well.