From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War

Absolutely fascinating! Mr. Gates is an excellent writer and is able to make complicated information easy to follow. And what an insight he gave to the Presidents he worked for; he didn't have an axe to grind with any of them, even though they represented both political parties. This is a book I enjoyed so completely that I hated to reach the end of it. It will be on my personal "re-read" list. No wonder Mr. Gates was selected to become Secretary of Defense in our nation's hour of need.

Rarely do you run across a historical book that is so chocked full of names, dates and acronyms that engages your mind as you push to reader faster. Gates delivers great insight wrapped in words that are illustrative of the push and pull of power players - within and between government bodies - domestic and global. If you are curious about the claims of one party or the other concerning the end of the Cold War, then this book will prove to be enlightening. All contributed to the demise, but perhaps none more than the Soviets themselves. Great read. Engaging. Insightful. Illuminating. Perhaps now more than ever before this a read that helps look at the challenges we, as a global community, face today. Buy it. Read it. Gain perspective.

The CIA is probably the one institution that the US President controls the most; or so this book argues. Robert M. Gates spent over two decades working at the CIA, and is one of the few career officials who came in near the bottom and rose all the way to the top. This book is his memoir, and recollection of how the CIA served 5 consecutive presidents in the Cold War. Starting with Richard Nixon, and ending with the first George Bush, Gates shows how each president used, and sometimes abused, the CIA to further their policies with regard to the USSR and communist parties around the world. The major points one gets from this book are as follows. First, Carter was no wimp with regard to the USSR. Second, the most dangerous years of the Cold War did not end with Vietnam; they included some years in the 1980's. Third, the CIA consistently disregards the laws of the US. Fourth, the CIA often gets suckered into doing thing at the whim of the president that it later regrets. Last, the first George Bush was probably one of the best diplomats the US has seen in recent times. Over all, this was a very good book and I am glad I read it.

Mr Gates' background in writing intelligence analysis is very apparent in his book, which covers the role of intelligence on policy and the figures that carried out the policy, from President Nixon to Bush Sr. Stylistically, ideas are introduced, expanded upon, and brought back together in sum and reflection in efficient essay form, yet in, one senses, what epitomizes intelligence directorate reporting at Langley. As such the recounting can be understandably dry (albeit with ready humor), but these ARE renderings of historical events; when I was patient, I found that his clarity and humility make the work readable and insightful. The DC cocktail crowd no doubt received ample fuel from Mr Gates' (decidedly fair) renderings of George Schultz and William Casey, both of whom Mr Gates spent much time with during the Reagan years. Other character sketches elucidate and emphasize Mr Gates' opinions about other high-ranking individuals in the various administrations, but his everyman-ish voice is an able mediator among the personalities.The retelling of some events where Mr Gates plays up his role or access get a bit tedious; for example, when he and Larry Eagleburger hit the European circuit to sell arms reductions (somewhat to the effect of "we went to London, then Rome, then Bonn, then Amsterdam")-likewise, when Mr Gates would accompany other advisers and President Bush to Kennebunkport, and almost any private meetings Mr Gates would have with President Bush.Mr Gates' own conservative bent comes through in several places, but most succinctly in his concluding remarks about the Soviet Union's demise. Here Mr Gates writes of a Soviet role in terrorist activity, yet a US role in aiding freedom fighters, which only extends a pervasive double standard in US government foreign policy. Of course Mr Gates' worked on a day-to-day basis to limit the Soviets' opportunities, and of course US hegemony is all the greater for it, but zeal can sometimes be confused for rationale: certainly the US has carried out its own "terrorist" activities, many through the CIA itself, and recent uncoverings of Kissinger's strong hand in Latin America are evidence of more glib and (many believe) illegal workings by the US executive branch.Mr Gates has personally intrigued me since I read an article on him around the time of his confirmation as DCI in 1991. The article told of his early job as a bus driver, teaching Russian phrases to community riders, and his reference to many of the Easterners among the DC establishment ranks as "guys with last names as first names." Such an endearing portrait of himself is difficult to find in his narrative and made me a bit disappointed he didn't talk more about graduate school and Russian studies years, especially as the Sovietology schools were evolving in the 1960s, yet such topics would admittedly digress from the book's theme.Aside from its occasional name-dropping and some opportune flag waving, Mr Gates' memoir is evenly told and

Bob Gates is the only person to begin working at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a low-level analyst and then rise to the position of Director of Central Intelligence. His career spans over six presidential administrations. He worked in the National Security Council staff at the White House during the administrations of four Presidents. He offers a comprehensive, unique, and insightful look into the role of national intelligence and the continuity it brought to national policy in spite of the different Presidents and their distinct personalities. His book is essential reading for all intelligence professionals. The book is not an historical account of the CIA, but, rather, a personal account of the intricate personal relationships between national policymakers and national intelligence analysts during the Cold War. This is a story of how intelligence contributed to stabilizing national policy and ensured its continuity, at least with respect to the Soviet Union, from one administration to the next. Due to the author's deference to his former superiors, important lessons are hidden in the subtlety of his words; it is incumbent on the reader to find them. Gates also offers his own evaluation of recent Presidents and their advisors.